CONFRONTING THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Report of the Commission on GLOBAL SECURITY, JUSTICE & GOVERNANCE

June 2015
The Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance is supported by The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center.

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Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance

June 2015

Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance
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Foreword

In our lifetimes, we have witnessed unparalleled human achievements: the halving of extreme global poverty in under two decades, the exploration of space and the rise of the Internet, and the steady advance of freedom and justice following the defeat of fascism and other forms of totalitarian government in the twentieth century, to name a few of the most notable examples. At the same time, we are keenly aware of the shadows that threaten our progress: militant extremism continues to take root in the world’s poorly governed spaces, where the rule of law has collapsed, and discrimination threatens the rights of women, children, and minorities in many places. Our fragile ecosystem, new threats in cyberspace, and the downside risks of an increasingly interconnected world economy also remind us daily that we need a new approach to global governance, one that relies on different kinds of public and private institutions.

We feel privileged to have co-chaired the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance since initial work began one year ago. An initiative of The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, the Commission has sought to address several serious global challenges at the intersection of security and justice, including critical questions of state fragility, climate governance, and the stewardship of the world economy and cyberspace. Without bold, effective, and inclusive global governance that also safeguards fundamental human rights, the hard-fought gains of earlier generations may be lost and the extraordinary potential of future generations jeopardized.

The recommendations of the Commission are intended, in this seventieth anniversary year of the United Nations, to encourage a broad-based global policy dialogue and an institutional reform agenda aimed at 2020, the seventy-fifth anniversary commemoration of the founding of the United Nations. We invite potential partners from around the world—in governments, civil society organizations, the private sector, media, and international organizations—to help build and sustain a coalition for progressive global change, in pursuit of a vision of justice and security for all.

We wish to express our appreciation for the ideas and commitment toward achieving a more just and secure world shared by our fellow Commissioners, to Abiodun Williams (president of The Hague Institute for Global Justice) and to Ellen Laipson (president of the Stimson Center), to the project team, and to everyone consulted in the preparation of this Report on Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance. We continue to believe in institutions at both local and global levels that inspire and engage the talents of many, and we must work relentlessly to make all such institutions fulfill that vision.

Madeleine K. Albright                   Ibrahim A. Gambari
Co-Chairs, Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance
Members of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance

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Abiodun Williams (President, The Hague Institute for Global Justice)

For more details on each of the Commissioners, please visit:
www.globalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/about/meet-the-commissioners/
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACUNS</td>
<td>Academic Council on the United Nations System</td>
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<td>AdJuST</td>
<td>Advocating Justice and Security Together</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEOI</td>
<td>Automatic Exchange of Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>AML/CFT</td>
<td>anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism</td>
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<td>AMR</td>
<td>Annual Ministerial Reviews</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Brazil, South Africa, India, and China</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>Bank for International Settlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, and China</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Climate Action Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBDR</td>
<td>common but differentiated responsibilities</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Carbon Disclosure Project</td>
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<td>CER</td>
<td>Certified Emissions Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERT</td>
<td>Computer Emergency Response Team</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>Cyber Fusion Centre</td>
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<td>CHR</td>
<td>Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>CICC</td>
<td>Coalition for the International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>(UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOCO</td>
<td>(UN) Development Operations Coordination Office</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>(UN) Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>environmentally sound technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERU</td>
<td>emissions reduction unit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>FSB</td>
<td>Financial Stability Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>g7+</td>
<td>group of fragile and conflict affected states</td>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of 20</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Conference on CyberSpace</td>
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<td>GCF</td>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
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<td>GCIG</td>
<td>Global Commission on Internet Governance</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GGE</td>
<td>Group of Governmental Experts</td>
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<td>GGGI</td>
<td>Global Green Growth Initiative</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>greenhouse gas</td>
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<td>GPC</td>
<td>Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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REDD UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
ROL rule of law
RPT Reform Through Parallel Tracks
SCR (UN) Security Council Resolution
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SDR Special Drawing Right
SDSN Sustainable Development Solutions Network
SHD-net Sustainable Human Development Network
SLCP short-lived climate pollutants
SRM solar radiation management
TM technology mechanism
TNC transnational corporations
TRIPS trade-related intellectual property rights
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNASUR Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDG UN Development Group
UNDOCO UN Development Operations Coordination Office
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNDPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEP UN Environment Programme
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA UN General Assembly
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM UN Development Fund for Women
UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPN UN Parliamentary Network
UNPOL UN Police
UNSC UN Security Council
UN GGE UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security
UPR universal periodic review
US United States
WCGI World Conference on Global Institutions
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
Preface

Today’s global challenges, from mass violence in fragile states and runaway climate change to fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber attacks, require new kinds of tools, networks, and institutions if they are to be effectively managed. Climate change, economic shocks, and cyber attacks are likely to have lasting and far-reaching consequences, and the marked and visible increase in mass atrocities in one country after another has reversed the trend of declining political violence that began with the end of the Cold War.

Dealing with each of these issues calls for policies and actions beyond the writ or capabilities of any state and threatens to escape the grasp of present international institutions. Tackling them requires a simultaneous focus on security and justice through enhanced global governance. Despite past attempts at reform, an acute crisis of global governance casts a shadow over how traditional and emerging global actors build consensus and cooperate to solve problems in response to a vast array of new global risks and threats.

The lens of security and justice and the emphasis on finding solutions to governance challenges at multiple levels of human experience distinguish the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance and its Report and inform both the analysis and recommendations that follow. With the launch of this Report, a concerted effort will begin to promote these and related global governance innovations, looking toward and continuing through the UN’s seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020.

The launch of this Report takes place in an important year for discussions on the future of the global governance architecture. This year is the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations, to be commemorated at a summit scheduled for September in New York, and includes landmark events in all three priority areas of the Commission. In April 2015, the Global Conference on CyberSpace was convened in The Hague, stressing the Internet’s transformative influence on the global economy and underlining access to it as integral to the Post-2015 Development Agenda. As the centerpiece of this agenda, later this year, the successors of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—will be launched, setting priorities for global development policy through 2030.

The report of the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the forthcoming publication of a ten-year review of the UN Peacebuilding Commission will affect how the UN addresses political stability and peacebuilding issues in the decade to come. The year will close in December with the results of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris (COP 21) and a view to a comprehensive and legally binding agreement for effective action against this global threat. The findings and recommendations of the Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance seek to complement these discussions, their overall aim being to ensure that neither security nor justice imperatives are brushed aside in the many and often sector-specific debates and initiatives that will take place in 2015 and beyond.

Global governance reform offers no scarcity of opinions, views, and agendas. The Commission sought to draw on the best data and proposals available to inform and shape its recommendations. Inspiring and complementary initiatives include the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, the Future UN Development System Project, the Global Commission on Internet Governance, and the Independent Commission on Multilateralism.
This Report targets international policymakers and a concerned global public. The project’s main partner institutions, The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, are committed to tracking progress toward implementation of the Commission’s reform agenda and to encouraging broad-based coalitions of international actors to rally support, including for far-sighted and potentially controversial proposals. The Report and follow-on activities are complemented by background papers elaborating on particular themes addressed in the Report (and found on the Commission’s website), which will be compiled into a companion volume.

The Report has four parts:

Part I presents its underlying conceptual framework, defines key terms, and highlights the growing range of nonstate, substate, and regional actors that increasingly influence and participate in key elements of global governance.

Part II delves into the three substantive focus areas—state fragility and violent conflict, climate and people, and the hyperconnected global economy—noting challenges and opportunities and offering recommendations to fill gaps in policy or practice using innovative approaches to critical emerging issues.

Part III turns to the reform of existing global governance institutions. It draws on the needs and problems identified in Part II and how they might be better addressed. Part III also examines how new forms of collaboration with and among nonstate, substate, and regional actors may produce better governance results for all concerned.

Part IV turns to questions of follow-on work and the building of coalitions and partnerships to advocate for the implementation of the Report’s recommendations. Simply presenting the Commission’s proposals to world leaders and informed communities worldwide is not enough. They must be taken up in practice. The Report therefore concludes with a call to action to mobilize support and implement the recommended reform program on or before the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

The Commission, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, and the Stimson Center would like to express their gratitude to everyone consulted for this project, whether as a peer reviewer or a background paper author, interviewee, or member of an experts’ discussion. They also wish to thank all institutions that contributed ideas, time, and resources.

The Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance was established to initiate and sustain a policy dialogue on innovations toward a global governance architecture commensurate to today’s transnational challenges. The contribution of each Commissioner to this Report was made in a personal capacity and should not be attributed to any other institution. The Commissioners approve the overall conclusions of this Report but not necessarily every statement in it. This Report follows from extensive research, more than twenty in-person and online consultations with global governance experts, and in-depth deliberations by the Commissioners.

The Hague and Washington, DC, June 2015
Executive Summary

Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance

Humanity today faces a growing range of global problems that require urgent attention—from the multiple wars and terrorist attacks fueled by violent extremism, repression by autocratic regimes, and conflicts in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Greater Middle East, and elsewhere, to the growing global dangers posed by climate change, economic shocks rippling through closely coupled economies, and increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. These interconnected issues cannot be dealt with effectively by any one state or group of states; we unavoidably share responsibility for one another’s security. Yet meeting these challenges, which undermine human security, human development, and human rights, also exceeds the operational and political capacities of global governance institutions created in the mid-twentieth century for critical but different purposes.

We live in a convergent era. Growing global connectivity, in particular, both enables forces of disorder and opens new opportunities to tackle centuries-old afflictions, such as global poverty, gender discrimination, and the spread of disease. For these and more recent issues like environmental degradation, 2015 is a convergent year. Powerful technologies and the intensified movement of people, goods, services, and capital associated with today’s hyperconnected global economy provide new ways to advance the Sustainable Development Goals for 2015–2030 to be launched this September by world leaders at the United Nations. The December UNFCCC conference in Paris offers a critical opportunity to deliver on the agenda for combating climate change, and management of the Internet may soon be profoundly changed as well. The UN is also rethinking how it does conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, and there remains contentious debate about how best to promote human rights and the international rule of law. In short, 2015 represents a watershed year, with the potential to cross a threshold into a new era in global governance and human experience. This Report engages that prospect with the breadth that it deserves.

The Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance offers pragmatic reforms using new tools and networks to build better global institutions and a new global ethic, with the aim of focusing policymakers, opinion leaders, and international civil society on the need for more dynamic and creative global solutions to looming global challenges. Responding to new threats and opportunities requires that we overcome the deep-seated divisions driving the present crisis of global governance, which will take time. With the launch of this Report, a concerted effort will begin to promote these and related global governance innovations, looking toward and continuing through the UN’s seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020.
The intersection of justice and security—or just security—is critical to understanding and tackling today’s global governance threats and challenges.*

Justice, including through the rule of law, is essential to safeguarding human security at the personal and communal level. Conversely, a just society is an illusion without security. Analyzing key global challenges through the prism of just security highlights both acute tensions and potential complementarities to be, in the first case, recognized and in the second, managed or reinforced. It lends fresh insights and greater urgency to tackling often intractable problems across and within borders.

The goal of just security is to forge a mutually supportive global system of accountable, fair, and effective governance and sustainable peace. This vision is rooted in long-standing international commitments to human rights, international law, and the critical role of flexible and evolving multilateral institutions, states, and nonstate actors in global governance. Beyond the United Nations and other global institutions, a growing number of regional organizations, including the African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, and the Union of South American Nations, are shaping global trends. Equally important are civil society, the business community, municipalities, and the media, each offering unique perspectives and assets and varying in size and reach. These increasingly global actors can work together in a network approach to governance toward inclusive and innovative solutions to some of the world’s most complex and pressing global issues.

Three major challenges and opportunities for global governance are fragile and conflict-affected environments, climate and people, and the hyperconnected global economy.

First, in fragile states and regions, large gaps in security, justice, and governance are readily identified but hard to fill. Despite a surge of UN peacekeeping and stability operations begun at the turn of the millennium, coping with state fragility and violent conflict remains as complicated and costly as ever, and billions of US dollars are spent annually in the quest for sustainable peace. Multiple, concurrent, and recurring intrastate conflicts, exploited by international terrorist and criminal organizations, have reversed the declining trends in political violence witnessed since the end of the Cold War. In 2014 alone, the number of refugees increased by 2.1 million to record levels, and the number of persons internally displaced by armed conflict grew by 5.2 million, another unfortunate record. At the same time, the growing roles of women, civil society organizations, and businesses, whose voices are amplified through modern communications technologies, offer new opportunities for effective peacebuilding, governance renewal, and transformational justice. Responding to these threats, challenges, and opportunities, the Commission’s recommendations include:†

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* Just security in the five other official UN languages translates as follows: Arabic: أمن العدالة; Chinese: 公正安全; French, sécurité just; Russian, безопасность по справедливости; and Spanish, seguridad justa. For elaboration of the concept, see pp. 12-14.

† Each of these reform proposals is elaborated upon—including their justification (for example, how they enhance the interplay of security and justice in global governance), chief features, and keys to progress—in the Report. A list of the Commission’s recommendations may be found in the Summary of Recommendations (pp. 114-117).
• **Create next-generation UN conflict mediation and peace operations capacity**: build responsive capacity to provide experienced mediators, including a greater proportion of women, for crisis and conflict prevention and peacebuilding; build capacity to deploy civilian, police, and military personnel to meet urgent peacekeeping requirements; build a new cadre of experienced personnel to serve as Heads of Mission and members of mission senior management teams; beyond transitional justice, invest in transformational justice; and coordinate activities closely with and materially support regional actors and local civil society, with particular attention to inclusion of women in peace processes.

• **Strengthen the Responsibility to Prevent, Protect, and Rebuild**: invest in early-warning capabilities and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) action plans for an approach to atrocities prevention that involves all UN agencies and programs; embed UN mission monitors in all forces participating in R2P implementation; and set concrete, achievable goals for all international actors seeking to prevent, react to, and rebuild after mass atrocities.

Second, with each successive report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the need to take extraordinary and decisive action addressing the causes and impact of climate change becomes more evident and urgent, as does the need for new, more productive approaches to meeting climate challenges, including greater public–private collaboration. A steady rise in emissions of greenhouse gases globally is heating the atmosphere and the oceans, melting polar and glacial ice, and raising sea levels and ocean acidity to the detriment of sea life and human security alike. The changing climate strikes hardest at those with the least capacity to adapt, other than to move. The IPCC projects the number of climate change refugees at 100 million in 2025 and 150 million in 2050. Humanity’s impact on the global climate is ever more clear, but its response has yet to address the deep injustices created by too little adaptation support for such vulnerable populations. As the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) look toward the Twenty-First Conference of the Parties in Paris, many are hopeful that a binding climate agreement can emerge, but others are also concerned that it will remain elusive. Mitigating and adapting to climate change globally may well require a new understanding of what constitutes security and justice in the twenty-first century. Responding resolutely yet creatively to this quintessential global governance challenge, the Commission makes the following major recommendations:

• **Innovate climate governance**: facilitate new kinds of engagement between the UNFCCC and other international regimes, subnational authorities, and civil society and business groups; establish an International Carbon Monitoring Entity, a Global Climate Action Clearinghouse, and a Climate Engineering Advisory Board to review all experiments involving atmospheric modification; and define a global goal for climate adaption comparable to the 2 degrees Centigrade atmospheric warming target set for climate change mitigation.

• **Develop a green technology licensing facility within the Green Climate Fund**: harness private–sector innovation for climate mitigation and adaptation, especially in support of vulnerable populations in developing countries.

Third, economic and technological globalization have created a hyperconnected global economy with significant benefits for many but worsened economic inequalities for others, as well as new threats to global economic stability and to public, corporate, and personal security. The US financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 spread throughout the global financial system, caused bank losses of more than US$4.1 trillion, and drove global unemployment up by thirty million. National and regional
economies remain vulnerable to capital flight, billions of US dollars-equivalent are lost annually to illicit financial flows, and connectivity facilitates novel kinds of crime, espionage, and intellectual property and natural resource theft. But three billion people (and climbing) can access the Internet, contributing—along with other means of modern communication—to an explosive growth in global trade. Expanding access to new technologies and participation in the global economy has the potential to lift tens of millions of people out of abject poverty and to advance the Post-2015 Development Agenda, creating a more secure and just world. In response to these inherent risks and opportunities, the Commission offers the following recommendations:

- **Establish a G20+ within a new framework for global economic cooperation to avert financial shocks and deliver on the Post-2015 Development Agenda**: enhance G20-UN-Bretton Woods institutional coordination to prevent the spread of cross-border financial shocks, promote inclusive economic reform, and foster the equitable growth necessary for achieving the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals.

- **Develop a global network of cybercrime centers and increase Internet access in the Global South through enhanced capacity-building**: bolster the global response to cyber attacks through INTERPOL and national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and increase Internet access and cybersecurity in the Global South through multiple initiatives, including the International Telecommunications Union’s Connect 2020 Agenda and the promotion of cyber hygiene.

A practical and integrated reform approach, underscoring and closely linking security and justice concerns, enables progress on all three global issues, as well as a better appreciation for key cross-cutting issues such as gender, migration, and anticorruption. When managed effectively, the hyperconnected global economy provides tools that can empower international and local responses to the special needs of fragile and conflict-affected environments. So can new communications technologies and the Big Data revolution help to unleash human creativity and collective action for addressing the climate crisis. At the same time, our small, dense, interconnected world cannot prosper if more than a billion inhabitants fail to cross a basic threshold for a safe, dignified life, or if rising sea levels, extreme drought, powerful floods and storm surges, trafficking gangs, and networks of violent extremists threaten the security, well-being, and survival of millions.

**A coherent set of global governance reforms to better promote just security requires innovating and streamlining global institutions and engaging critical regional organizations, local authorities, the business community, and civil society across generations more effectively.** Repeated failures to reform within the UN and other entities deepen the global governance crisis with implications for security and justice. Advancing progress requires a strong grasp of the impediments to previous reform efforts. In particular, these include: (i) a lack of political will to change, particularly among powerful countries or within entrenched bureaucracies; (ii) poor design and advocacy for a specific policy or institutional reform; and (iii) limited skill and effort invested in sustaining a reform program through to completion.

By helping mobilize pressure for global (intergovernmental) institutional reforms while serving as resourceful partners for global institutions with fresh perspectives, nonstate, regional, and local actors are an integral part of still nascent network governance. To succeed in the twenty-first century, the United Nations and other global institutions must extend their traditional convening role for Member States to include innovative ways to engage these increasingly influential actors. Seizing the opportunities for improved global governance, though cognizant of the risks and challenges to reform, the Commission makes the following recommendations:
• **Establish the UN Global Partnership:** give a greater voice to underrepresented policy issues, such as women’s rights, migration, and training a modern workforce, through new social compacts and a new hub and online platform whereby the entire UN system can tap into the expertise of civil society and the business community.

• **Expand UN Security Council membership and nontraditional engagement:** create more opportunities for countries, regional organizations, local authorities, and nonstate actors to contribute to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, while increasing the Council’s representative legitimacy and restraint in the use of the veto.

• **Establish a UN Peacebuilding Council:** transform the Peacebuilding Commission into a Council—similar to the Human Rights Commission’s transformation in 2005—with new coordination authorities, new financial and knowledge resources, and a new focus on prevention, including “peacebuilding audits.”

• **Strengthen and more fully use the International Court of Justice:** expand acceptance of the World Court’s jurisdiction and make use of its authoritative advisory opinions in innovative ways.

• **Enhance the working relations between the UN Security Council, International Criminal Court, and UN Human Rights Council:** support sustained dialogue, sanctions to enforce judgments and arrest warrants, and leverage the Human Rights Up Front initiative’s system-wide conflict analysis and recommended early actions in response to large-scale human rights abuses.

• **Launch the UN Parliamentary Network:** establish a parliamentary advisory body for the UN General Assembly to raise greater awareness and participation in UN governance, consistent with other networks in place for the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and regional organizations.

**An effective strategy for reform requires smart coalitions of like-minded states and nonstate actors to mobilize and sustain support for change.** The ideas, networks, resources, and leadership skills of all actors with something to contribute need to be assessed, cultivated, and harnessed at the earliest stage of initiatives to reform global governance, including from governments, civil society groups, the business community, regional organizations, and local authorities. Three examples emblematic of these features are the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, and the international effort to adopt R2P as a global norm.

Clear interim milestones, backed up by well-honed communications, monitoring, and coordination tools, are also important to success. In particular, the Commission recommends investing in a hybrid approach that taps into the strengths of two major avenues to global governance reform designed to overcome deep-seated divisions in the international community:

• **Reform Through Parallel Tracks** acknowledges that different kinds of multilateral reform negotiations will require different negotiating forums and will proceed at different speeds. In doing so, it can facilitate a careful sequencing of reforms based on criteria such as urgency, political feasibility, and cost.
• Marking the UN’s seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020 with the culmination of a multi-stakeholder and formal multilateral negotiation on global institutional reforms, a World Conference on Global Institutions could serve as a rallying point for smart coalitions and simultaneously generate political momentum for multiple, urgent global reforms. Every effort should be made to engage the voices and ideas of civil society at the most local level, as well as under-represented groups, in the lead-up to the World Conference.

When security and justice are recognized as jointly pivotal to global governance, today's most urgent challenges can be overcome. Just security can inform a practical reform program that innovates our global institutions, laws, policy tools, and relationships. Leaders from all countries, including from powerful states and emerging global actors, have a particular responsibility to ensure that the United Nations and other global institutions continue to inspire, safeguard human rights, and give even the most vulnerable people a reason for hope. Guaranteeing security and justice for all peoples and nations is the practical and moral imperative of our time. Just security is intended to enable humanity not only to survive but to thrive with dignity, offering the basis for a new global ethic and new direction for global governance.
I. Just Security and the Crisis of Global Governance
The words *just* and *secure* do not aptly describe the world today. *Global governance*, a term coined two decades ago to connote hope for effective responses to global problems through collaborative international action, today finds itself in crisis. From North Africa and the Middle East to South Sudan, Ukraine, and Afghanistan, the past several years have seen a marked uptick in political violence within states, reversing the trend of reduced political violence recorded since the end of the Cold War, as shown by the *Global Peace Index 2014*. A changing global climate promises to affect all states and the livelihoods of tens of millions of people in deeply damaging ways, even as the immense benefits of increasing cyber-connectivity in today’s global economy and social networks are mirrored by equally immense risks. Although these are scarcely the only challenges humankind faces, and everyone does not experience their impact in the same way, they have repercussions for all and illustrate what is at stake in contemporary global governance.

This part of the Report consists of three sections. Section 1 summarizes key challenges to global governance. Anchored around the notion of just security, Section 2 presents the conceptual framework that underlies the Commission’s approach to and recommendations for understanding these challenges. Section 3 identifies the principal nonstate, substate, and regional actors contributing to global governance reform and renewal and their roles in rapidly emerging “new social compacts” for public-private collaboration in solving critical socioeconomic problems at levels of governance from local to global.
1. Key Challenges to Global Governance

Fragile states—among the most impoverished and conflict-ridden in the world—struggle to maintain the rule of law and to offer basic security and justice to their citizens. States and peoples alike suffer when weak and corrupt governments appropriate national patrimonies for private ends, often in league with transnational criminal organizations. According to the UNHCR’s Global Trends 2013, more than fifty-one million people were forcibly displaced at the end of that year, most because of conflict, the highest number recorded since global statistics on displacement have been collected. Women’s equality also lags badly in fragile states, and female civilians suffer disproportionate harm in conflict-affected environments. Additionally, despite the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security in 2000, women remain acutely underrepresented in UN-brokered peace talks and peace implementation processes.

Two centuries of industrialization have affected the global climate markedly, and new annual emissions of greenhouse gases are deepening that impact. Rising sea levels threaten large coastal cities where growing numbers of persons are expected to migrate to escape more severe droughts and more frequent inland storms and floods in coming years that will reduce the yields of essential crops. Acidification of the oceans already threatens the livelihoods of millions around the globe who depend on the sea for their survival, and it will continue indefinitely. Coming decades may see growing numbers of economic migrants, most leaving rural for urban areas within their own countries, putting increased adaptive pressure on already straining cities where many new arrivals will live in rapidly expanding “informal housing” and find work mostly in the informal economy. Others will take the risk of emigrating—with or without official sanction—to wealthier parts of the world, subject to financial and physical exploitation by the smugglers and traffickers who facilitate such movements, especially at deep water crossings. Developed states have contended with illegal immigration for some decades already, but conflict, climate, and population growth will increase immigration pressures over time.

Today, 82 percent of the world’s 7.2 billion people live in the Global South. By mid-century, the world will be home to an estimated 9.6 billion people; 96 percent of the increase is expected to come from the Global South. Where girls and women have access to education and to reproductive health services, developing regions see a dramatic reduction in population increase and in maternal and child mortality, enabling women to participate in the labor market. Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other low- and middle-income regions on these critical socioeconomic indicators: primary school enrollment of girls (25 percent—some eighteen million—are not enrolled, according to the World Bank), maternal mortality (two to five times higher), and under-five child mortality (roughly double that of South Asia and four to five times higher than other developing regions). Although each of these statistics is better than in decades past, they suggest that many African governments are failing to provide the health and education services that African women and children need, acutely demonstrated by the Ebola pandemic of the past year. Africa is expected to experience the greatest gain in population of any region by mid-century, more than doubling to 2.4 billion—more if unmet demand for contraceptive services continues at present rates. Meeting the health, well-being, and employment needs of expanded populations will challenge governments that are already unable to provide basic services and economic opportunity for their citizens and often have little in the way of reserves to manage disaster.
Box 1.1 Is the UN Still “Fit for Purpose”?

The United Nations was established in 1945, with fifty-one Member States, to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Since then, its membership has grown to 193. During the decades of the Cold War, other institutions and alliances largely filled its war-preventing role, except for the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was entrusted to verify nuclear nonproliferation regimes. After the Cold War, the General Assembly played a key role in advancing the 1997 treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. (Its Technical Secretariat, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, collaborated with the UN to remove chemical weapons from Syria from 2013 to 2015.) In 2001, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 energized counterterrorism activities worldwide and created the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to monitor Member States’ compliance. Meanwhile, in 2004, Resolution 1540 banned the interstate movement of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related materials and prohibited their transfer to nonstate actors, in an action automatically binding on all UN Member States. A surge in UN peacekeeping and stability operations began at the turn of the century and continues at present: more than 130,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel deployed in eight complex operations on three continents, in addition to eight more traditional operations.

Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN has promoted human rights through the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the conventions on the prohibition of torture and on the equal rights of women, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and, in the last decade, the Human Rights Council. Security Council thematic resolutions have focused attention on women, peace, and security and on the protection of civilians in conflict. Although the rights records of many UN Member States remain poor, the number of electoral democracies has roughly doubled since 1985, to 125. This development has led some observers to highlight the comparative “democratic deficit” of international bodies governed by “one state, one vote” rules or by criteria of economic power or historical political power. Different criteria for membership or voting rights could increase organizational inclusiveness and legitimacy in addressing urgent global issues. At the same time, it would also require major structural reforms, possibly the replacement of some institutions, and very likely the participation of new stakeholders. Historically, such systemic changes have come about in the wake of major wars between globally powerful states. The threats facing humanity today and in years to come will be far more diffuse but no less serious.
Opportunity will depend on both nondiscriminatory terms of international trade and on effective and wide-ranging access to the hyperconnected global economy, including the Internet. Access to the Internet has been rising rapidly in all parts of the world, but use of basic mobile communications much more quickly. In most of the Global South, mobile phone penetration exceeded 100 percent (more than one phone per person) by 2013 and had reached 71 percent in South Asia and 66 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. Just 1 or 2 percent of those populations have landline phones. Growth in mobile connectivity over the last fifteen years has been explosive. Its impact has been correspondingly revolutionary for small business and banking, making up for missing infrastructure in faster, more flexible, and more accessible ways. Mobile broadband access is likely to similarly leapfrog wired broadband as smartphone access proliferates, but such growth will still require substantial deepening of infrastructure, given the much greater bandwidth requirements of the smartphone culture. High-income countries have nearly a thousand secure Internet servers per million people, whereas sub-Saharan Africa has only nine per million people and the Middle East and South Asia just five.6

Cyberspace is not a safe or secure space, as a check of any home router’s intercept log will quickly attest. A constant “solar wind” of snoopers and sniffers, hackers and hijackers, phishing expeditions, and data trawlers batters the router’s firewall and the backup security packages protecting one’s server, desktop, tablet or smartphone. Institutions are more challenging and lucrative targets than individuals, and offer the prospect of proprietary data or identity theft in wholesale lots. A single cyber attack in late 2014 stole banking data for more than seventy-six million households and seven million small businesses.7 At the same time, increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet by extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS) or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, draw new members to the Middle East and offer online instruction to alienated individuals who take up their cause remotely. The Internet and the social media it hosts, by offering access to ideas and information and ready channels for organizing dissent, can pose the threat of freedom to autocratic governments, whereas terrorist groups making use of it, and government responses to such use, may pose a threat to the freedom of open societies.

The ability of all societies to win the hearts and minds of up and coming generations will be undermined unless arguments for order, security, and stability also appreciate the social as well as the legal and political value of justice as a critical goal and component of public policy. As a moderating influence that acknowledges the essential value of human rights, a strong conception of justice applied to public policy can engage women and men of all generations in the quest for human dignity and for an inclusive, well-governed, and environmentally sustainable future in each of the critical issue areas this Report addresses.
2. The Conceptual Framework

This section lays out the conceptual framework that focused the Commission’s work, guided its deliberations, and underpins this Report. It begins by explaining how conceptualizing three critical spaces of human interaction informs the priority areas the Report emphasizes. It then both defines global governance as a form of network governance and the sorts of essential public goods global governance provides. Finally, it defines the critical concepts of security and justice. Their intersection in global governance is the vantage point for each issue area and from which the Report’s policy and institutional reform recommendations flow.

2.1 Defining Critical Spaces

Humanity lives and operates simultaneously in three spaces critical to contemporary life and governance: public, ecological, and transactional. Each is unique in form and function yet closely linked to and interactive with the others. Each of the issue areas addressed in the Report is a subset of one of these three spaces (see figure 2.1).

2.1.1 Political or public space (res publica)

Public space is the home of governance (formal and informal) and of rights-exercising groups and individuals enjoying areas maintained for common use. Together they debate public policy or further public purposes that may be matters of consensus or contention. Individuals operating in this space are protected when a state is functioning well and impartially, against assault, intimidation, and other forms of violence. A well-functioning civil society fully exercising its basic human rights is the backbone of a well-functioning state, and well-functioning states are the backbone of healthy global political and transactional spaces—the realm of trade, finance, and other markets and human networks. Both of these depend in turn on a healthy global ecological space—the planetary systems of lands and oceans, weather, and climate.

The less well public institutions function and the more rule of law and civil society falter, the more rapidly the public space for policy formulation, contestation, implementation, and reorientation within a political community withers—until it disappears altogether, and is replaced by nepotism, cronyism, corruption, repression, and violence. Without a vibrant and resilient public space, there can be neither justice nor security within any community, whether global, regional, national, or local. Furthermore, the decay of public space on one level can easily spill over onto others and ultimately affect global governance. Wherever states are fragile or torn by conflict, they cease to be part of the healthy global governance architecture; they become instead fracture points in the provision of public goods at global, regional, national, and local levels.

2.1.2 Ecological space (planetary systems)

As evidence mounts of interdependence among the natural systems that permit and support life on earth, scientists have begun to think in terms of a planet-wide system of systems that influence one another and set the background conditions for human life and civilization. In the first 150 years of the Industrial Revolution, the impacts of energy effluence were considered fleeting and, to the extent that they were persistent, were locally focused, such as the great smogs of London or Los Angeles. Today we understand that human impact has cumulated and become stronger.
as economies and populations have grown, and has global consequence. Current and projected human action is exerting a powerful influence on many planetary systems—atmosphere, oceans, fresh water, and others. These systems functioned for four billion years before people appeared and function now without regard for people and their problems. People, however, do need regard for these systems, with which their collective fate is intertwined. Each system has what scientists call planetary boundaries, safe operating conditions beyond which they may become unpredictable and even “change state”—rebalance their flows abruptly, possibly in ways not friendly to humankind.9

Figure 2.1 Intersecting Critical Spaces and Key Problem Sets

2.1.3 Transactional space (networks of exchange and communication)

Economic globalization and the explosive growth of digital technologies, from mobile phones to the Internet, have created a vast new global transaction space. As IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde has observed, “Today, the world economy is not simply connected, it is hyperconnected. This will propel financial integration on a scale not yet quantified, and to corners of the world not yet reached.”10 The hyperconnected global economy is marked by openness and low costs of communication and transport, facilitating flows of trade, capital, information, and labor, and opens vast new economic opportunity. Billions of people actively participate in some part of this space, online or offline, daily.

This digital transactional space holds questions for global security and justice. The more humanity conducts hyperconnected business at the speed of light, the more vulnerable it becomes to cascading failure. The more its economic and political discourse shift to the Internet, the more exposed they become to government surveillance as well as criminal and terrorist cyber-assault. It is thus a space where issues and values of justice and security strongly interact and sometimes clash.

Together, these three domains form the fabric of contemporary life. A collapse of one will gravely affect the others. Without well-functioning states, concerted action on climate change and secure global transactions are difficult to imagine, but without a functioning ecosystem, there can be no functioning states. Without globalizing communications and information technologies, a truly
broad discourse on security and justice and solutions to humanity’s most critical challenges will remain elusive.

2.2 Defining Global Governance

The complete scope of governance, as defined by the 1995 Commission on Global Governance, includes informal or consensual arrangements for managing aspects of human relationships, from local, customary justice to the Montreal Protocol on global atmospheric ozone. For this project, governance emphasizes the objectives of global public policy, as expressed in the UN Charter and other key documents for global governance, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The institutions of global governance are the “mechanisms for steering” states and societies toward such goals.

We focus on institutions and relations that involve some legitimate authority, that is, authority accepted by participants as a right to rule, use power, and leverage compliance. Such authority can be exercised not only by governments, but also by various other actors over their communities, which may be linked by kinship, religion, profession, or business. They participate in global governance provided they “exert authority over communities located in two or more states.”

Global governance is also understood to encompass relations of international actors with national, subnational, and local actors. Thus, for example, UN peacekeeping operations may have a duty and authority from the UN Security Council (global) both to help rebuild the capacity of a post-conflict government (national) and to protect civilians from physical violence (local).

2.2.1 Global public goods: What they are and why they are needed

Governments and global governance arrangements exist to provide public goods, which one person can use without diminishing availability to others and which people cannot be excluded from using. For these reasons, markets have limited incentives to provide them, and governments underprovide global public goods for similar reasons: states that have not contributed to providing such goods cannot be practically excluded from enjoying them.

Different global problems involve different kinds of public goods with different sorts of participation incentives that problem-solving strategies need to recognize. For example, “weakest link” public goods can fail if states that contribute the least to the global effort do not contribute that share, as with gaps in vaccination campaigns against infectious disease. “Aggregate” public goods, on the other hand, are those whose effectiveness varies depending on overall strength of participation. A successful aggregate public good would be the restoration of stratospheric ozone under the Montreal Protocol, in which virtually all states participated.

Global justice and security are aggregate public goods that no single state or group of states can provide worldwide. Although some provide more than others, the more states that participate in providing these goods, the stronger both become. At a subregional level, however, security can be a weak link good because certain states’ low levels of governance undermine not only their own people’s security and access to justice but the security of neighboring states, as well.
2.2.2 Global governance as network governance

Global governance is a mix of bilateral, informal multilateral, and treaty-based relations among states increasingly influenced by nonstate actors’ interests and activities. The largest segment of it, the UN system, is a loose network of organizations that answer to no single administrator. The UN Secretary-General, for example, administers the UN Secretariat but coordinates with other parts of the system. The relationships of UN Member States are similarly networked in flat organizations such as the General Assembly. Even the UN Security Council (UNSC) is a two-tiered network of permanent and nonpermanent members—the five permanent members (P5) caucus together and influence the Council’s proceedings but cannot require that other Council members vote with them.

Three basic forms of network governance are summarized in table 2.1.17 The first is participant-governed, having no central core of management and no lead entity, just a group of organizations collaborating toward more or less common goals. This model corresponds roughly to informal groupings of states, such as the G20, as well as the top level of the UN system.

The second network model has one member that leads the others “because of its central position in the flow of clients and key resources.” Such a role is mandated to a UN peace operation and its Head of Mission (HoM) when it deploys into a country where other UN entities already operate.

The third model uses what is called a network administrative organization to manage the network’s interests and operations on behalf of its members. One example in the UN is the Development Operations Coordination Office. Its thirty-four-person staff supports the UN Development Group, a network of thirty-two UN agencies, funds, and programs.

Table 2.1 Key Forms of Network Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Form</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
<th>Goal Consensus</th>
<th>Need for Network Level Competencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared governance</td>
<td>High density</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead organization</td>
<td>Low density, highly centralized</td>
<td>Moderate number</td>
<td>Moderately low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network administrative organization</td>
<td>Moderate density, monitored by members</td>
<td>Moderate to many</td>
<td>Moderately high</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Provan and Kenis 2007

2.3 Defining Security

For most of the twentieth century and through the end of the Cold War, global security was mainly seen as the absence of war between major powers, the long and bloody proxy wars of the superpowers in Vietnam and Afghanistan notwithstanding. Developments after 1989 empowered the UN Security Council, which progressively widened the concept of “threats to international peace and security” to encompass largely intrastate conflicts. UN peacekeepers were sent first to implement peace agreements, then to support humanitarian action in conflict, and most recently to suppress conflict and protect civilians, a duty built into virtually every UNSC peacekeeping mandate since 1999. Most recently, mandates have shifted the focus of UN action from state-level capacity-building to public safety and security in still-unstable areas, for example, in Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic.
The notion of focusing international efforts on individuals at least as much as the state is integral to the concept of human security. As articulated in the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR), this concept has seven dimensions: economic, food, health, political, environmental, personal, and community security. It reflects an understanding of insecurity that extends beyond imminent physical harm, but in doing so risks “securitizing” a wide array of human needs. To skirt such pitfalls, this Report focuses on the core of human security, understood as the minimum conditions that the state or other governance structures must maintain to give individuals enough safety to allow them to divert at least some of their attention from short-term self-preservation to longer-term aspirations.

At the state level, comparable minimum conditions include the ability to organize the defense of state territory, wield preponderant coercive capacity within that territory, manage territorial borders, achieve political legitimacy or the “right to rule” (domestic and international), collect legitimate tax revenues, and use them for legitimate social purposes.

If disrupted by conflict or disaster, the different dimensions of security—human and state—follow different restoration timelines. Assuming a ceasefire and political accord, military institutions can in principle be disarmed and demobilized fairly quickly, but finding productive roles for former fighters takes longer and depends heavily on the recovery of post-conflict states’ broken economies and on former fighters’ social rehabilitation. Building new or reformed institutions of security, law enforcement, and politics takes even longer because they involve not only physical institutions but also new habits of mind. These institutions must be able to settle civil disputes and enforce contracts and create or modify underpinning legal codes. Similarly, police must be able and inclined to enforce the law and courts able and inclined to adjudicate infractions fairly.

When safety and service-regulatory frameworks are in place, a post-conflict government is better positioned to address economic and ecological threats created or masked by conflict, such as illicit export of timber and minerals, or extreme weather (drought, storms, floods) that delays or destroys agricultural production and furthers migration to overburdened urban centers. Economic shocks that ripple worldwide—more likely given global interdependence and the speed and volume of electronic markets—can undermine state and human security alike.

In short, security extends far beyond the interests of and pressures on the state to include the needs and pressures on its people. Increasingly, such concepts of security dovetail with key principles of justice.

### 2.4 Defining Justice

Security has always been integral to global governance and the mission of the United Nations, but global justice has not received comparable attention or support. Documents such as the 2004 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the 2014 HDR refer to security hundreds of times but to justice only sparingly. UNSC resolutions have far more global prominence than decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), even though both are also principal organs of the United Nations. Does this mean that justice is less important a theme in global governance than security?
The UN Charter’s preamble includes four main aims: “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,” “to establish conditions under which justice ... can be maintained,” and “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” The absence of war makes achieving the other three aims possible. The Charter preamble also makes it clear, however, that keeping war at bay is primarily a means to greater ends.

That justice includes procedural and retributive justice—the formal institutions and processes of the judiciary (civil and criminal) including courts, judges, records, prosecutors, defense counsel, jails, and prisons—is clear, but fair and effective adjudication is only a piece of the picture. Another piece is the informal mechanisms of dispute settlement and informal justice found in most traditional societies, which may have survived war years in better condition than the formal system and may enjoy more local trust. A third piece is distributive justice: how society allocates its resources. In some war-torn states, the national allocation of wealth—and land, and influence—may have been a principal cause of war. Held dear in all cultures, conceptions of justice—and its relations with security and peace—also vary between different cultures (box 2.1).

Distributive justice has been the object of vigorous debates in political theory and philosophy that are germane to the critical choices that post-conflict societies face. The contemporary debate can be traced back to John Rawls’s influential *A Theory of Justice*, which addressed how fundamental rights and duties and “advantages from social cooperation” could be most fairly distributed in society. Rawls argued that unbiased debate would yield two fundamental principles. First, all people should have an “equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties.” Second, when society has options for how it allocates resources, its choices should be “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” that is, should to the extent possible reduce rather than increase (or ignore) inequality.

**Box 2.1 Global Public Discourse on Justice, Security, and Peace**

*Archbishop Desmond Tutu—*
“Where justice and order are not restored, there can be no healing, leaving violence and hatred ticking like a bomb in the corner.”

*Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China—*
“We should uphold justice. It is imperative to promote greater democracy and rule of law in international relations, use fair and just rules to tell right from wrong and settle disputes, and pursue peace and development within the framework of international law. All parties should jointly uphold the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations and reform and improve the global governance structure.”

*Mahnaz Afkhami, Iranian-American human rights activist—*
“Clearly, any definition of a culture of peace must address the problem of achieving justice for communities and individuals who do not have the means to compete or cope without structured assistance and compassionate help.”

Rawls focused on justice within a society. Other scholars—notably Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge—extended his arguments globally. Beitz argued that, given growing interdependence among states, “confining principles of social justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others may benefit from living in ‘just’ regimes.”²² Pogge argued that people’s life chances should not be predetermined by accident of birth and that global institutions have a duty to not harm innocent people, yet have set rules that foreseeably and avoidably—when followed to their logical and functional conclusions—cause severe poverty and unnecessary deaths.²³

Amartya Sen has also called for greater attention to how institutions of justice affect those they are supposed to serve and for the focus of development attention from institution-building to shift to helping people and societies directly. Donors should stop seeking “perfectly just arrangements” and be satisfied with enhancement of justice.²⁴ He has stressed the need for better public dialogue on justice at the global level and the importance of including civil society organizations and global media in that dialogue.

In sum, the goals of justice in an interdependent, globalized world can be framed as achieving a basic level of liberty and opportunity for the advancement of both women and men while reducing social and economic inequalities to benefit, in particular, the least advantaged in society—thus showing special concern for the acute abuses, discrimination, and inequities perceived and experienced by much of humankind.

2.5 Toward Just Security

The quest for international security (and the related notion of order) is not new, though its full realization remains aspirational. Before the UN Charter, its pursuit was enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations and earlier in the Concert of Europe. The notion of justice emerged more resolutely in deliberations at the global level with the Charter, a result of the insight that to truly “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” collective or common security alone is not enough, that global justice—as the effective pursuit of “larger freedom” on a global scale—is equally important.

Security is merely the appearance of order in a framework of structural violence unless tempered or leavened by concepts of justice that include human rights, human dignity, legitimate government, and other normative limits on the use of power. Vice versa, the pursuit of justice is crippled if not backed up by the requisite means to sustain security and order.

In a world at peace, which provides all its inhabitants with the chance of a decent and safe life, security and justice are visibly complementary. Concerns for one entail concerns for the other. Indeed, history has shown time and again the futility of attempts to instill—worse, impose—security with no consideration for justice. That simply creates the manifestation of order underpinned by the use or threat of violence. At the same time, endeavors to impart justice without security are all too easily undone. Security and justice are both needed if humanity is to not only survive but also thrive with dignity.
For this Report and its reform agenda, we view the joint pursuit of security and justice in global governance as a quest for just security. Just security aims to forge a mutually supportive system of accountable, fair, and effective governance and sustainable peace globally. It further recognizes that both security and justice are indispensable to human development.

For good global governance and a resilient global order that empowers people and nations, security and justice must prevail across governance levels; global actors, including those within civil society and the business community, need to promote these linkages actively. Lack of either security or justice on any level, from local to global, not only contributes to instability, but produces destabilizing spillovers both horizontally (to neighboring regions) and vertically (to higher or lower levels of governance).

Advocating Justice and Security Together (AdJuST), discussed in Part IV of this Report, is critical to implementing the vision of just security and its associated policy goals. The AdJuST initiative encourages the reconciling of views on security and justice among emerging powers, developing and developed states, and increasingly powerful nonstate actors. The twin pursuit of security and justice is an essential element of any new global governance architecture or reform enterprise.

Government, though important, is not the totality of governance, let alone human experience. Governments may provide a considerable amount of security and justice for their citizens. However, in an age of globalization, international organizations as well as nongovernmental actors found within civil society and the business community are significant contributors and, indeed, may be global actors in their own right, with the potential to contribute to security and justice across the globe (see also figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Intersections Between Security, Justice, and Governance

Governments are responsible for providing the bulk of security and justice ...
The growing connectivity between security and justice in global affairs exhibits both short-term trade-offs and tensions but can also reveal ways in which they are mutually reinforcing (for instance, security can lend urgency and fresh perspectives to long-standing climate justice concerns). Their intersection provides a framework for understanding and responding to today’s most pressing global governance challenges in this project’s three spaces. It connotes the central importance of institutions and policy innovations—at global, regional, national, and subnational levels—in promoting security and justice effectively, equitably, democratically, and accountably.

Moreover, the notion of just security places justice and legitimate forms of governance at the center of twenty-first century conceptions of security. Applied to challenges facing global governance today, an approach that emphasizes security and justice simultaneously would aim to refashion global institutions and their policy instruments to strike a more effective balance between security and justice that does not privilege one major concept over the other.

In highly unstable environments, short-term trade-offs favoring security may be necessary, but always with the goal of returning to balance, and with justice—as embodied in military law codes, International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and mission rules of engagement—as a constant “governor” of security and stabilization actions. Lastly, just security encourages the reconciling of perceptions of security and justice of emerging powers and lesser developed countries of the Global South with actors in the Global North. Both concepts, however, need not be pursued equally at all times and in each conceivable setting.

The interplay of security and justice can strengthen global governance and improve the quality of life for all people. But it can also generate tensions, risks, and pitfalls for global governance. Skillful, cooperative, and innovative leadership among a range of state and nonstate actors sensitive to historical context and current global realities can, by insisting on the pursuit of justice and security simultaneously, help ready global governance for twenty-first-century challenges.

On the eve of the UN’s seventieth anniversary, the world is less Westphalian than ever. The concept of global governance acknowledges that today’s threats and interdependence place in question the community of states as the sole pillar of security and justice in the world. Today, it is more appropriate to speak of at least three United Nations, according to Tom Weiss’s 2009 article in *Global Governance*: the Member States, the Secretariat and UN bureaucracy, and civil society. These and other actors are assuming an increasingly prominent role within the wider global governance architecture conceived of as network governance (see 2.2.2), both as contributors to and as detractors from security and justice.

At the same time, the demise of the state as a relevant entity in global governance has not occurred, nor is it likely to. It is also safe to say that a world state or any singular provider of justice and security worldwide is not imminent, nor is any benevolent unipolar moment. The state remains the primary addressee of obligations under international law and other global norms. In particular, it remains the primary provider for justice and security. Reinforcing this insight are such concepts as R2P, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) and its complementarity principle, which clearly acknowledges that the state remains primarily responsible for, respectively, keeping its citizens safe, the protection of human rights on its territory, and the trial of perpetrators of atrocities. However, as a second observation, each of these key norms and documents equally hold that where states fail to deliver, other levels and actors of governance need to step in. Hence, although states may continue to be seen as primarily responsible, they are not the only or always the most suited providers of justice and security; they may find themselves in need of assistance regarding the most serious threats and challenges in global governance.

The role of international organizations and, in particular, subnational levels of government and a wide variety of commercial and civil society actors has long been recognized as critical to humanitarian and disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction. More recently, the role of nonstate actors in grappling with the challenges of climate change has been recognized as critical to meeting the challenges of climate change (see, for example, in the 2013 Lima-Paris Action Agenda). Governance of the Internet has always been a multi-stakeholder, multilevel enterprise with governments as collaborators but not controlling partners of a global net that is 90 percent privately owned.

The Commission, therefore, considers the following four categories of intergovernmental, substate, civil society, and business actors as key drivers of its reform agenda (illustrated in figure 3.1):

- **International and regional organizations**—Today there are about 250 intergovernmental organizations, both within and without the UN system. Many regional and subregional organizations, such as ASEAN, the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the EU, are increasingly developing a global outlook and serve as partners to global multilateral efforts, including peace operations. For instance, the European Union fights piracy off the coast of Somalia, ASEAN has become the driver of building a wider, ASEAN-Pacific governance architecture, and the AU undertakes “hybrid peace missions” in cooperation with the UN.
• **Local authorities and cities**—Formally part of government, substate actors claim considerable powers in their jurisdictions, cities in particular, but they can also furnish distinctive contributions to global governance. Regions, municipalities, and mega or global cities are increasingly regarded as new structures of decentralized decision-making that fit the speed and changing nature of the global economy, with the world’s 750 largest cities already accounting for 57 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP). Local communities, on their part, are the first responders for climate change adaptation or rebuilding efforts after conflict.26

• **Civil society**—More than four thousand nongovernmental organizations to date have acquired consultative status with the UN’s Economic and Social Council, and many prominent organizations—such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International or Greenpeace—are active worldwide. Global philanthropy, moreover, wields staggering amounts of wealth. In 2013, the top ten charity foundations together donated more than US$5 billion, roughly the same amount as official development assistance (ODA) from such countries as the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, and Canada, which are among the top ten state ODA contributors.

• **Business sector and the media**—The role of the business sector in global governance has long been acknowledged as well, and its responsibility for respecting and contributing to global values such as human rights, the environment, and even peacebuilding. This sector includes multinationals as powerful, globally operating entities. The two thousand largest companies in 2014 accounted for US$38 trillion in revenues and employed ninety million people worldwide. But this category also encompasses international media organizations and local entrepreneurs as important drivers of post-conflict recovery, as well as adapters to new technologies on the ground.

Figure 3.1 Nonstate, Subnational Government, and Intergovernmental Actors Contributing to Justice and Security
Leading policymakers and scholars have called for nonstate actors’ potential in global affairs to be harnessed, including Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, and John Ruggie.27 The recommendations in this Report offer a number of concrete steps to make the most of nonstate actors’ contributions to security and justice in global governance. These include exploring innovative ways to bring all relevant actors to commit to sets of principles, shape common expectations, and focus efforts on joint goals in the form of what are called new social compacts. The idea of such compacts has gained in popularity in the past 15 years, featuring, for instance, in Indonesia’s Human Development Report 2001 and the Harvard Business Review,28 and with potential application to a range of today’s global challenges.
II. Just Security and Global Governance in Critical Spaces
When key problem sets in each of the three critical spaces—public, ecological, and transactional—are examined in detail, the need for just security in global governance becomes evident. In the public space, the Commission focuses on state fragility and violent conflict. For the ecological space, it looks at the looming impact of climate change on peoples’ lives and livelihoods. For the transactional space, it considers key issues in the hyperconnected global economy. These areas interact in ways that highlight the urgency and complexity of certain issues, but they also present opportunities for positive change. Functioning institutions and systems of governance within and across each are fundamental prerequisites for security and justice in global governance. Analysis of the three themes highlights how “getting reform right” requires placing justice and security in a mutually reinforcing relationship.
4. Coping with State Fragility and Violent Conflict

This section examines the tools and responses available to the international community and global institutions to support fragile and conflict-affected environments. It looks at how these tools might be sharpened and how the support might be more effective. It is in such settings that the need for links between security, justice, and governance are greatest but at the same time hardest to forge. This derives in part from a critical enabling factor for state fragility, namely, the international community’s reluctance to confront political elites who usurp sovereign prerogatives that rightly rest with the public at large. The Carnegie Endowment Working Group on Corruption and Society concluded in July 2014 that

Every country that harbors an extremist insurgency today suffers from kleptocratic governance…. The motivational literature of those extremist movements is littered with references to corruption. Every government that faced significant mass protests during the 2011 Arab uprisings ... perpetrated acute corruption on behalf of narrow cliques that included top government officials and their close relatives.\(^{30}\)

Corrupt government contributes to fragility, impedes development, and cheats people of their rights and dignity. It is not the only source of fragility but it exerts a powerful drag on efforts to build state and societal resilience. When regimes are corrupt, common security and impartial justice are hard to come by. Corrupt governance armors itself in the rhetoric of sovereignty without the legitimacy to assert that claim. When government corruption is endemic, it is not a technical flaw in the system. Rather, tapping public revenue for personal and collective private gain in many places is the system, and it is futile, costly, and counterproductive to ignore that it is. Other problems cannot be solved if the resources to solve them are drained routinely and tax revenues are diverted.

Many global players, such as the World Bank Institute, offer tools to enhance the transparency of government, and in so doing reduce the marginal cost of corruption, but such tools do not necessarily change the attitudes of those responsible for the system, who will seek ways to circumvent the constraints. That development agencies, civil society organizations, and even UN peace operations and large military deployments such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan are guests of governments tends to limit the amount of openness with which such neopatrimonial or clientelistic corruption can be addressed.

The problems of fragile states and their “ungoverned” spaces (that is, areas under the control of private militias, terrorist groups, or no one in particular) are not just domestic. They tend to cascade disorder into neighboring states. They can be used as transit zones by drug or human traffickers and are prone to having their resources looted for international markets. Figure 4.1 depicts the range of international missions deployed to support restoration of security and rule of law in such environments.
4.1 Key Challenges and Opportunities

After steady declines since the end of the Cold War, global indices of armed conflict—still primarily internal conflict—began to rise again in 2008, according to the Global Peace Index 2014 published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). In its mid-2014 report on forced displacement, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported record half-year increases in and record totals of refugees and internally displaced “persons of concern.” Over the previous twelve months, the total number of refugees increased by 2.1 million and the total number of internally displaced persons by 5.2 million. Most were forced to flee from just three conflicts—in Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan—pushing the combined world refugee and displaced persons total to over fifty million.

The Institute for Economics and Peace has estimated that in 2013 the total economic impact of containing or preventing violence worldwide, including military spending, was US$5 to $10 trillion. The higher level equals 11 percent of global GDP and takes into account IEP’s peace multiplier, which accounts for the value of not experiencing violence, not living in fear, or having enough
confidence in the future to invest in productive enterprise. The World Bank Institute calculates that more than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by fragility and conflict, and more than half of those people live in poverty, compared with 22 percent for all low-income countries taken together. As figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate, conflict-affected states (a significant proportion of which come to host peace operations of various kinds) also tend to be among the world’s least developed countries (LCDs). And political violence is not the only kind that takes a serious toll on human development. The Geneva Declaration has highlighted the poor performance on MDGs of states with very high homicide rates, noting that this “offers a powerful case for making violence prevention and reduction a central plank in the war on poverty.”

Figure 4.2 Least Developed Countries

Although some unique features figure in the eruptions of brutal armed conflict in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ukraine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, familiar factors drive them, including ethno-political tensions, rebel separatism, and armed resistance to authoritarian regimes.

The challenges lie in using knowledge at hand to curb the outbreak of such wars, to limit their consequences when prevention fails, and to repair the damage when they end or are ended. The grim news is that too few resources are being brought to bear in timely fashion in service of prevention, or that action may be politically blocked under current interpretations of powers like the UNSC veto, as the war in Syria has illustrated.

The better news is that in this century, the leaders of states have agreed that states have a responsibility—inherent in the laws and norms that guide state behavior, and in recognition of the dignity of the individual person—to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity within their borders. Since the end of the Cold War, international peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts have offered interim security and support for rebuilding in more than two dozen conflict-affected settings. International and special hybrid criminal tribunals have sent more than one hundred war criminals to prison for their actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Such courts cannot meet the entire demand for postwar and transitional justice, but they are a start.

4.2 Current Responses

International tools and techniques to meet the challenges of fragility and violence include conflict prevention, the participation of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the norm of Responsibility to Protect (and Prevent and Rebuild), peace and stability operations, post-conflict peacebuilding (especially to strengthen rule of law and both state and society resilience), building respect for human rights, and a range of transitional justice measures, from formal trials to community reintegration.

4.2.1 Gender and peacebuilding: A seat at the table and a stake in the process

One of the UN’s major goals for 2015 onward is to ensure “equal rights of women and girls, and empower them to participate and take on leadership roles in public life.”35 Barriers to greater women’s roles include the inaccessibility of formal peace processes and inconsistent international intervention. Currently, peace processes tend to have a gender bias in that they primarily involve the almost-always male leaders of contending armed forces and groups and mostly male mediators or facilitators.36 When crucial decisions about post-conflict governance are made, therefore, women usually lack a seat at the table despite the different impacts of war on men and women. That is, women’s experiences and concerns are not adequately represented or adequately addressed.37

Several instruments at the global level aim toward a framework that advocates for the greater inclusion of women in peacebuilding. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) passed unanimously in 2000, paving the way for six more resolutions related to women, security, and conflict-affected environments. However, formidable political, cultural, and economic obstacles remain to women’s full participation as peacemakers or even as citizens.38 UNIFEM reported that ten years after SCR 1325, in fourteen cases it reviewed, fewer than 3 percent of peace agreement signatories were women.39

In its seven-point action plan, the UN committed to promoting the rule of law before, during, and after conflict and particularly to systematically promote women and girls’ rights to security and justice.40 Women’s participation in peacekeeping missions is one significant way the UN can model its policy goals. About 15 percent of UN Police (UNPOL) presently are women; toward a goal of 20 percent. Military units have far fewer women, reflecting the military gender balance in their home countries. Women made up 28 percent of the international civilian staff of UN missions in 2014, 21 percent of senior professional levels, and 18 percent of national staff (locally hired personnel, national staff are 70 percent of UN civilian mission personnel).41

Fifty states worldwide have committed to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) to meet the obligations of SCR 1325.42 These plans are one of the most powerful tools at the national level to increase the inclusion of women in politics and peacebuilding, strengthen their role in decision-making about security, and ensure their protection in times of conflict. Although NAPs differ in objectives and implementation, some important recommendations for successful implementation can be drawn from the Dutch experience, as noted in recommendation 4.3.1.2.
4.2.2 Preventing armed conflict

By almost any yardstick, preventing armed conflict is less costly than either its conduct or its consequences. For the most part, we know this from instances when prevention has failed or has not been attempted, because the warning signals were not clear, were not believed, were not a priority, or were not politically feasible for those who might have responded. Strategic prevention allows more time to work and to build effective and equitable service delivery capacity and the accompanying governance culture that fragile states tend to sorely lack. The Arab Spring reminds us that perceptions of social injustice often reflect experience of corrupt and violent governance. The surges of violence in the Central African Republic and South Sudan also show how violence can be triggered by those who know how to exploit latent grievances for other purposes.

Determined local power brokers may count on international inaction in the face of continued misgovernance. The bigger and more complex the problem, the costlier it is likely to be to remedy from the outside and the greater pause it is likely to give to those outside who may consider corrective action. A perverse logic applies whereby the greater the degree of misrule and the more deeply embedded the networks of corruption, the less likely outside action to correct the situation is until the situation explodes from within.

Social media has played a growing role in mobilizing people and resources that that may have a demonstration effect at great distance. This effect can be positive for communities demanding better governance, social equity, and opportunities, but it also carries risks of instability that can escalate, with unpredictable consequences. Moreover, thus far, social media has been better at undoing than redoing, better at shaking up old power structures than promoting new ones.

4.2.3 Considering a decade of R2P

Sovereignty is increasingly understood in terms of the responsibility of public authority toward those under its control rather than as a mere prerogative of those wielding power. This understanding is at the heart of the R2P, born of mass atrocities that occurred in states with governments too weak to prevent them or that themselves became lethal threats to their own citizens. The repercussions of atrocities can be felt far beyond the sites of the original crimes, often in the form of population displacement and regional instability.

The R2P concept was fleshed out by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, with Canadian government support, as summarized in box 4.1. The UN World Summit in 2005 endorsed a version of R2P:

We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
In March 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized a no-fly zone over Libya to protect Libyan civilians from further atrocities stemming from suppression of anti-government protests. The Security Council did not name Libyan authorities as perpetrators, nor did it invoke R2P specifically, but many observers considered implementation of Resolution 1973 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and some other cooperating states to be an instance of R2P, at least in its early phases. Critics of NATO’s later actions argue either that those actions went too far toward ousting the Qaddafi regime or not far enough, failing to take up the responsibility to rebuild.

If R2P and its corollary responsibilities to prevent and rebuild are to be more than declaratory principles, proponents need to better define the implications of each and to address the political, as well as functional, obstacles to making the norm operational. As France noted in its statement to the General Assembly’s 2014 dialogue on R2P, for example, the Security Council has not been able to act on Syria, owing to “four double vetoes.” After four years, four million Syrians are internally displaced and more than three million are living as refugees. At least a third are in Lebanon, a refugee burden equivalent to twenty million refugees in Germany or Turkey or eighty million in the United States, or roughly two-thirds of the population of Mexico.\(^\text{46}\) Globally, regionally, and locally, protection for those driven from their homes, and country, has been comparatively weak, as the

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**Box 4.1 Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect**

The original International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report defining R2P in 2001 outlined three phases of R2P, namely, prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. The Commissioners considered prevention the most important phase. In 2005, states accepted a modified version of R2P in the World Summit Outcome Document. In 2009, the UN Secretary-General’s report called “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” defined three pillars of R2P. Pillar one stresses the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens. Pillar two encourages international aid to states needing help in discharging their protection responsibilities. Pillar three pledges “timely and decisive” collective international action when states are unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibilities or are themselves a threat to their peoples.

The ICISS report identified four ways to operationalize R2P: political and diplomatic, economic, legal, and military. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report identifies tools and actions to better operationalize R2P. These include: (i) ratifying the Rome Statute; (ii) helping states develop economically, implement the rule of law, and build the capacity of policymakers, police, courts, and militaries; and (iii) take collective action, initially using diplomacy, social pressure, sanctions, and arms embargoes; should these fail, outside powers might invoke R2P and a “just use of force” to stop mass atrocities. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document requires that any armed intervention go “through” the UN Security Council. France led a debate at the UN in 2014 on conditions under which permanent members of the Security Council should refrain from exercising their veto and instead confine themselves to a “constructive abstention,” including situations involving the commission of mass atrocities. New technologies and sources of data have only begun to be used on behalf of R2P crises. But such tools can only be as effective as the political will and the resources that states and other actors apply to their responsibilities under R2P. Although R2P has become part of the UN’s vocabulary, it is now time to make it a hallmark of UN and international community action.

conflict continues and deepens with the rise of the self-styled Islamic State. And yet CSOs, such as the Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC), continue to work, documenting human rights law violations and working toward transitional justice.

The Security Council’s permanent members (the P5) take varying positions on R2P. In West Africa and Francophone areas of the Sahel, France has taken action that may be considered consistent with R2P to counter several terrorist groups whose emergence coincided with outpourings of arms and fighters from the disorder in Libya. The United States established the interagency Atrocities Prevention Board consistent with R2P in April 2012, but its record of achievement to date is limited. Based on statements during the 2014 General Assembly dialogue on R2P, other permanent members of the Security Council appear to be diffident (UK), cautious (China), or skeptical (Russia).

4.2.4 Stabilization and peacekeeping operations

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the African Union (AU), and other regional organizations have undertaken peacekeeping and stabilization operations (the latter where peace must be created and then kept). Most peacekeepers have deployed under the UN flag but many others under UN authority. Emerging powers contribute significant numbers of troops, police, and other resources to complex UN operations. The AU has been building an African Standby Force on the basis of rapidly deployable regional brigades and more recently an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis. The UN provides logistical support to the African Union operation in Somalia and the AU and UN share command of the peace operation in Darfur. Hybrid and partnership operations—where more than one entity has military or civilian mission presence on the ground—are increasingly common, as are missions in unstable settings.

In recent years, UN operations have deployed in unstable environments where semi-hostile host governments (Sudan), active hostilities (South Sudan), local and regional militias (DRC), or violent extremist groups (Mali) threaten the population and the mission alike. Such circumstances require greater capacity and willingness to engage hostile forces both for self-protection and to fulfill mandates to protect civilians from physical harm, while keeping the use of force proportionate and focused on minimizing civilian casualties.

The UN’s mission in Mali faces a particularly dangerous environment in the north of the country, where both secessionist parties and terrorist groups hold sway. A model of global collaboration, it has nonetheless suffered more fatalities from hostile action in eighteen months than the UN experienced in ten years of operations in DRC. The mission cannot be impartial regarding those who daily set improvised explosive devices and attack UN convoys, including al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, yet a UN mission lacks the strength, cohesion, and mobility to mount effective operations against such groups on a continuing basis. The Force Intervention Brigade for the UN mission in DRC was authorized in 2013 to neutralize armed groups in its eastern provinces. It did well at first but has since flagged.

All UN troops and police are borrowed from its Member States for each mission, most forces come with national caveats on their use, and national and UN processes together usually mean nine to twelve months are needed to fill out mandated mission strength. The UN also relies on civilian recruitment mechanisms whose lag times have resisted multiple rounds of improvement.
The ability of UN peace operations to use force in defense of the mandate, including for civilian protection, is largely limited to the tactical level and the quality of engagement varies according to the particular units available to it at the moment of need. Nonetheless, UN operations have come to be the material responses of last resort for many violent crises where the lack of sustained regional response capacity makes UN presence the alternative to a security vacuum.

If dangerous missions continue to be assigned, the UN will need more ready and rapid sources of deployable capacity. It would be better still, however, if the organization had better means of analyzing and preventing outbreaks of conflict and the rise of violent extremism. At US $8.5 billion per year, the cost of UN peace operations is equal to just 1/2 percent of world military spending.55

### 4.2.5 Peacebuilding: Rule of law, security sector reform, and state-society resilience

Part of the problem with peacebuilding, aside from the difficulty, is the ongoing lack of agreement as to precisely what it entails and what its goals should be (see box 4.2).56 Because practitioners are not able to agree on substantive objectives, working definitions have tended to fall back on process, which hurts the ability to generate collaborative programming among the array of bilateral and multilateral, public, and private entities that aspire to build a lasting (sustainable) peace.

One element on which most do agree is the rule of law. The World Bank’s *World Development Report 2011* highlighted the difficulties that states recovering from conflict have in restoring or creating effective rule of law, a generations-long process of technical adjustments and cultural shifts in how government is viewed and run. Outside parties have limited ability to alter a host state’s governing culture. Many efforts by conflict-affected states to end armed violence become caught between wartime structures of power and organized crime cartels that use weak states as both transit zones and new markets. Rebuilding rule of law—and both the capacity and integrity of governmental institutions—is nonetheless a high priority of most international peacebuilding efforts.

An equally high priority is the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of former fighting forces, both armies and militias or guerrilla forces. But in current conflict environments, DDR outcomes are difficult to sustain. Political agreements still settle some conflicts, but key agents of violence, both groups and individuals, may not be part of the settlement and may be independently motivated, economically or ideologically—for example, violent extremists with agendas beyond local politics. Thus, they may not be drawn to a DDR program, except perhaps to feign demobilization, accept transitional cash support, and move on to the next conflict or criminal opportunity. The latest edition of the UN’s *Integrated DDR Standards* addresses such potential only in passing. DDR and other peacebuilding efforts may also be seriously undermined by the wide availability of illicit small arms and light weapons. The UN Security Council uses a range of sanctions to restrict the flow of illicit weapons and tracks sanction implementation using Panels of Experts created for that task. The UN Arms Trade Treaty signed in April 2015 also includes measures to prevent and reduce the diversion of weapons for illicit purposes.57

A wide range of development actors engage in rebuilding rule of law. The UN Development Programme has funded a number of these efforts—especially legal and judicial training programs—in countries acutely in need of such capacity. The European Union also deploys missions to support rebuilding rule of law in eastern Europe, Africa, and Southwest and Central Asia.

Effective rule of law requires capable, law-abiding, and rights-respecting institutions of justice and law enforcement. In post-conflict settings, that often entails security and justice sector reform. In
many conflict-affected states, formal institutions of criminal and civil justice may have been badly
damaged or never reached the entire population. In such cases, informal, traditional, or community-
based justice has received growing attention as a workable alternative while efforts are made to
bring traditional forums into alignment with international standards of human rights.58

4.2.6 Human rights and transitional justice

Respect for human rights is one of the pillars of the UN Charter. States and societies have evolved
many creative ways to discriminate, use, and abuse those who are out of power, in custody, young,
old, female, of a different religion, unconventionally gender identified, or displaced by violence.
UN treaties and other international agreements protect the human rights of civilians in conflict,
ban genocide, ban torture, ban discrimination against women, and specify the rights of children
and minimum acceptable conditions for those in detention or prison.59 Too often honored in the
breach, building greater respect and support for human rights should be a fundamental objective
of peacebuilding enterprises. Its absence from the Secretary-General’s most recent reporting on
peacebuilding is all the more unfortunate.60

Recent armed conflicts have been especially brutal to civilian populations and characterized by
frequent and widespread war crimes and by crimes against humanity, whether committed as an
element of military strategy or under lax command and control of forces. What mix of institutions,
actors, and incentives may help ensure that rule of law and transitional justice measures can be
pursued, while promoting stabilization, recovery, and peacebuilding? What mix will promote, in
other words, just security?

Box 4.2 Evolving Definitions of Peacebuilding

Despite the visibility of UN supported peacebuilding in the last fifteen years, the creation of the
UN Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005, and the 2009 report from the Secretary-General titled
“Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict” (that includes annual progress reviews through the
Peacebuilding Commission), a universally shared definition of peacebuilding remains elusive.

According to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “peacebuilding [is] action to identify and
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into
conflict.”

In defining peacebuilding, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has argued that “national and
international efforts in the early post-conflict period should focus on meeting the most urgent and
important peacebuilding objectives: establishing security, building confidence in a political process,
delivering initial peace dividends and expanding core national capacity.”

According to the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, four goals are critical
to peacebuilding and statebuilding: “Legitimate Politics (foster inclusive political settlements and
conflict resolution); Security (establish and strengthen people’s security); Justice (address injustices
and increase people’s access to justice); Economic Foundations (generate employment and improve
livelihoods); [and] Revenue and Services (manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair
service delivery).”

Sources: UN, An Agenda for Peace; UN, “Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath”; International
Dialogue, “A New Deal.”
Box 4.3 How Civil Society and the Business Community Help Build Peace

Civil society groups and businesses contribute significantly to peacebuilding through advocacy, direct development assistance, generation of employment opportunities, community-based multi-stakeholder dialogues, philanthropy, direct involvement in peace negotiations, and other forms of peace dividend.

Recent history offers many examples of their positive role in the consolidation of sustainable peace. For instance, civil society has actively facilitated social cohesion through intercommunity dialogue in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Bosnia. Civil society groups were also instrumental in the establishment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (see 6.2.3), which inhibits the marketing of “conflict minerals.” The experience of the Mujeres de Portillo in Caracas, Venezuela, shows how a long-lasting conflict between competing gangs can be solved by a local initiative from members of that very community. Initiatives like this are becoming more frequent, especially in traumatized societies that do not see other alternatives than to take charge of their communities and set up auto-organized responses.

Business has felt increasing responsibility for peacebuilding. A stable and reliable business environment is good for both conflict-affected communities and long-term growth. Such norm-building efforts as the Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and other value-based commitments promote the business community’s socioethical interest in the promotion of peace. By making their core business activities more conflict-sensitive through social investment and policy dialogue, businesses have reinforced efforts to build durable peace in fragile regions, countries, or communities. In Colombia, for example, high-level representatives of the National Business Association of Colombia participated directly in peace talks. Colombia’s private sector also facilitated the reintegration of former combatants by offering them employment opportunities.

Still, the roles of civil society and business engagement in peacebuilding remain underdeveloped. Business groups have been criticized for using peacebuilding as window-dressing for perpetuation of unsavory activities. A primary focus on profit does not always cohere with the imperatives of building sustainable peace. The effects of conflict diamonds and oil extraction are just two well-known examples of business having a negative impact.

Intergovernmental organizations sometimes exclude civil society groups from important peacebuilding decisions and activities. This often follows from a lack of coordination with civil society organizations or appreciation of their core strengths.

Underlining the positive role that civil society and business can play in peacebuilding recognizes the need for inclusive, yet well-organized approaches to creating the conditions for durable peace. While negative side-effects should not be overlooked, without tapping the resources, technical capabilities, and passion of these essential actors, reaching the ultimate objectives of peacebuilding (see box 4.2) will only become that much harder.

Over the past thirty years, thirty-three post-conflict or post-authoritarian countries—from El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, and Brazil to Germany, South Africa, South Korea, and Kenya—have organized truth and reconciliation commissions of varying scope and powers. Some place greater emphasis on truth, others on reconciliation; many have amnesty provisions, though other than in South Africa, none has granted amnesties for gross violations of human rights. More extensive measures, such as criminal trials, lustrations, reparations, truth commissions, and vetting have appeal to victims, addressing their demands for recognition of their suffering and some form of accountability for abusers. Yet, carefully tailored versions of these measures, as well as amnesties or de facto amnesties, can be incentives to cooperate for those who might have been perpetrators, including members of the security sector.

Both judicial and nonjudicial approaches to transitional justice have a global governance dimension in the International Criminal Court (ICC), ad hoc and hybrid international criminal tribunals, and international human rights bodies. Where conflict has left few or no judges and relatively few trained legal professionals, as in Sierra Leone and Timor Leste, internationalized processes may be set up to address serious crimes. In both of these countries, truth and reconciliation commissions were also established, the final reports of which were handed over to the UN.

4.2.7 UN Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission

The UN Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and promoting “the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments” (UN Charter Articles 24 and 26). Precisely because it wields considerable formal authority on fundamental questions of war and peace, increasing the Council’s representation and decision-making transparency—including with regard to use of the veto by its five permanent members—is consistently the most high-profile UN reform topic and just as consistently stymied. Discussions have included the need to better engage troop and police-contributing states, civil society, and business groups in the Security Council’s prevention, peacemaking, and peacekeeping agendas.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission, established in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 UN World Summit, is a subsidiary advisory body to the General Assembly and the Security Council. It is mandated to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources, support integrated strategies, and develop best practices to assist war-torn countries. Once viewed as an innovative experiment to break away from business as usual, the Commission has a mixed record. Its attempt to create integrated peacebuilding strategies quickly became intertwined with many other processes and mechanisms at work in the fragile states it chose to support. With no control over peacebuilding funds and with little staff support, it has not been an especially effective player. UN Member States need to revisit the Commission’s relationship with the Security Council and General Assembly, its basic authorities, and its current limited focus. Moreover, there remains room for improvement for collaborating with civil-society actors on the ground, as noted by a report published in April 2015 by of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and the Quaker United Nations Office (entitled Filling the Gap: How civil society engagement can help the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture meet its purpose). For further elaboration on both the Security Council and Peacebuilding Commission, see 7.2.2, 7.2.5, 7.3.2, and 7.3.5.

4.2.8 Fragile states and the Post-2015 Development Agenda

In 2011, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, in what is known as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal), recommended actions and reforms that recognized the special needs of fragile and conflict-affected states beyond the scope of the
Millennium Development Goals. In 2014, these needs were formalized by the Open Working Group in Sustainable Development Goal no. 16: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” In February 2015, the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, an external group set up by the UN, published a full list of indicators to serve as a model for the final package of performance benchmarks for implementation of the SDGs.64

4.3 Reform Agenda

Options and recommendations to fill critical gaps and improve global governance support to fragile and conflict-affected environments are discussed in the following sections.

4.3.1 Strengthen the role of women in peace and security

4.3.1.1 Strengthen the role of women in peace processes

Representatives of international and regional organizations need to do more to ensure that women are included in peace processes.65 Prioritizing justice for women “is an essential part of rebuilding trust in state institutions, establishing inclusive citizenship and ultimately sustainable peace.”66 To raise the profile of women on an international level, the following steps should be taken. First, global and regional institutions should be examples for women’s inclusion and should appoint women to prominent peacemaking roles at the international level. Second, international actors that fund and support peace processes should actively demand the inclusion of women in peace processes.

Third, global and regional institutions need to embark on a more holistic global campaign for women’s equality and gender mainstreaming, which co-opts men as partners in the realization of women’s rights. For example, the HeforShe campaign should be implemented at the national and grassroots level through National Action Plans and other policy instruments.67

4.3.1.2 Learn and share lessons from implementing National Action Plans under SCR 1325

National governments should build implementation of their National Action Plan for SCR 1325 (women and peacebuilding) into their foreign policy. In particular, three key steps are recommended:68

- **Alignment with national policy priorities** is an excellent way to secure and sustain political will. For National Action Plans to be effective tools of foreign policy, they must align with and augment a country’s existing priorities. When a NAP is viewed as a critical element of larger national policy goals, it ensures two critical components of effective implementation: political will and resources.

- **Plans that complement and influence foreign policy need not rely on Resolution 1325** to be successful. Instead, the Dutch experience suggests a different lens: attaining meaningful participation of women in peace and security processes, affirming women’s contribution to peace and security, and achieving women’s human security. These objectives offer a framework more easily customized to a country’s specific goals.

- **Stakeholder cooperation** is essential, but cooperation models must be customized to the country. Civil society’s involvement often determines the overall reach of a country’s NAP.
4.3.2 Prevent armed conflict

4.3.2.1 Improve conflict analysis and crisis warning
In 2000, the General Assembly rejected a proposal to give the UN Secretariat a strategic early-warning and analysis capacity for instability and armed conflict. Fifteen years later, the UN’s continuing involvement in stabilization efforts suggests that revisiting the proposal is appropriate (see also proposal 7.3.5.2).

R2P can be invoked too late to be of major help in fast-moving atrocity scenarios. High-level discussions should, therefore, both work out an agreement on the signs and factors associated with mass atrocity events, and designate responsibility for analysis and warning to enable quicker decision-making. That capacity could be vested in the UN Secretariat and include rotating contributions from Member States.

Building the capacity of states to prevent atrocities requires far closer attention to the political, social, and institutional factors known to generate political extremism and violence

4.3.2.2 Focus on the Responsibility to Prevent
Building the capacity of states to prevent atrocities requires far closer attention to the political, social, and institutional factors known to generate political extremism and violence. Moreover, the UN Security Council should not be seen as the only organ with authority relevant to R2P if preventing atrocities is to be taken seriously. All major UN agencies and programs should develop a plan of action to review the relevance of their work to the R2P principle and a unified UN perspective on the challenge of preventing and addressing atrocities.

4.3.3 Develop greater consensus on R2P operations

4.3.3.1 Specify the responsibilities and objectives of R2P mission participants
The ICISS report and 2005 World Summit Outcome Document each specified a collective responsibility by invoking the international community. Other than that the UN Security Council should authorize armed humanitarian intervention, however, more can be done to assign specific responsibilities to states and institutions among the international community when states are unable or unwilling to uphold their responsibilities domestically. The effort to set concrete, achievable goals for various actors under R2P pillars two and three (see box 4.1) needs to be a concerted one. These goals could take the form of a multi-stakeholder, new social compact that includes civil society and business active in the fragile or conflict-affected environment (see also 8.3.1.1). States could build consensus through a new diplomatic initiative or independent expert report, or the UN Secretary-General could focus on this agenda in his annual R2P report.

4.3.3.2 Emphasize the principle of “no net harm” in R2P planning and deployments
To strengthen the R2P principle and its operationalization, intergovernmental consensus is needed to accommodate some of the challenges and proposals that have emerged since the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Brazil’s Responsibility While Protecting concept is one approach to addressing such challenges. It is especially important that R2P authorizations incorporate a due diligence requirement with regard to protection of civilians and avoidance of civilian casualties.
4.3.3.3 Embed standards-monitoring and human rights teams in R2P-associated events
To accommodate some of the concerns that have emerged since 2005, especially on implementation of R2P, states undertaking protective interventions should agree to embed UN mission monitors in their operations in exchange for UN Security Council authorization to act, to verify due diligence in avoiding civilian casualties, in line with the concept of Responsibility While Protecting.

4.3.4 Strengthen UN military, police, and civilian response capacity for peace operations

4.3.4.1 Make designated Member State military units available for UN or regional peace operations on short notice
A number of UN operations in the past decade have been set up as crisis intervention efforts or have deployed into areas with active insurgencies—either for want of alternative forces or to replace such forces. If this trend continues, Member States need urgently to revisit concepts for making military units of battalion or brigade size available for UN use on thirty to sixty days’ notice and to upgrade those concepts for twenty-first-century conditions and demands. The need applies to frontline military units as well as to engineering units, medical units, and intelligence and surveillance capabilities. States should offer deployments of at least six months’ duration. Units and contributing countries on the short-notice standby list should rotate off and be replaced by other units or countries after not more than one year on standby.

4.3.4.2 Enhance UN ability to rapidly deploy military planning and support teams to new and existing UN missions
The current capacity of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) to deploy small numbers of military specialists on temporary duty for mission setup and advice should be substantially enlarged to accommodate the expanding mandates of UN field operations and the continuing need for planners, analysts, and other specialties to support those operations on an urgent basis. We recommend that OMA, which is presently staffed with about 110 officers to support as many as one hundred thousand troops in the field, be expanded by at least fifty posts and that the bulk of OMA personnel be trained and available for temporary field duty as required.

4.3.4.3 Make designated Member State formed police units available for UN deployment on short notice
Equivalent time-urgency applies in the early days of a new mission to formed police units, for which the UN presently depends on not more than fourteen Member States. Given the time-sensitive needs of many new generation operations, it behooves Member States that use gendarmerie-type police units domestically to designate one or two well-trained and well-equipped units for relatively rapid call-up to UN missions for deployments of not more than one year.

4.3.4.4 Establish a sizable standing and reserve capacity to support rapid and sustainable deployment of police to UN peace operations
Few countries maintain police capacity intended for international operations. The United Nations, however, has been called on to deploy at least ten thousand police in its peace operation in each of the last seven years and five to nine thousand in the seven years earlier. UN policing has not had a lean year since 1998. Police are in continual demand domestically in all countries, and those who deploy internationally tend to return home after not more than a year in the field. Box 4.4 summarizes a proposal to meet UN rapid deployment needs in this area.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Proposals</th>
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<th>Primary Tasks</th>
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<tr>
<td>UN Police Standing Capacity (POLCAP)</td>
<td>A permanent, standing cadre of police and police development specialists available for rapid setup of police components in new peace operations, pre-deployment training of police officers seconded to UN missions, technical advice to ongoing missions, and staffing of police components in transitioning missions.</td>
<td>Lack of operational institutional memory; incomplete needs assessments; lack of personnel experienced in UN mission setup, management, police development and police reform; slow deployment of key personnel to missions; uneven quality of police personnel.</td>
<td><em>When not deployed to missions:</em> Vet and train reserves; conduct lessons learned analyses; refine UN police guidance and standard operating procedures; plan for anticipated missions; do refresher training. <em>Immediately pre-deployment:</em> Mission-specific training; participate in strategic assessments and mission planning. <em>Deployed (seven to twenty-one days post-mandate):</em> Advanced mission planning, police reform planning, police HQ setup, field training and supervision of UNPOL from reserves.</td>
<td>400 persons: 275 uniformed police and 125 civilian experts in all facets of police development, management, and planning; 25 to 30 percent women; could be deployed in flexible teams; operating tempo up to 50 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Police Reserve (UNPR)</td>
<td>Gives Member States financial incentives to place specific officers on reserve for UN work, and reimbursement for deployments. Reserve officers would receive general and pre-deployment training on UN police standards and mission requirements and in turn be available for rapid deployment.</td>
<td>Slow deployment of individual UN police; unknown experience and skills of those who will be deploying; uneven UN access to needed specialties; lack of pre-deployment training prior to arrival in mission.</td>
<td><em>When not deployed to missions:</em> Must be certified prior to joining reserve, undergo periodic training in UN police policy and operations and periodic assessment; two weeks of annual refresher training. <em>Immediately pre-deployment:</em> Mission-specific training Deployed (sixty days post-call-up): UNPR officers would conduct all activities currently carried out by individual UNPOL.</td>
<td>Based on demand for UNPOL and operating tempo realistic for active duty police; three in reserve for each deployed (25 percent optempo, or one year in four with UN). About eighteen thousand reservists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Senior Police Roster (UNSPR)</td>
<td>A roster system where senior (retired) police officers and civilian police specialists would be available for UN mission service. A fraction willing to deploy on short (thirty-day) notice would receive an annual retainer.</td>
<td>Poor availability of police leadership with international experience; poor leadership-level institutional memory.</td>
<td>Serve as Head of Police Component, chiefs of police operations, training, criminal intelligence; with sufficient seniority and experience to be credible mentors and advisers to senior host state counterparts.</td>
<td>Variable but on the order of fifty.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Source: Adapted from Durch and England, Enhancing United Nations Capacity, xxi.*
4.3.4.5 Establish standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployment needs for civilian specialist skills
To expand and enhance the next generation of peace operations, the Commission recommends establishing a new UN Civilian Response Capability of approximately five hundred personnel, to include fifty top flight mediators and experienced diplomats. A reserve component of about two thousand would recruit personnel from across the UN system and beyond for specific planning, management, institutional development, and technical skills. These arrangements would need to offer participants both incentives and periodic feedback on their quarterly likelihood of call-up, and to confirm their continuing interest and availability (for further discussion, see box 4.5).

4.3.5 Improve capacity for restoring rule of law, transitional justice, and host state resilience

4.3.5.1 Focus G20 support on the New Deal for engagement in fragile states
The G20 leading global economies, in consultation with an upgraded Peacebuilding Commission (see 7.3.5), should meet with the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states to chart a path to implementing the recommended actions and reforms of the New Deal for engagement in fragile states.

4.3.5.2 Combat corruption to support effective rule of law
Immediately post-conflict, government institutions will likely operate within long-standing frameworks of political influence, including systemic corruption that diverts public funds to private ends. Peacebuilders should understand that building government legitimacy in the eyes of society requires anticorruption strategies built into capacity-building programs, giving equal emphasis to personal and institutional integrity and ways to incentivize it. Reducing corruption is essential to building effective rule of law, given that corruption amounts to bending that rule at will.

4.3.5.3 Augment current disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programming with greater emphasis on countering (preventing the rise of) violent extremism
DDR programming in countries emerging from conflict needs to be more attuned to the direct effects that regional conflict and entrepreneurs of violent extremism may have on DDR outcomes. Regional instability may attract demobilized fighters to other conflicts and cash transition payments may inadvertently reinforce fighter “recycling” or recidivism by providing what amounts to a form of unemployment insurance to fighters between engagements, especially where regular employment is scarce. To reduce recycling and counter violent extremism, DDR programs should focus on social reintegration of ex-fighters as much as it focuses on immediate income support, and use biometric data to build databases of individuals who process through DDR programs anywhere in the region.

4.3.5.4 Consider hybrid models of justice when transitioning to a modern state court system
Building competent formal state court institutions in conflict-affected states that reach most of a country’s citizens can take decades. Hybrid models of justice combining customary, religious, and international human rights principles can offer a realistic interim way forward for rule of law promotion in fragile and conflict-affected environments. A hybrid approach that accepts a role for informal, traditional, or community-based justice for a transitional period can be both pragmatic and cost effective. Equally important, it can help build the foundations for durable peace as justice is dispensed and citizens’ rights are safeguarded by an arrangement for which the state can take at least partial credit and garner legitimacy at the expense of militant anti-government groups (such as the Taliban movement in Afghanistan).
Box 4.5 A New UN Civilian Response Capability

The United Nations has a primary role in responding to threats to international peace and security. As of January 2015, it deploys more than 122,000 personnel from 123 countries in sixteen peace operations, including five thousand international civilian personnel and twelve thousand locally hired staff. Gradually, the strategic response to crises has shifted from reaction to prevention. To prevent conflict recurrence, civilian experts have taken on a growing number of tasks, from public administration reform and economic development strategies to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. Recent examples include the multidimensional missions in South Sudan and Mali.

UN peace operations are mandated not only to deliver temporary stability but to offer a fresh start for conflict-ridden environments. But these operations face perennial challenges in recruiting appropriate personnel. Delivering an immediate cessation of violent conflict is a task for military and police forces but promotion of justice and prevention of conflict relapse requires more attention to building a competent, legitimate, and accountable government, which is not a job for soldiers or police. Civilian experts, such as lawyers, judges, doctors, teachers, and civil engineers are necessary to stand up civilian courts, provide or rebuild health services, and rebuild schools, train teachers, and perhaps operate schools. Turning stabilization into transition—from externally supported security into home-grown “just security”—requires substantial civilian expertise.

The Commission therefore recommends the establishment of a new United Nations Civilian Response Capability with a cadre of five hundred international staff under a jurisdiction to be determined but flexible enough to cross-roster personnel between, for example, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Development Programme, without encountering serious obstacles. Some of this cadre should be deployable within a week or two and possess technical and managerial skills most needed in today’s operations. A diverse, yet specialized track of fifty senior mediators and Special Envoy/Representatives of the Secretary-General should receive regular refresher courses and serve as the senior echelon of the larger professional civilian cadre. The standing group should be complemented by a two-thousand-strong standby component of highly skilled and periodically trained international civil servants pulled from across the UN system, including the World Bank and IMF, and beyond the UN system to tap further specialized skillsets (including judges, municipal-level administrators, engineers and technical specialists, including in newly needed skills such as cybersecurity).

The new Civilian Response Capability would ensure that the UN can better respond to the urgent needs of conflict prevention and recurrence worldwide. Central to the future of integrated (civilian-military-police) UN peace operations, the capability would aim to establish strategic partnerships and regional and other peacebuilding actors beyond the UN system. It would represent a clearer commitment by the world body to the Responsibility to Rebuild within the broader R2P principle.

Sources: Gowan, UN Crisis Diplomacy and Peacekeeping; UNDPKO, “Peacekeeping Fact Sheet”; United Nations, “Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations”
4.3.5.5 Consider transformational justice as a postwar alternative that addresses not just the results but also the roots of violence

As conflicts around the world continue to flare up, and some transitional justice efforts stumble, more effective international responses to help fragile communities overcome grievances that plague their societies need to be found. One approach is to design such programs to be transformational, rather than transitional, on the argument that war-torn societies need more than one kind of post-conflict truth and justice. They need legal or retributive justice supported by forensic truth, acknowledgment of wrongdoing, socioeconomic justice (compensation for injury or loss), and political justice (democratic accountability as well as public policy and services).70

The state remains the indispensable building block for providing security and justice in global governance. It should, however, also receive the support it needs from the international community to fulfill this role when its own institutions and capacities falter. Preserving a viable public space cannot be seen in isolation from shared ecological space and the world’s increasing reliance on new technologies.
The impact of human activity on the global climate is clear, and, with each successive IPCC report, the need to take extraordinary and decisive action becomes more evident and urgent. The IPCC is the scientific research arm of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty signed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The Convention recognizes that halting global warming and other effects of climate change requires a global effort, as broad climatic trends ripple through regions without regard to national boundaries. As the parties to the Framework Convention look toward the Twenty-First Conference of the Parties this December in Paris, many remain hopeful that a binding climate agreement can emerge that applies to all parties; others remain concerned that the conference will come up short again.

It is reasonably well known that global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) must be sufficiently and rapidly reduced to keep mean global surface temperatures from rising more than two degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels (2ºC). Long-running disputes focus on who contributes how much to emissions reduction (or to avoiding emissions increases) and who pays for such mitigation efforts and for adaptation to the effects of climate change. Knowing the path forward in broad terms has allowed other actors, from international organizations to groups of states and coalitions of commercial or civil society groups, to undertake initiatives in parallel with the global negotiations and consistent with 2ºC. Even if the negotiations do not result in an agreement with enforceable obligations at the end of 2015, other initiatives already in the climate pipeline to educate, inform, advise, nudge, coordinate, and strengthen 2ºC mitigation norms and adaptation efforts will continue—as, very likely, will the negotiations.

Likewise, the ideas and recommendations in this section are intended to be useful, implementable, and consistent with the intent of the Framework Convention process, whether or not the Paris Conference of the Parties produces a binding agreement. More than any other issue, climate change requires proactive and inclusive multilevel governance: global, regional, national, and subnational, including public-private partnerships and both business and civil society initiatives. Many potential contributors have roles to play in stabilizing the global climate within margins of safety for humanity at large and, in particular, for those most at risk to the effects of climate change. The largest proportion of vulnerable people live in countries that have contributed the least to creating the present situation. They face decisions about the future course of their lives as technology offers new energy choices not available or accessible to prior generations, provided they can afford it. How established and rising industrial powers undertake specific actions will set the stage not just for climate change, but also for security and justice, for the remainder of the century and beyond.
5.1 Key Challenges and Opportunities

Since the inaugural IPCC report in 1990, periodic updates have continued to deepen the scientific consensus around the nature, causes, and effects of a changing global climate. In the IPCC’s most recent assessment report, its fifth, the findings are most dramatic. GHG levels are the highest they have been in more than eight hundred thousand years and rates of increase are the highest in twenty-two thousand. Global temperatures are predicted to rise more than 2ºC above pre-industrial levels before 2100 unless global GHG emissions are pushed 40 to 70 percent lower by 2050 than they were in 2010 and fall to zero by 2100.72

Figure 5.1 Earth Surface Temperature Changes under Different Assumptions about Greenhouse Gas Emissions

(a) Change in average surface temperature (1986–2005 to 2081–2100)

Source: IPCC, Climate Change 2014. Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers, 12. RCP2.6 is the IPCC’s most optimistic scenario, showing results of early and aggressive reductions in GHG emissions. RCP8.5 is the projection of business-as-usual trends in GHG emissions. The numbers to the upper right of each map reflect the number of models used to create these projections. Reprinted with permission.

Given the global problem with CO2 emissions, subsidies to extract fossil fuels should be a relic of the past. However, continued subsidies for fossil fuels keep energy prices artificially low, encouraging overconsumption of carbon resources. The IMF estimated in 2013 that removing fossil fuel subsidies globally could cut CO2 emissions by 13 percent and save governments US$1.9 trillion worldwide, the equivalent of 8 percent of total government revenues or 2.5 percent of global GDP.73 Shifting at least some subsidies to renewable energy sources or to tax credits for using renewable sources or conserving energy could help manage the impact of possible price increase in fossil fuels.

CO2 is not the only GHG, but it is the most abundant and long lasting. Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) can have much stronger warming effects. For example, 1 ton of atmospheric methane has about the same warming effect as 25 tons of CO2 and 45 million tons of methane are released each year in the course of petroleum and methane extraction and distribution alone.74 Other SLCPs include black carbon and tropospheric ozone, a component of urban smog that forms when sunlight hits other airborne pollutants.75 Between 2010 and 2040, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that a suite of measures to reduce these pollutants could lead to a 0.4 to 0.5ºC reduction in global temperatures and help prevent 2.4 million premature deaths annually from polluted air.76
Among the most visible of global warming’s effects today is the rise in sea level due to substantial glacial melting and the expansion of sea water as its mean temperature increases. Sea level rise has accelerated in the past decade and is expected to accelerate further with growing global surface temperatures. Should GHG emissions fall to zero, elevated surface temperatures will continue because of the persistence of atmospheric CO2. Glacial melting has increased in the past decade and will accelerate with future surface temperature rise, but current temperatures are enough to ensure continued glacial melting for the indefinite future. Air temperatures would already be higher but for the oceans absorbing more than 90 percent of atmospheric heat build-up and 30 percent of the CO2 generated by human action. And because water expands in volume as it heats up, rising ocean temperature alone contributes to sea level rise. The absorbed CO2 also reacts with water to form carbonic acid, which is destructive to shelled ocean life. Under the most optimistic of IPCC scenarios, sea levels are expected to rise about 20 centimeters by 2050 and 50 centimeters by 2100; under business as usual, they will rise nearly one meter. Regardless of the scenario under consideration, sea levels will continue to rise for centuries. Rising waters and worsening weather already pose serious threats to low-lying islands and small island states. They will soon pose equally serious threats to many of the world’s busiest port cities.

Damage potential was highlighted by an OECD-commissioned study of port cities’ exposure to damage from a worst-case, hundred-year coastal flood event. In 2005, about forty million people (roughly 10 percent of the population of 136 cities studied) and US$3 trillion in assets were exposed to risk of catastrophic damage. Running that scenario forward to the 2070s—assuming greater storminess and a half-meter sea level rise (the current mid-range IPCC estimate) and accounting for population growth, greater urbanization, and coastal subsidence—the risk-exposed population grew to roughly 150 million with US$35 trillion in assets placed at risk. Urban populations projected to be at greatest risk of catastrophic flooding in the 2070s include Kolkata (fourteen million, seven times more than in 2005), Guangdong (ten million, four times), Lagos (three million, nine times), New York–Newark (three million, two times), and greater Tokyo (2.5 million, 2.5 times). Lest 2070 seem too distant to be of merit for planning, it is worth recalling that major flood control projects like the Thames Barrier have typically taken thirty years or more to complete.

The people of the world’s least developed countries, or “bottom billion,” are most susceptible to environmental stress because they are least equipped financially to relocate or otherwise adapt. LDCs will face issues of food and water security, and of managing internal and international climate migration, much of which will be to cities. By 2030, the end year for the SDGs, climate change related economic losses are predicted to reduce global GDP by up to 11 percent among LDCs due to deepening drought and to lead to lower crop yields, higher food prices (25 to 100 percent), and greater food insecurity. Population estimates indicate that Africa’s population will at least double by 2050, and climate change is expected to decrease its arable land by as much as two-thirds. Because 650 million people in Africa presently depend on rain-fed agriculture, they are especially vulnerable to drought. Moreover, a large percentage of African farmers and livestock-tenders are women. Since men may migrate to seek alternative livelihoods, the impact of climate change on women in such circumstances may be doubly harsh.

A basic sense of justice as fairness would direct special attention and resources toward those least able to cope with climate change—those most vulnerable today and future generations—but governance shortfalls aggravate disparities within and between states. Low government capacity worsens the effects of environmental stresses. A state apparatus that cannot deliver public services or relocation support, or does not care to, is a further burden on those who can least afford it. The major questions then are as follows:
“Who pays” for the damage inflicted by cumulative carbon and other industrial emissions over time has been a major sticking point in moving global climate negotiations forward. The major historical emitters are the world’s richest countries and the major new emitters are the world’s emerging economies. China is the world’s largest user of coal and India is expected to surpass the United States, presently the second largest, before 2020.82

“Who decides” what policies should be pursued, and how they should be implemented, have only more recently been contested and remain understudied facets of climate policymaking. Thus far, states and their national governments have been the central players in global climate negotiations. Although civil society organizations have long held observer status in UNFCCC deliberations and find opportunities to speak in plenaries, their participation is at the discretion of the meeting’s chair. No observers are permitted to attend small, informal-informal sessions, although some CSOs may be accredited to their national delegations.83 CSOs and other actors have a direct stake in how these negotiations work, in who has a meaningful voice in the deliberations, and in the global governance institutions they may yet produce.

The struggle to ensure a global equilibrium between climate technology development and use is yet to be won

“Which actions” are required to effectively combat climate change is far from clear. It is, however, consensually recognized that technological innovations have a significant role in climate adaptation and mitigation strategies. Numerous public global, regional, and national climate policies and frameworks emphasize the need for writing greater investment in development and green technology transfer into climate change action plans.84 Yet environmentally sound technologies (ESTs), such as innovative renewable energy sources and sustainable agricultural technologies, often emerge from the private sector. Challenges encountered by the latter in the research and development of ESTs include financing and marketing restraints, especially in developing countries and LDCs.85 LDCs grapple with obstacles relating to gaining access to and using ESTs.86 These obstacles include EST intellectual property regulation and inadequate infrastructural and human resource capacities to use the products. The international community and governments are exploring policies to encourage green technology producers and enable poor users to gain access to, and effectively use, developed technologies.87 Nevertheless, the struggle to ensure a global equilibrium between climate technology development and use is yet to be won.

“Why wait” until diplomacy finally crafts a political response to climate issues is a question posed by scientists and engineers who see potential in an engineering response, if only to slow the onset of warming and buy time for politics to catch up. Debate has thus arisen about whether to attempt to actively intervene in climate dynamics. Such geoengineering concepts include techniques that have consequences for the entire global community if applied, and raise equity concerns over how related decisions would be made. No one actor or group of actors should be able to use unverified technology that may place others at risk, particularly without their consent or without their knowledge, and without careful oversight. This sector is currently without formal regulation or international-level guidance. We return to it in section 5.2.5.
Finally, climate change poses challenges to more than national governments. Cities in particular are anticipating challenges to their abilities to provide public services as populations rise, partly from internal migration away from drought- or flood-stricken farmland. Efforts to help the most vulnerable build lives more resilient to climate change depend in part on intelligent financial support to adaptation—both to persons and to municipalities bearing the brunt of climate migration—and being able to provide the right adaptive technology at a reasonable price.

5.2 Current Responses

International efforts to broker agreement on how to respond to climate change have been underway since the early 1990s, but initial successes have given way to decades of complicated and often cumbersome negotiation. Issues of justice are raised with an emphasis on the rights and duties of states, rather than on fair and secure outcomes for people. Technology shows promise for both mitigation and adaptation but will not realize its full potential if users cannot access or afford the results of innovation.

5.2.1 International climate governance: The UNFCCC and other forums

Through the UNFCCC COP, Member States have worked toward an agreement to rein in emissions, though recent efforts to generate a new binding agreement beyond the 1997 Kyoto Protocol have met with opposition. Leading GHG emitters are wary of handing over implementing oversight to an international governing body, and developing countries worry that caps on GHG emissions will leave them at an economic disadvantage. Improving nonstate engagement with the UNFCCC negotiating framework remains a concern for many, even as record numbers of CSOs and business representatives attend the annual COPs.

The Framework Convention (Article 3, paragraph 1) establishes that states have “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) for dealing with GHG emissions. Specifically, developed and transitional economies listed in the Framework Convention’s Annex I have responsibility for taking actions to limit their emissions. A somewhat shorter list of developed countries (Convention Annex II) is responsible for providing financial assistance to developing countries for climate reporting, mitigation, and adaptation efforts.

The Kyoto Protocol to the Convention was negotiated in 1997 and entered into force in early 2005, setting emissions targets for six GHGs for an initial commitment period of 2008 through 2012, again only for developed countries. Of the 192 signatories to the Protocol, the United States did not ratify and Canada withdrew in late 2012. The Protocol envisioned further commitment periods and the 2012 Doha Amendment proposed one, but in two years only twenty-six of the required 144 countries ratified the amendment. One element of Kyoto was an international emissions trading scheme designed to promote clean development (see box 5.1). It is now in abeyance but still promising in concept. The task of the Paris COP is to devise follow-on measures to Kyoto.

The shortcomings of the Copenhagen round of talks led to formation of a number of informal groups of Member States intended to advance the Framework Convention process. The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action formed in March 2010 with representatives from Latin America, Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Oceania but few of the globe’s major GHG emitters, with the intention to have a more open and constructive “offline” conversation on major negotiating issues.
The Petersberg Climate Dialogue is an equally diverse group with thirty-two members (as of 2014), including the United States, Japan, and BASIC members (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), as well as Cartagena participants such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, Peru and the United Kingdom. 89

Since 2011, the government of Japan has been developing the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), through which it matched funds with other donors, such as the Asian Development Bank, toward climate mitigation projects in developing countries. A Joint Committee of Japanese and host country representatives review, approve, and oversee projects. Between January 2013 and July 2014, Japan signed JCM agreements with twelve developing countries.

In June 2012, the Rio+20 Conference decided to establish a new UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable Development as the main UN platform dealing with sustainable development.90 The HLPF is supposed to meet annually at the ministerial level under the auspices of ECOSOC and every four years at the heads of state level.

Also at Rio+20, eighteen states from the Global North and South signed an Establishment Agreement to transform the Global Green Growth Initiative (GGGI)—originally launched in 2010 as a nonprofit organization by the government of the Republic of Korea—into an international organization. Now at twenty-four members, GGGI “works with developing and emerging countries to design and deliver programs and services that demonstrate new pathways to pro-poor economic growth,” aiming for environmentally sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction and social inclusion. GGGI works in ten developing countries and plans to add a further sixteen countries during 2015.91

In March 2013, the UN General Assembly created an expanded governing body for UNEP, the UN Environment Assembly, of all UN Member States. At its first ministerial meeting in June 2014, the new assembly pledged in the outcome document to take action against climate change in accordance with the objectives, principles, and provisions of the UNFCCC.

Coming out of the Lima COP in December 2014, participating states agreed to submit their “intended nationally determined contribution” (INDC) to 2020 GHG emission goals to the UNFCCC Secretariat before the Paris meeting. It is widely anticipated that the sum total of pledges in the INDCs will not rise to the levels needed to meet a 2ºC objective.

Another initiative in support of climate mitigation and green energy at the intergovernmental level, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), was established in 2011 in Abu Dhabi. Its membership presently includes 120 states. Forty others are seeking to join. With a small budget (US$64 million), IRENA aims to become a principal source of knowledge and best practice on renewable energy sources and on transitioning to a renewable energy economy.

In general, far more emphasis has been put to date on mitigation and mitigation finance than on climate adaptation. An exception is found in the global disaster risk reduction community, which sees climate change as a looming source of stronger natural disasters requiring greater resilience on the part of communities and countries. Greater resilience to climate impacts is a goal of climate adaptation measures as well. But whereas mitigation measures can be funded and undertaken at scale, effective adaptation measures are usually more community—and situation—specific. Moreover, although mitigation has 2ºC as a measurable global goal, adaptation has no agreed equivalent.
Despite recognition that the poorest and most vulnerable of human communities need the most assistance to adapt to climate threats, the amount of international funding provided for adaptation was only US$25 billion in 2013, a modest increase over 2012 but still just 7 percent of total climate finance. Regional and local governments and communities affected by adaptation programming should also be engaged earlier and more actively. The Climate Policy Initiative, which tracks climate financing, notes that while its reporting on mitigation finance includes private flows (58 percent of the annual total and most invested domestically rather than in third countries), private flows for adaptation are difficult to determine, and because the co-benefits of adaptation are local more than global, it is more difficult to incentivize international adaptation assistance.92

Box 5.1 Emissions Trading and Credits Under the UNFCCC

The Kyoto Protocol established an international emissions trading (IET) scheme, also known as cap and trade. IET allows for the buying, selling, and trading of carbon emissions allowances, as well as removal units—those earned for such actions as land conversion and reforestation efforts. Countries that pollute more than their cap can buy allowances from those that emit less than their allowance. In theory, cuts are made where they are most feasible, and bought more affordably where they are not. Annex I countries can earn credits (called certified emissions reduction (CER) credits) through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for emissions reduction projects completed in developing countries. Projects have included solar energy systems in China, carbon sequestration in Costa Rica, and reforestation initiatives in Uganda. To qualify for credit, projects must account for reductions above and beyond existing efforts in the project country. As of 2014, 7,870 projects have been registered in 107 developing countries, for a total calculated reduction of 1.5 billion tons of CO2 equivalent. Many see this as a strong way to expedite sustainable development and facilitate environmentally sound technology transfer to developing countries.

For reductions in developed countries, the Kyoto Protocol provided Joint Implementation (JI), which lets Annex I countries earn emissions reduction units for projects they support in other Annex I countries, especially those categorized as “economies in transition.”

Dissatisfaction with the Kyoto Protocol has since reduced interest in both mechanisms. Few countries have signed on to the new commitment period, which has caused demand for projects and credits to crash. Total Emission Reduction Units for JI dropped from 526 million in 2012 to 16 million in 2014, and CERs issued for the CDM went from over 20 million in 2012 to barely 5 million in 2014.

Sources: UN, Mechanisms Under Kyoto Protocol; UNFCCC, “Bonn Climate Change”; UNFCCC, Annual Report; and Wike, “Many around the world see climate change as a major threat.”
5.2.2 Regional organizations and bilateral initiatives

As the global negotiations have continued, regional and bilateral groups of states have reached climate accords of their own. In September 2012, the European Union and China signed an agreement for EU support to Chinese development of carbon trading systems, water and waste management, and sustainable urbanization. Two years later, the EU reached an internal agreement to cut GHG emissions to 40 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. The EU accounts for 10 percent or less of annual global GHG emissions, so the net effect by 2030 will be a 4 percent global emissions reduction.

In November 2014, the United States and China agreed to pursue independent GHG targets. The United States pledged to cut its emissions 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, and China agreed to both cap its emissions not later than 2030 and increase the share of energy it generates from nonfossil fuels. The two largest GHG emitters demonstrated by this action that they affirm the reality of climate change and wish to take steps to mitigate it. Although China’s pledge does not include any near-term reductions, other policy initiatives such as major investments in renewable energy show promise for the medium term.

5.2.3 Subnational and nongovernmental approaches to mitigation and adaptation

This category comprises initiatives taken beneath and beyond the national level to find solutions to immediate problems of climate mitigation and adaptation faced by governors and mayors—who may have more in common with peers than with their parent governments—and by international corporations, which are fast recognizing the growing market opportunities associated with managing the impact of climate change.

5.2.3.1 Subnational government initiatives: cities and regions

The most recent IPCC report states that urban areas produce three-quarters of energy-related CO2 emissions and up to half of total GHG emissions. The density of cities as growing hubs of economic activity also puts them most at risk of the flooding, coastal storm, public health issues, and pollution impacts anticipated as a result of climate change. It follows that urban areas, often relatively autonomously governed entities, would be important targets for mitigation and adaptation efforts and also seek to learn from one another.

Urban areas would be important targets for mitigation and adaptation efforts

In recent years, groups of cities have taken it upon themselves, with the help of international organizations, to form collaborative networks that leverage collective knowledge and strategically target at-risk areas with high-reward ideas. Programs like the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, whose members are home to 18 percent of global GDP, and International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI)-Local Governments for Sustainability, which supports urban planning and conferences for hundreds of local governments, channel mutual lessons learned, successful approaches and collective lobbying power toward change. At the 2014 UN Climate Summit, the Compact of Mayors initiative, involving both C40 and ICLEI, was announced to solicit

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emissions reduction commitments and garner financing on a global scale. Participants will “use the Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories (GPC)—the world’s most widely-endorsed GHG accounting and reporting standard for cities.” A climate risks and adaptation data framework is under development. Standardized reporting and sharing best practices will help ensure that initiatives are compatible with one another and have coherent impact on a global scale. A global reference point from which relevant climate-related knowledge and programming could be derived would efficiently complement the global relationships that these coalitions help build.

Other subnational and municipal governments have been coming together in networks of support for sustainable development, renewable energy, and GHG reductions. The Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD) was founded in 2002 and represents fifty subnational governments from thirty countries on sustainable development issues at the global level. R20 is another association of more than forty subnational government entities from five regions, and has more than five hundred affiliate jurisdictions. Its stated mission is to help subnational governments around the world to develop low-carbon and climate resilient economic development projects.

The Climate Group is a nonprofit entity that manages the States and Regions Alliance (founded in 2005), which includes twenty-seven subnational governments representing more than three hundred million people. At the UN Climate Summit, they signed the Compact of States and Regions, in partnership with CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project; see also 5.2.3.3), committing to providing an annual account of the climate commitments made by state and regional governments around the world and report progress toward those commitments. A single global clearinghouse of information, and in particular of analysis on accumulating good practice in climate mitigation and community resilience, could be a valuable bridge between these proactive jurisdictions and the many others not yet represented in their ranks.

Much of climate governance relies on corporate interest and adherence

5.2.3.2 Corporate initiatives

Although governments at all levels are looking for ways to minimize and manage the results of climate change, much of climate governance relies on corporate interest and adherence. National commitments can set goals, but achieving these goals requires cooperation and compliance by industry—which often has a longer time horizon than governments. In September 2014, the New York Declaration on Forests included major corporations like Walmart, Unilever, Nestlé, General Mills, Barclays, and Danone pledging to eliminate deforestation activities from their supply chains, including third-party suppliers, by no later than 2020, and to evaluate and disclose their deforestation footprints.

In 2013, a number of US corporations, including ExxonMobil, Google, Microsoft, and Wells Fargo, put a shadow price on carbon, basically imposing an internal cost-added for risk and investment calculations. Some have gone as far as to include climate impacts in their annual reporting process. In 2014, Shell proposed a resolution to its shareholders to expand such reporting to post-2035 climate scenarios, operational emissions, and low-carbon R&D. Internal pricing by companies with global reach can help inform national and international pricing schemes. Coordination of corporate...
and government plans could improve the accuracy of international reduction goals and pool resources toward achieving those goals.

Other business coalitions seek to pressure governments on behalf of clean energy and climate change mitigation and adaptation. We Mean Business is a coalition “working with thousands of the world’s most influential businesses and investors [who] recognize that the transition to a low carbon economy is the only way to secure sustainable economic growth and prosperity for all.” The coalition urges greater “urgency and ambition” in government climate action, elimination of high-carbon energy subsidies, meaningful carbon pricing, “ending deforestation,” robust energy standards, scaled-up renewable energy, and “actionable incentives” to promote “an early transition to a low-carbon future.”

Another example is the UN Global Compact’s work in the area of environmental sustainability. The Global Compact recently joined forces with UNEP and the UNFCCC Secretariat on a global campaign asking companies to demonstrate leadership in pricing the costs of carbon emissions as a necessary and effective measure to tackle climate change. Their Caring for Climate campaign currently has 402 corporate signatories. Another innovative climate initiative of the Compact is the CEO Water Mandate, a public-private platform designed to assist companies in the development, implementation, and disclosure of water sustainability policies and practices. More than one hundred multinational enterprises have endorsed this initiative, including AkzoNobel, Tata Steel, Aluminum Corporation of China, and Ford Motor Company.

5.2.3.3 Civil society organizations
CSOs are active in campaigning and working on issues of climate change as a global challenge, organizing themselves in global networks such as Climate Action Network (CAN) International, and developing mechanisms to cooperate with and monitor the climate-related performance of business. Their activities include keeping climate change high on the multilateral agenda and urging decisive action by governments. Composite entities—nongovernmental, nonprofit, drawing membership from CSOs, companies, and subnational units of government—can build bridges to and engage both the commercial sector and multiple levels of government to collaborate in slowing climate change through market-based incentives, knowledge sharing (including best practices), and voluntary transparency. CDP, for example, is a global nonprofit founded in 2000 that manages a “global natural capital disclosure system” in which more than 4,500 companies participate, “representing over 50 percent of the market capitalization of the world’s largest 30 stock exchanges,” as well as more than a hundred cities from eighty countries. CDP partners with the Climate Group in the RE100 initiative to persuade “at least 100 companies to make a global 100 percent renewable commitment with a clear timeframe for reaching their goal.” RE100 is supported by IRENA and We Mean Business.

A low carbon future depends, at least to some extent, on the development of new technologies

5.2.4 Technology development, use, and distribution

Much of this discussion has addressed renewable forms of energy and organizations and businesses promoting transitions to it. Yet, the rules by which these industries should play are not standardized across the many jurisdictions where they operate. This may well be an area where the
new International Renewable Energy Agency may exert influence, but technology development and transfer is about more than green energy.

A low carbon future depends, at least to some extent, on the development of new technologies. The latest IPCC assessment report emphasizes the necessity for continuous investment in ESTs for both climate change adaptation and mitigation, and for making them more accessible to developing countries (see box 5.2). It is also important that there be effective platforms for raising, sharing, and discussing directions for innovative research and building research cooperation between developed and developing countries. The Innovation for Cool Earth Forum, founded by Japan in 2014, is one such platform.

However, the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is one of the facets of EST development that producers consider a prerequisite for research and development investment. The discussions on whether the WTO-system of trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) is a booster or a barrier for technology transfer of these green technologies have since long reached a stalemate between developed countries that consider strong intellectual property protection systems a necessary condition for technology transfer and developing countries that regard the rules as a barrier.104

To increase developing countries’ access to ESTs, a new technology mechanism (TM) was created by the UNFCCC in 2009 and a new Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2010. The function of the TM is, among others, to identify existing climate friendly technologies for mitigation and adaptation and to facilitate the adaptation and deployment of currently available technologies to meet local needs and circumstances.105 The GCF is tasked with the responsibility of promoting the paradigm shift toward low-emission and climate-resilient pathways by providing financial support to developing countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change, taking into account the needs of those developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.106

To date, the TM and the GCF have received too little funding and political support to enable them effectively to execute their responsibilities in relation to climate technology development and use. With regard to intellectual property rights, a “third way” between, on the one hand, maximalist protection and, on the other, calls for upending the current system is still lacking. The Paris Conference of the Parties in December 2015 provides new opportunities to reinvigorate interest in these international initiatives, open to public-private-partnerships that, first and foremost, seek to leverage technical ingenuity and financial resources for climate management from within the private sector.

5.2.5 Geoengineering: Weighing benefits and risks

Geoengineering (also called climate engineering) refers to strategies that try to alter the climate system through direct human intervention, broadly divided into two categories: (i) removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and (ii) modifying the reflective properties of the atmosphere.

Carbon dioxide removal, or carbon sequestration, is the better understood of the two approaches. It aims to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere and store it either by trapping it in the oceans through chemical reactions or in natural sinks underground. The most basic sequestration techniques are widely considered safe for experimentation and limited implementation. Modifying the reflective properties of the atmosphere—also called albedo modification or solar radiation management (SRM)—is the more controversial approach. It seeks to increase the atmosphere’s reflective properties
by dispersing aerosols or cloud-seeding or brightening techniques, for example, to keep a larger fraction of the sun’s heat from reaching the lower atmosphere, lowering global temperatures if done on a large enough scale. Unlike storing excess carbon, however, these techniques can fundamentally alter other important climate dynamics, such as regional precipitation patterns, and they do not alter GHG concentrations or their contributions to ocean acidification. SRM strategies are likely to have unforeseen transboundary impacts, would pose a host of governance challenges and ethical concerns, and do not address the root causes of carbon pollution. Any SRM experimentation should, therefore, be undertaken with the greatest caution.

In 2011, 160 CSOs and other nongovernmental actors lobbied the IPCC not to promote geoengineering, fearing that it would overshadow broader climate mitigation efforts, as well as divert funds that might otherwise be used for climate adaptation. However, some forms of geoengineering may be a growing risk to orderly climate change management because they appear temptingly inexpensive, and have no framework in place to prevent unwise experimentation, even on a fairly large scale. Although the science of geoengineering is mentioned in the most recent IPCC assessment report, little mention is made of governance aspects or a recommended way forward. Currently no international treaties govern geoengineering and no international organization has offered policy guidance, but national scientific bodies have begun to consider its applications and implications, and the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies has suggested a code of conduct.

### 5.3 Reform Agenda

Climate change poses threats to the current and future well-being of humanity, to the security of peoples and states, to basic norms of justice, and to global biodiversity and planetary system stability. Both security and justice must inform choices made at multiple levels of governance to mitigate the sources or adapt to the effects of climate change. The innovations recommended in this section are made with these multiple dimensions of decision-making and acute need in mind. They would support either a binding agreement through the Framework Convention Conference of the Parties or an arrangement to pledge and review targets or measures designed to reach and sustain a 2°C climate outcome or better.

#### 5.3.1 Global innovations in climate governance

##### 5.3.1.1 Facilitate and strengthen linkages between the UNFCCC and other international regimes and organizations dealing with climate change

The UNFCCC is broadly accepted as the primary forum for international negotiations and climate decision-making. Nevertheless, several other international entities, such as the Montreal Protocol, the International Civil Aviation Authority, and the International Maritime Organization, carry important responsibilities and authorities over various aspects of the climate problem. So, too, a number of international clubs and coalitions such as the G20 and the Major Economies Forum have undertaken climate initiatives. Coordinated action across a broad range of actors and issues will likely yield a greater aggregate impact than multiple separate endeavors. To promote synergies and reduce redundancies or incompatibilities, the UNFCCC should enhance coordination between these regimes and institutions.

Explicit coordinating mechanisms could entail establishing formal memoranda of understanding for reporting to and from the UNFCCC or delineating divisions of labor between administrative bodies of existing organizations. Further, the Paris Agreement should authorize the COP to develop rules
and modalities concerning multilateral linkages among international or club regimes. Such rules should include, for example, minimum environmental integrity standards for monitoring, reporting, and verifying (MRV) and for crediting mechanisms for mitigation measures. Oversight functions to ensure compliance could be performed through existing UNFCCC institutions, such as the expert review groups that currently review Annex I inventories. Additionally, the UNFCCC can perform a coordinating role by developing default or model rules—defining key terms, measurement units and timelines, common frameworks, and so on—for linking potentially disparate current and planned climate regulatory initiatives. By supplying default rules, the UNFCCC can reduce transaction and compliance costs between heterogeneous systems and encourage harmonization between regimes over time. The OECD Model Tax Convention provides a useful illustration. Although not binding, it is the basis for 225 bilateral tax treaties.

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**Coordinated action across a broad range of actors and issues will likely yield a greater aggregate impact than multiple separate endeavors**

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**5.3.1.2 Give subnational and nonstate actors the opportunity to endorse climate rules more stringent than the UNFCCC process creates**

Over the past two decades, the UNFCCC COPs have seen a growing number of stakeholder institutions participate either formally, as members of their state delegations, or informally. To broaden the array of stakeholders in the anticipated 2015 Paris Agreement, some have argued that the agreement should be opened in some way to signature by actors other than national governments, to include provincial and state leaders, mayors, industry and professional associations, and civil society organizations, including women’s organizations. There are also precedents in the International Labour Organization (ILO)’s processes in which labor unions and businesses can sign agreements, alongside governments.

If the Paris Agreement proves to be not more than the parties’ promise to pledge (to a certain amount of GHG reduction) and review (the results some years later), however, it may be more productive in both the short and the long run for the various coalitions and initiatives working to limit climate change to announce a parallel commitment and signing process, whereby they commit to deeper and faster action than that pledged by national leaders—as a starting point for a new social compact for global climate action (for further discussion, see 8.3.1.1). Their intent should be publicized in advance of the Paris meeting and pledges posted on a common website. This would both show their respective commitments and show up their national government counterparts, possibly shaming them into deeper commitments executed with greater urgency.

**5.3.1.3 Establish an International Carbon Monitoring entity**

A new UNFCCC-based International Carbon Monitoring branch could assist in evaluating various pledged emissions reductions, deforestation efforts, and policy strategies for countries with less robust monitoring structures. Although we do not contemplate that it would have sanctioning abilities, it could keep track of the implementation of national, alliance-based, and industry group pledges through monitoring and reporting initiatives aimed at clarifying progress. Such an entity could keep a cross-sector database of pledges, encourage the alignment of timelines, and recommended reporting deadlines to help countries meet set goals.
The authority could also help keep track of successful mitigation strategies by comparing theoretical and actual impacts, and it could coordinate with the Climate Action Clearinghouse (see 5.3.1.4) to promote best practices among participating countries. No matter the deal or specifics that come out of Paris, such an authority would be an invaluable tool for future agreements and COP discussions, and it would ensure the effective evaluation of various climate strategies in the developing world.

5.3.1.4 Establish a Global Climate Research Registry and Climate Action Clearinghouse
Climate-related research is expected to grow in scale and scope, and having a mechanism to keep track of present and forthcoming research results would support efficient research planning and an early sharing of results. A single global registry, with which national climate research registries could establish reciprocity agreements, should be beneficial to all climate research, help avoid duplication, promote partnerships, and highlight research gaps. A Climate Action Clearinghouse would accept mitigation and adaptation project reports (interim and final) from all levels of government in all regions, as well as from civil society groups and industry (under selective arrangements as needed to protect proprietary data). It should, in turn, regularly distill and publish good practices in established categories of climate action, both mitigation and adaptation. These two entities could be attached to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which already manages the Global Framework for Climate Services, or be a joint body of WMO and UNEP. The registry and clearinghouse functions could, however, be physically decentralized.

5.3.1.5 Establish a Climate Engineering Advisory Board and Experiments Registry
Climate engineering experiments should be subject to careful scrutiny, especially those involving solar radiation or albedo management techniques. All such experiments should be subject to review and approval by an expert advisory board attached to the new Climate Research Registry (see 5.3.1.4) and UN Member States should agree to treat its decisions as binding, in the common interest; an appeals board would also be desirable. All atmospheric research involving solar radiation management should be considered human subject experimentation insofar as its intent is to affect the living conditions of people and, even if conducted over uninhabited places, experimental effects could carry into populated areas. Approval should be conditioned on best available evidence and modeling indicating that expected transboundary effects are minimal. Experiments with purposeful transboundary impacts, where scientifically warranted, should also require the formal approval of the nations affected.

Carbon sequestration technologies could have a different threshold of action triggering oversight from the proposed advisory board because the effects of smaller experiments could be quite localized. Larger experiments, or those involving direct extraction of CO2 from the atmosphere, should be presented to the advisory board.

All approved projects should be entered into a Climate Engineering Experiments Registry—a special track of the Climate Research Registry.

5.3.1.6 Engage the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and UNEP Environment Assembly on climate issues
The recently created High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and the UNEP Environment Assembly could perform important promotional, advocacy, and implementation review roles for a new climate agreement emerging from the Paris COP, ensuring that sustainable development policies and programs fully reflect the requirements of climate management. A first necessary step would be for both bodies to establish their bona fides in the climate change debate, linking sustainable development and environmental protection goals more clearly and directly to the objectives of climate mitigation and adaptation.
5.3.2 Build climate consciousness into the work of other key global entities

5.3.2.1 Make global and regional trade more climate-sensitive
Current and prospective new global and regional trading arrangements, including the World Trade Organization, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, should adopt measures consistent with curbing the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and favorable for population adaptation to the effects of climate change, especially in support of those most vulnerable to its effects.

5.3.2.2 Seek advisory opinions from the ICJ in climate change disputes
Dealing with the effects of global climate change raises fundamental legal questions. For Small Island Developing States, climate change may be an existential concern. For other states, issues of equity or adequacy of adaptation assistance may be of concern. Also, whether one class of states is liable to another for the enduring results of its actions in the past is a long-standing issue. As the principal UN judicial organ, the ICJ can pronounce authoritative interpretations of the state of international law, and it has done so in cases concerning genocide (2015, 2007, and 1951), the legality of nuclear weapons (1996), and other important issues. The UN General Assembly should request such an opinion on the obligations of states to pursue serious domestic measures to mitigate climate change, as requested by the Alliance of Small Island States, as well as other matters as may be raised by specialized UN agencies and countries with a particular stake in climate governance.

5.3.2.3 “Green” the G20
The G20 should add an annual ministerial meeting on climate change to its docket. Such a meeting would allow Member States to align policies on climate finance, risk disclosure, and energy development. The meeting would build on both the recent work of the G20 Climate Finance Study Group and the G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan. The meeting could also target trade barriers to climate policies and adopt formal stances toward the WTO reforms recommended in this Report. The G20’s mix of Global North and South and cross-regional representation would be a good forum for such trade discussions and could build the GDP coalition necessary to encourage such changes (see also 6.3.1.1). Any decisions made on united policy goals and trade reforms would reflect the decisions made in Paris, but have the ability to affect private investment, public finance, and trade in a way the UNFCCC cannot.

The G20 should add an annual ministerial meeting on climate change to its docket

5.3.3 Climate adaptation needs better defined objectives and more financial support

5.3.3.1 Define one or more global climate adaptation goals and gauge their achievement in terms of measurable improvements in local human security
The objective of climate adaptation should be to ensure human security while achieving the 2ºC target by building resilience (the capacity to withstand and recover from climate-related socioeconomic shocks) and anticipation (the ability to foresee “risks induced by gradual climate-related environmental changes”). Adaptation initiatives should assess baseline vulnerabilities (recognizing that vulnerability has multiple dimensions) in order to measure improvements
in human security arising from adaptation efforts, using a small number of context-specific indicators.\textsuperscript{108}

5.3.3.2 Structure climate finance to increase net support to climate adaptation

Climate finance institutions and programs should explore arrangements by which a portion of funding within large mitigation initiatives could be regularly earmarked for well-designed and measurable climate adaptation projects that initially prioritize acutely vulnerable populations.

5.3.4 Engage private enterprise on market-based incentives to reduce carbon emissions

5.3.4.1 Negotiate carbon subsidy reduction targets

The mandatory removal of subsidies has been politically infeasible but some (nonfossil-fuel) industry groups are supporting this goal. Aiming for ambitious pledge-what-you-can outcomes at the Paris talks would foster discussion and could create public pressure, but negotiators could also lean on industry to go for something better. A goal of phasing-out all fossil fuel subsidies by 2020 would be desirable—perhaps making use of WTO environmental exceptions on tariffs (GATT Article XX) for the purpose of taxing carbon in trade.

5.3.4.2 Reduce emissions of short-lived climate pollutants

Putting global targeted caps on short-lived climate pollutants, an approach similar to the Montreal Protocol, would ease climate effects in the short run but needs to be backed up by tight caps on CO\textsubscript{2}. The International Energy Agency estimates in its World Energy Outlook 2014 that minimizing methane emissions from upstream oil and gas production would generate about 18 percent of the emissions savings needed to stay on a 2ºC trajectory.

5.3.4.3 Institutionalize financial climate risk reporting

Regulatory agencies should mandate a minimum level of corporate risk disclosure for climate scenarios by publicly traded companies. A recent Shell Oil internal proposal suggests reporting analyses of business operations for post-2035 scenarios, annual operational emissions, and investments in low-carbon R\&D, on an annual basis. Such mandated disclosure is well within the powers of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, and would both protect investors and put public pressure on major polluters. It would also fast-track what companies are already beginning to do. The regulations would not require changes in business practice. Rather, they would lead only to reporting on what they are or are not doing—yet could have widespread impact nevertheless.

The same logic should be applied to large lending institutions. The World Bank should require that borrowers provide a minimum level of climate risk disclosure on specific projects and that implementing contractors, if publicly traded, put corporate level disclosure policies in place. The IMF should require a minimum level of climate risk regulation in the public financial sectors of loan accepting countries. In the broader banking industry, seventy-nine major institutions have subscribed to the Equator Principles, a risk management framework for “determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risk in projects” intended to provide a minimum standard for due diligence to support responsible risk decision-making.\textsuperscript{109}

5.3.4.4 Establish a Green Technology Licensing Facility

One of the outcomes of the Lima conference was that parties called on the Green Climate Fund to reserve funds for the implementation of National Adaptation Plans that define the technology needs
of countries. To address the IPR dimension of these efforts in an innovative and constructive way, a dedicated Green Climate Technology Licensing Facility within the framework of the new Green Climate Fund would boost appropriate technology transfer to developing countries. The facility represents a middle ground that aims at facilitating access to technology but not threatening the current system of protection (see box 5.2). By ensuring that technology, to the extent that it is not already of an open source nature, is licensed on social terms to least developed countries in need of such technology, the facility would promote protection of vested interests of intellectual property owners, and make the intellectual property system work in favor of least developed countries.

The Licensing Facility could ensure increased transfer of environmentally sound technologies, in particular:

- Incorporating proprietary sharing clauses in contracts concerning funded projects;
- Purchasing licenses from enterprises with crucial ESTs; and
- Assisting in the transfer of such technology to developing countries where the ESTs are critically needed.

Box 5.2 The Case for a Green Technology Licensing Facility Within the Green Climate Fund

The UNFCCC Technology Needs Assessment Synthesis Report of 2013 concluded that the highest priorities of environmentally sound technologies for climate adaptation in developing and least developed countries were in agriculture and water, followed by infrastructure and settlements, including coastal zones. Barriers to transfer of technology in these areas include a lack of access to capital, trade barriers, lack of information and human resource capital, and intellectual property rights, especially in biotechnology, photovoltaic, and wind energy.

To increase access to ESTs by developing countries, the UNFCCC set up the technology mechanism in 2010, an institution that aims to spur technology development and transfer via technology needs assessments, and building enabling environments for climate technology finance. The TM could be a significant technology enabler if it were granted access to the requisite funding.

During COP 15 in 2009 in Copenhagen, developed countries pledged to donate US$100 billion per annum to developing countries to help combat climate change, with distribution through the Green Climate Fund. The GCF, which formally opened its offices in May 2014, has currently received about 10 percent of the initial pledge. It has recently published guidelines for its operations, but a missing element is an ability to arrange favorable licensing terms for the technology transfers that it funds.

The Commission proposes a Green Technology Licensing Facility that would work toward removing barriers to technology transfer and promote joint technology development and sharing of IPRs. Additionally, the facility could incentivize the use of technologies, rather than focusing solely on the protection of IPRs, for example, by developing tailor-made programs to promote recipients’ absorptive capacity for ESTs. The facility could also undertake public awareness campaigns to encourage innovative green technology firms to transfer ESTs as an integral part of companies’ corporate social responsibility ethos.

Source: UNFCCC, “Third synthesis report,” 21; van der Veen, “Enhancing Technological Responses to Climate Change.”
Climate change is a threat to the human security of hundreds of millions of people and their livelihoods. As an issue concerning the global ecological space as a whole, climate governance requires more than a piecemeal approach as time quickly slips away. However, just as climate change was caused largely by technological progress, another new space of transaction and human interaction has opened up due to new technologies, linking our economies and human social and political relations. This hyperconnected global economy, operating increasingly in cyberspace, exhibits many risks but also holds the key for many innovative solutions to today’s global challenges.
6. Governing the Hyperconnected Global Economy

Ever since the financial crisis of 2008–2009 kept the world in suspense, it has been apparent that the crisis in global governance is, to many, also economic. Today’s global economy is characterized by the increasing openness and integration of markets and transnational flows of trade, capital, and labor (economic globalization), further intensified by the technological advances of our time, such as the Internet, and both ensuing new opportunities and risks for global security and justice. The concurrent trends of economic and technological globalization over recent decades, due in part to significant reductions in transport and communications costs, as well as the progressive lowering and elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers, have opened a vast global transactional space with an increasingly hyperconnected economy at its core. This section addresses select, salient issues at the intersection of security and justice in global economic governance, recommending both policy and institutional reform options to strengthen the governance framework across borders.

In 2013, global exports in goods and services totaled US$18.8 trillion and US$4.6 trillion, respectively. Every day, total trade on foreign exchange markets is an estimated US$5 trillion, a number unthinkable without the help of computer-assisted communications. Global connectivity has evolved exponentially over the last twenty years, from the rise of the Internet, to mobile computing and communications, to rapidly falling unit prices and growing network coverage. Traditional forms of economic development cooperation between the Global North and South—such as official development assistance—are being overshadowed by foreign direct investment, international trade, public and private loans, technology transfer, and remittances. Increasing “hyperconnectivity” and shifts in the global economy have important implications for the private sector, individual consumers, governments, and, indeed, the very structure of the global economy.

Although global trade and economic interdependence were already on an upward trajectory, mass access to the Internet further fuels the trend toward hyperconnectivity. In a group of thirteen countries, including the G8 economies and large emerging markets such as Brazil, India, and China, the Internet accounted for about 3 percent of GDP and 20 percent of their growth from 2004 to 2009. Internet adoption across the Global South at levels found in developed economies could, by some estimates, greatly increase GDP growth rates, significantly boost productivity, and create around 140 million new jobs.

With growing economic interdependence the vulnerability of national economies and, consequently, the global economy has risen

Whereas the economic and technological features of globalization have provided enormous socioeconomic dividends for many, they also exacerbate inequalities and can act as threat multipliers. With growing economic interdependence and reliance on critical infrastructure, the vulnerability of national economies and, consequently, the global economy has risen. Cross-border economic shocks such as the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, capital flight, natural resource theft, corporate espionage, loss of privacy, and theft of intellectual property are just a few risks to which the hyperconnected global economy is vulnerable. Hyperconnectivity also spills over into the public space and has potential negative consequences of its own. Increased information and
communication technologies rarely empower only one side in a conflict; technologies can favor the status quo and not necessarily activist agents of change in a contest of wills and messages; media bias in nondemocratic societies can underreport protest and nonviolent collective action by opponents of the regime.\textsuperscript{116}

Given its potential to boost human ingenuity and productivity, but parallel negative potential, what does the hyperconnected global economy need from global governance? What approaches would best meet those needs, consistent with meeting equitably the security and justice needs of all? How can the risk of another sudden global economic slide best be reduced? In the absence of effective global governance, hyperconnectivity in the global economy can both enhance and detract from just security.

6.1 Key Challenges and Opportunities

Foremost among the challenges facing the hyperconnected global economy is its continuing vulnerability to periodic, rapid financial shocks. On a day-to-day basis, however, the global economy and public welfare are undermined by substantial illicit financial flows and illegal natural resource exploitation. Hyperconnectivity will continue to intensify in coming years, as hundreds of millions of people gain access to the burgeoning digital marketplace. Indeed, as a recent OECD/G20 report noted, “the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself.”\textsuperscript{117}

When the 2008–2009 financial crisis in the United States swept through the global financial system, the damage affected many regional and national economies. The International Monetary Fund put global bank losses at US$4.1 trillion, and the International Labour Organization estimated that the number of unemployed in 2009 was about thirty-four million higher than in 2007.\textsuperscript{118} By 2013, the global economy was still falling about four million jobs short of keeping pace with the growth in the labor force.\textsuperscript{119} In addition to exposing fundamental problems in national regulatory systems, what soon became a truly global financial and then economic crisis exposed fundamental problems in the post–World War II global economic governance arrangements designed to ensure financial and economic stability.

In developing countries, falling prices and export demand, accompanied by reversals of capital flows and reductions in remittances, have resulted in declining output and employment, adversely affecting the most poor and vulnerable.\textsuperscript{120} Meanwhile, the global financial crisis resulted in not only a prolonged economic crisis in Europe, but also a deeply political and constitutional one. As the public discourse on Greece and the Eurozone and Thomas Piketty’s popular work on wealth distribution show, considerations of economic security can quickly spill over into concerns for justice, democracy, and fairness.\textsuperscript{121} Economic crisis and inequality have worldwide spillover effects, as young people continue to face grim employment prospects, with implications, as noted in Section 1, both for the scale of economic migration and for the potential attractiveness of extremist narratives offering place and purpose, however destructive, to those unable to find constructive alternatives.\textsuperscript{122}

Meanwhile, the risks of another global financial meltdown—amplified by poorly regulated markets for securities and currencies, as well as diverging interest rates and monetary policies in major economies—remain high.\textsuperscript{123} The 2008–2009 financial crisis might not have triggered new trade and currency wars, but is the global governance architecture prepared to prevent future such scenarios?
What measures should be taken to help developing countries protect hard-won progress in poverty reduction in the event of future crises?

Among the chief causes of the 2008–2009 crisis were the pursuit of risky business practices by private and public financial institutions with inadequate internal controls, the failure of public regulatory agencies to provide proper oversight, flawed credit ratings, fraud, a deterioration in confidence in the US dollar’s role as a global store of value, rapid financial sector deregulation and capital market liberalization, monetary policies focused predominantly on price stability, and, more generally, weak and poorly coordinated and poorly regulated national and international banking and bank-like institutions.124 Yet global economic governance that addresses these underlying causes and fosters global economic, financial, and monetary coordination—and both prevents and responds to the needs of those most adversely affected by cross-border economic shocks—is not in the offing.

Another momentous challenge in today’s economy is illicit financial flows (IFFs). IFFs are monies removed from a country illegally or illicitly, and they can include the proceeds of corruption, tax evasion, aggressive tax minimization schemes, money laundering, intellectual property theft, or other criminal or immoral activities. Between 2003 and 2012, the developing world lost US$6.6 trillion to IFFs based on estimates of trade mis-invoicing and leakages from national balances of payment. Illicit outflows increased at an average rate of 9.4 percent per year (roughly twice as fast as global GDP growth) over this ten-year period.125 Sub-Saharan Africa was affected the most in percentage terms, with illicit outflows draining 5.5 percent from regional GDP (versus an average of 3.9 percent across all developing countries).126 A separate estimate calculated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) put global proceeds from criminal activities at US$2.1 trillion in 2009 (equivalent to 3.6 percent of global GDP), with approximately US$1.6 trillion laundered through the global financial system.127 Aside from eroding national tax bases and diverting funds from critical public expenditure projects, IFFs help fuel insecurity in the hyperconnected global economy by sustaining the work of criminal syndicates and international terrorists to the detriment of global security and justice.

A further fundamental security and justice concern within an increasingly integrated global marketplace involves the unprecedented transboundary movement of illegally extracted natural resources. In fragile and conflict-affected environments, in particular, governments, individuals, multinational firms, and terrorist and criminal organizations compete for finite resources in ways that can prolong armed strife or provoke a relapse into violence.128 Globally, the activities of large, multinational carbon-fuel and mineral extraction corporations can have severe environmental consequences, including an acceleration of climate change’s harmful effects. Although a potentially large source of public revenue for financing national and global public goods, natural resources can, when poorly managed, contribute to global insecurity and injustice through negative political, economic, social, and environmental dynamics.

Last, information and communications technologies (ICTs) have facilitated impressive growth in advanced economies, resulting in what is referred to as a third industrial revolution. Facebook has 1.3 billion active users; only two of the world’s countries can boast a larger population.129 This is not a purely social statistic—information shared by users on Facebook and elsewhere collectively becomes Big Data, which can have substantial commercial value.130

However, the increasing dependence of many countries and all international business on the Internet and other communications technologies exposes the critical infrastructures of societies
across the world to new risks. In 2014, international banking institutions faced increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks (box 6.1). Estimates of the annual cost of cybercrime worldwide vary, but can be as high as US$400 billion.131

Box 6.1 The Dangers of Cyber Attacks on International Banking Institutions

In the summer of 2014, unknown individuals hacked the digital infrastructures of eleven US banks. In a sophisticated, massive cyber-attack that is among the largest data breaches in history, the hackers stole the banking data of more than seventy-six million households and seven million small businesses. The motive behind the attack remains unclear: no money was stolen, but experts say that the information could be used in targeted cyber theft campaigns, including attempts at phishing, for years to come.

Forensic investigators have found that the hackers exploited known vulnerabilities in the banks’ security systems to access confidential information. In fact, it has been estimated that 92 percent of all cybersecurity incidents, including data breaches, follow just nine basic patterns, and that up to 80 percent of cyber attacks can be stopped by properly implementing basic information risk management practices.

The hacking of the US banks is just one example of the risks associated with our increasing reliance on critical infrastructures and the vulnerability this entails. As highlighted during the 2015 Global Conference on CyberSpace in The Hague, protecting critical infrastructures that facilitate the provision of services essential to the functioning of modern societies, such as water, electricity, transport, and financial services, is a core aspect of maintaining international peace and security and national social and economic stability. Poorly protected systems can endanger not only individuals and communities but also entire countries, with spillover effects that compromise security and stability at a regional or global level. Despite the visible benefits of the digitization of society, improvements are urgently needed in the management of cybersecurity risks (see 6.3.4).

Sources: Glazer and Yadron, “J. P. Morgan”; Global Conference on CyberSpace, “Chair’s Statement”; Lobban, Countering the threat to cyber business; Verizon, 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report

Despite global gains in connectivity, a large part of the world’s population remains unattached to the digital marketplace or attached at such slow speeds that they cannot derive economic benefits. Access to the Internet is a function of both network coverage and affordability and as such remains limited in large parts of the world.132 Although the Internet has gained ground rapidly in much of the developing world, less than 20 percent of the population of South Asia has Internet access. The same is true of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where only about half of Internet users have broadband access, though the percentage is growing. As hundreds of millions of people in the Global South strive to gain access to new technologies (especially mobile Internet access), however, they are also exposed to attendant risks, such as cybercrime, and need trusted, reliable, and affordable sources of online security.133
6.2  Current Responses

Global bodies have introduced measures, with varying degrees of effectiveness, to combat the multiple challenges and threats to the hyperconnected world economy, while seeking to maximize its inherent potential for sustained and equitable growth that rewards all countries and peoples. They have sought to adapt to economic changes underway and, in particular, to stem the most severe effects of the transnational 2008–2009 financial meltdown from which the world has yet to fully recover.

6.2.1 Global economic governance and cross-border economic shocks

The rise of the Group of 20 (G20) as a Leaders’ Forum proved especially important for coordinating a global response to the spread and deepening of the recent global financial crisis of 2008–2009.134 The G20’s April 2009 London Summit, in particular, is widely credited with helping stop the financial and economic collapse that began to take shape with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, especially by reinforcing commitments to undertake strong Keynesian expansionary policies. The G20’s most important actions lay in its coordination of the major economies’ macroeconomic responses and the development of standards and risk assessment tools for the voluntary reform of national financial regulations.

Other major steps included the G20’s decision in April 2009 to transform its Financial Stability Forum into the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which entailed that members are now represented by their central banking authorities and their national finance ministers. The FSB was given the task of coordinating the financial regulation efforts of a series of specialized “minilateral” bodies, including the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation, which assigns unique tags to parties engaging in financial transactions worldwide (a major potential gain for transparency and traceability).135 The G20 also expanded the membership of both the FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to include all G20 members, thus including major emerging markets—for the first time—in the membership of world financial coordination bodies.

Many of the core issues in global economic governance remain only partially addressed

At the same time, there is little or no evidence that any G20 country reshaped its national actions in a significant way in response to G20 agreements made in London, Pittsburgh, and Seoul. Many of the core issues in global economic governance, including preventing future cross-border economic shocks and sustaining inclusive growth and job creation worldwide, remain only partially addressed. Although members of the G20 collectively represent large shares of world population and GDP, the forum faces a major problem as an ad hoc body that leaves 173 countries and more than a quarter of humanity unrepresented in decisions with major implications for global finance, relying on trickle-down policy impacts and the hope that what is good for the G20 is good for the rest of the world.

But G20 members are also members of the Bretton Woods institutions as well as UN Member States (fourteen of the twenty presently are members of the ECOSOC), and have developed structured means of consultations during their meetings with business, civil society, labor, and youth (the B-, C-, L-, and Y-20s).136 There are, then, pathways that may be built upon and
strengthened to better link its work to larger global governance institutions, regional institutions, and emerging nonstate actors, each of which we discuss further below.

The IMF, for its part, issued the largest share of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in history with a view to stemming the crisis, increasing its resources, and reemphasizing the need to revise the voting powers within this institution. However, the need for further action—especially as regards emerging economies—is readily acknowledged by the IMF. Five years ago, the Fund’s Executive Board approved a reform package, a key feature of which is to align voting shares in such a way that all BRIC countries would be part of the ten largest IMF shareholders. This rebalancing would also have an impact on the composition of the IMF’s Executive Board, with fewer seats for European countries and the election of all Executive Directors. To come into effect, under IMF rules, the reforms need to be ratified by the Board of Governors, with an 85 percent supermajority. As of April 2015, 147 members having more than 77 percent of total voting power have expressed their consent. All the same, the entry into force of the reforms remains uncertain.

6.2.2 Defending international labor rights

The failure to address labor rights as a matter of human development and security in the hyperconnected global economy ignores key rights and conditions of the majority of humankind. Under the theme of “decent work,” the International Labour Organization promotes international labor rights through eight major conventions, including freedom of association and collective bargaining, elimination of forced and child labor, and nondiscrimination in the workplace. While these core labor standards are incorporated into many trade agreements and corporate social responsibility strategies—thanks, in part, to the UN Global Compact (2000), UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011), and post-disaster initiatives—they await adoption and promotion by key global economic institutions such as the IMF and WTO. Moreover, especially since the Tazreen factory fire in November 2012 and the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in April 2013, which resulted in the deaths of almost 1,300 people, Bangladesh has become a laboratory for networked approaches to fundamental labor rights, such as the Bangladesh Accord for Fire and Building Safety—a multi-stakeholder arrangement including the ILO, global brands, retailers, trade unions, and CSOs.138

6.2.3 Curbing illicit financial flows and extremist financing

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created in 1989 by the G7 and now including thirty-six state members, plays the leading role in coordinating global anti–money laundering efforts. The FATF promotes voluntary adoption of forty recommendations designed to prevent criminals and terrorists from accessing the formal financial system and to help states enforce domestic laws. To encourage implementation, it blacklists safe havens, provides economic and diplomatic support, conducts peer assessments, and performs external evaluations with the help of the IMF and World Bank. In doing so, the FATF supports efforts to enforce anti–money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws and regulations and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.139

Other multilateral bodies working to curb IFFs associated with terrorist and criminal activities include the UN Security Council and General Assembly, the G20, the European Union, the OECD, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Association for Insurance Supervisors, and the Wolfsberg Group of global banks.
The continuing growth in IFFs, which undermine the conditions for security and justice in both poor and rich nations by providing working capital to socially disruptive organizations and by depriving governments of resources that might otherwise have been invested in public goods, suggests that the global AML/CFT regime has at best slowed the pace of transfers. Moreover, it has not demonstrated robustly that its strategy of controlling the proceeds of crime and the financial enablers of terrorism has resulted in reducing either crime rates or terrorist acts. In addition, domestic measures—many recommended or mandated by international instruments—that have proven effective in deterring tax evasion, corruption, and money laundering have yet to be adopted.

The OECD and the G20 recently spearheaded a new standard for banking transparency and decreasing tax evasion, the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) in tax matters, which helps governments recover lost tax revenue. Countries implementing AEOI commit to sending and receiving established sets of information on an annual basis, without the need for specific requests. All OECD member countries and several nonmembers endorsed the OECD Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters in May 2014. More than sixty-five states have committed to its implementation. In October 2014, fifty-one countries also signed the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, which details the information exchanged as per the AEOI standard. Although a step in the right direction, this initiative has yet to become a truly global standard. Moreover, developing countries face significant constraints in terms of the financial and management capacity and resources required for implementation.

### 6.2.4 Natural resource management in the global marketplace

Responding to resource curse fears and the concerns of CSOs such as Global Witness and the campaign Publish What You Pay about the transparency of payments by extractive industries to governments and the recorded revenues, governments formalized twelve transparency principles (box 6.2 presents three key principles) in June 2003 that laid the foundation for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

EITI membership includes forty-eight countries from around the world, and many international organizations and global extractive corporations have committed to implementing the EITI principles. It serves as a normative and practical framework for the governance of natural resource exploitation using an innovative, multi-layered approach to global governance that brings to the table different actors—with different policy preferences and areas of expertise—from government, the private sector, and civil society. EITI shows how a multi-stakeholder and voluntary approach can contribute to the strengthening of fragile and conflict-affected environments, where the ability of governments and communities to derive benefits can be limited by the complexities of resource-related transactions. In particular, it addresses concerns about transparency of payments from extractive industries to governments and of recorded revenues, a lack of which has been connected to opportunities for corruption, conflict, perverse incentives that undermine good governance, and broader negative repercussions for the environment and people’s livelihoods. The EITI compares extractive industries’ information about payments to governments with government information about revenues, and it requires international, national, and subnational reporting on resource-related revenues.

Although increasing transparency has already translated into financial gains for national budgets, EITI has fallen short in forging strong links between improved transparency in a country’s extractives sector and the initiative’s fundamental goal of contributing to broader socioeconomic change. The lack of negative repercussions for companies that fail to comply with EITI principles
Box 6.2 Select EITI Principles

1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative economic and social impacts.

4. We recognize that a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development.

10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use.

Source: EITI, “EITI Principles.”

is a serious shortcoming of the initiative. EITI also sidesteps sensitive issues related to transfer pricing and IFFs, and it fails to account for the widely documented environmental and social dislocation costs associated with natural resource exploitation.

6.2.5 Norms and institutions for secure access to the digital marketplace

The international community relies on several institutions and governance processes for taking on the challenge of governing the highly decentralized domain of cyberspace. Prominent institutions include the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the Internet Society, and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Important multi-stakeholder meetings and processes include NETmundial, which convened 1,480 stakeholders in April 2014 in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and held its second meeting in May 2015, and the ongoing London Process, a succession of conferences on cyber governance named after its first host city, the most recent iteration of which stressed the importance of ensuring a “free, open and secure Internet for the benefit of all.”\textsuperscript{144} In 2013, a NATO initiative resulted in the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, a nonbinding expert document. A second edition (Tallinn 2.0) is in the making. Moreover, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security has declared in its report of June 2013 that international law is applicable to cyberspace, and progress has been made with regard to determining the scope and manner of its applicability—particularly with regard to cybersecurity and cyber warfare.\textsuperscript{145} The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for its part, has produced an international code of conduct for information security, last updated in 2015 and shared with the UN.\textsuperscript{146} UN bodies like the Internet Governance Forum play consultative roles in Internet governance. The ITU’s International Telecommunications Regulations do not as yet include authorities to deal with Internet governance.

The Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) is a rare example of a binding international instrument on the governance of cyberspace. According to its preamble, its stated aim is to “pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation.” The Convention has been signed by more than forty countries to date, with recent accessions including Australia, Japan, and Panama.
The Chair’s Statement at the 2015 Global Conference on CyberSpace (GCCS) affirmed “the applicability of existing international law to State behaviour in cyberspace.” At the same time, it expressed a “commitment to exploring the development of voluntary, non-legally-binding norms for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace during peacetime.” Also at the GCCS, Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden and chair of the Global Commission on Internet Governance (GCIG), presented a “Social Compact for Digital Privacy and Security” outlining specific principles for consideration by governments and other key stakeholders that emphasized the need to protect human rights and promote rule of law and data integrity online.

Despite such initiatives for norms and principles of cyber governance, and repeated calls for their adoption in one form or another in recent years, a wide-ranging understanding among key countries and stakeholders on specific norms has yet to be reached.

### 6.2.6 Expanding secure access to the Internet among least developed countries

The GCCS Chair’s Statement noted the Internet’s “major and transformative influence on the global economy” and stressed “the importance of including the need for Internet access for all and cyber-capacity building in the post-2015 Development Agenda.”

Although Internet access has been expanding in all regions, major lags remain in Africa and Central Asia (see figure 6.1). The current proposals for the SDGs include providing universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020.

Moreover, the ITU launched in 2014 the Connect 2020 Agenda for Global Telecommunication/ICT Development. Among other goals, it aims to achieve Internet access for 50 percent of households in developing countries by 2020 and to reach gender equality among Internet users by that date.

#### Figure 6.1 Global Internet Connectivity and Penetration

![Global Internet Connectivity and Penetration](source: Matherly, Shodan Blog. Reprinted with permission.)
Aside from questions of Internet architecture and affordability of access, those about which actors should promote access and security remain contested. The divergent positions of key national and international actors in connection with these institutions and processes manifests the level of discord. Some public actors, such as the United States and EU, and private entities, such as Google and Microsoft, have criticized the ITU—a specialized UN agency based on public-private partnership, including seven hundred private-sector entities and academic institutions—for exceeding its remit by attempting to venture into the territory of Internet governance, and privileging the views of nation states. Different international perspectives permeate the critical transition of oversight of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) (see box 6.3). Moreover, although advanced industrialized countries and multinational companies have invested in sophisticated cyber infrastructure, software, and other measures concerning cybersecurity, developing countries suffer serious gaps in critical capacity to promote Internet access and cybersecurity.

Box 6.3 Responses to the IANA Transition

The decision of the US National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA) to transfer its stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority—a department of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which performs key technical tasks to ensure the smooth functioning of the Internet—to the global multi-stakeholder community was welcomed by many. However, disagreement is pronounced over which entity should have authority over IANA when the US government’s current contract with ICANN expires in September 2015. The US has reiterated that it “will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution.” However, submissions made by India, China, and Russia prior to NETmundial, the global multi-stakeholder meeting on the future of Internet governance, which took place in Brazil in April 2014, and at other forums suggest that these actors favor precisely the type of international entity to which the United States objects. These divergent responses to the IANA transition highlight once again the deep-seated division between key state actors about how the Internet should be governed and by whom.

Sources: NETmundial, “Russian Parliament Submission”; NETmundial, “Government of India”; Kumar and Hariharan, IANA Transition; NTIA, “NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions”; UN, “International code of conduct for information security”

6.3 Reform Agenda

The global security and justice challenges associated with today’s hyperconnected global economy are as unprecedented as the technologies that make economic interconnectivity possible. Protecting against another global financial meltdown, while leveraging the benefits of new technologies and economic integration, requires updating global institutional structures and how they link up and deal with vital resource mismanagement as reflected in IFFs, illicit trade in natural resource endowments, and the challenges of cybersecurity. Taken together, these adaptations add up to a new framework for global cooperation in these critical areas that maximizes the full potential and mitigates the risks of managing today’s highly interwoven global economy—with significant utility for dealing with fragile states and the impact of climate change on human security. The Commission recommends urgent, high-level attention to the following specific global governance policy and institutional reforms.
6.3.1 A new framework for global economic cooperation and crisis response

Given the shortcomings of current responses to global economic stability, the Commission proposes a new framework for global economic cooperation to build on the strengths of the G20—including its diverse, yet manageable number of members, which account for two-thirds of the world’s population, 85 percent of global gross domestic product, and over 75 percent of global trade, while also seeking to improve ties with universally representative institutions. The proposed reforms also reflect learning from the difficulties in reforming the UN Economic and Social Council and other institutions of global economic governance in promoting better global economic coordination.

6.3.1.1 Create a G20+ to enhance coordination with the UN, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies

Thus far, the G20 has been minimally institutionalized, with an annually rotating presidency and agenda and no common staffing for purposes of continuity or linking up on a regular basis with other global or regional institutions. The Commission, therefore, recommends transforming the G20 into the G20+—where the plus signifies new linkages, supported by a modest (possibly virtual) secretariat—and strengthening its level of institutional coordination with the United Nations (including the General Assembly and ECOSOC), the World Bank, IMF, WTO, ILO, and regional organizations. Section 7.3.3 elaborates on this concept. In brief, a G20+ would promote integrated economic, social, and environmental approaches to international problems and, in so doing, would build upon the G20’s current interactions with civil society and the business community, as well as regional and subregional organizations, especially from regions underrepresented in the G20 itself: Central America, Andean South America, Africa, Southwest and Central Asia, and much of Southeast Asia.153

Second, the G20+ would lend support to and introduce financial and other incentives for countries and regions that sustain financial and economic regulatory reform and renewal, while reducing economic nationalism. In support of these aims, it would promote transparency for all economic and financial actors and activities, as well as appropriate regulation and supervision. Finally, the G20+ would better respond to cross-border economic crises by leveraging an upgraded G20 with far closer ties to the UN to enhance coordination (including technical and financial resources) between UN Member States, global economic bodies, and regional and other development banks, including, as they gain experience, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS Development Bank.

A G20+ can and should focus on financial stabilization and crisis avoidance, while working with its partners and through co-memberships to develop policies and strategies that aim to reduce economic inequality and build job opportunities that may, in turn, reverse the troubling global trend of decreasing confidence in governments. We cannot say precisely how that effort should be undertaken—that is a task for those closer to the problem—only that it must be.

6.3.1.2 Strengthen the IMF

Enhancing the IMF necessitates the realization of agreed upon reforms to update the body’s system of weighted voting to reflect the growing economic power of emerging economies, including representation in its Executive Board, while preserving the voting shares of the world’s poorest countries. This would acknowledge the changed economic relations of our time, while seeking to enhance the legitimacy of the IMF’s decisions. In addition, it is an invitation to emerging economies like China to fully engage in such global forums and to avoid fragmentation of international financial governance.
6.3.1.3 Bolster the FSB
The legitimacy of the Financial Stability Board can be bolstered by a variety of measures. Though not an exhaustive list, these include, first, engaging key public constituencies by establishing advisory councils with, for example, the business community, worker and trade union bodies, international civil society organizations, and other key constituencies likely to be affected by global financial instability; and, secondly, establishing formal working relationships with key UN system entities, such as DESA, UNCTAD, ILO, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The FSB should also establish a permanent working group or taskforce for cross-border resolution and a Crisis Management Group for more proactive responses to future economic shocks.

6.3.1.4 Ensure labor rights, especially for women, and global economic governance for inclusive growth
International development agencies (including regional development banks), and the IMF should adopt core labor standards as part of their own practices and make provision of their services conditional on adoption and respect for those standards by member governments. Decent work is a driver of inclusive and sustainable economic growth, whereas jobless growth and sudden layoffs can heighten tensions and a sense of injustice in society. Translated into meaningful, fairly paid, and safe jobs, decent work must be at the heart of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Respecting the call for decent work also means creating space for and strengthening the role of the International Labour Organization within the broader system of global economic governance. Multilateral organizations, governments, and the private sector should also pursue policies that encourage greater participation of women in the global labor force. Currently, women’s contribution to economic growth falls far below their full potential, with serious implications for justice, equality, and national development. A comprehensive policy response, based on strategies to increase demand for female labor and incentivize work through appropriate tax and expenditure measures, is needed.

6.3.1.5 Establish a system-wide UN Sustainable Human Development Network
Applying a network governance approach and incorporating key recommendations from the reports of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, the Future United Nations Development System project, and the UN’s earlier Delivering as One coherence agenda, a Sustainable Human Development Network (SHD-net) would aim to move beyond existing practices across the UN system and forge a truly integrated development system. Specifically, each UN program, fund, and agency, as well as the World Bank, IMF, and regional development banks, would collaborate to maximize impact, improve the use of technical and financial resources, and better streamline reporting and broader administrative requirements in all UN member countries. Further tapping the ideas, networks, political support, and human and institutional resources from the proposed UN Global Partnership (see 8.3.2), the SHD-net would focus its normative, policy, and programmatic priorities on assisting all countries—developing and developed—to meet their Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

6.3.2 New tools to combat illicit financial flows and extremist financing
To counter the threats fueled by growing IFFs, particularly the financing of terrorist groups and criminal networks, the Commission makes the following recommendations to the Financial Action Task Force, United Nations, G20, and other bodies.
6.3.2.1 Promote the AEOI standard and transparency of corporate registries
The Automatic Exchange of Information standard, introduced by the OECD and G20, is a truly
global instrument that benefits all states, including fragile countries in urgent need of tax revenue
to deliver on essential justice and security tasks. The Commission recommends, first, that more
countries from the Global North and South adopt the AEOI standard, as well as sign and ratify the
Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, and, second, that additional technical assistance be
delivered to fragile states to facilitate implementation.

This development—which benefits poor and rich nations alike—makes it harder for money
launderers to hide their proceeds and easier for the victims of tax evasion to recover funds. For
developing countries to fully realize the benefits of this new transparency, the developed world
and international institutions should recognize and help overcome the financial and capacity
restraints that prevent less well-off countries from participating in a multilateral regime for AEOI.
Simultaneously, developed and developing countries should promote the transparency of corporate
registries to prevent money launderers from operating behind shell companies.

6.3.2.2 Assess the effects of anti-money laundering policies on crime and terrorist groups
The goal of anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism laws and regulations is to
reduce crime and terrorism, not merely to reduce money laundering in support of these activities.
To date, not enough evaluative research has been undertaken into the effects of various specific
AML/CFT policies that keep this goal in sight. It is recommended, therefore, that the UN set up an
independent global public policy research project geared toward properly assessing these policies
as the only way to ensure progress on reducing crime and terrorism and to avoid counterproductive
policies that waste scarce resources.

6.3.2.3 Use human rights norms and policy tools to curb illicit financial flows
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and other corporate social responsibility
standards can contribute to improving due diligence requirements to prevent or decrease IFFs in
different economic sectors (including financial, accounting, and legal). Participatory budgeting
and a human rights approach to budget monitoring can shine a spotlight on whether IFFs divert
government expenditure from promoting the public good. Empowered with the right information,
CSOs, the media, and the general public can each play significant roles in holding states,
businesses, and facilitators (lawyers and accountants) to their human rights obligations.

6.3.2.4 Address IFFs in the Post-2015 Development Agenda
A strong SDG on illicit financial flows should stress the need for better and more data for the
calculation of IFFs, improved measurement of progress for curbing IFFs, and an impact assessment
of each policy intended to achieve that aim—each requiring improved fact-sharing through Big
Data (multilateral data integration). In addition to reactive measures such as tips, media reports,
protests, audits, and whistleblowers, data mining can stimulate proactive approaches that detect
and sometimes even predict IFFs.

6.3.3 Transform the EITI into EITI+ for effective governance of natural resources

Despite some successes, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has significant
shortcomings in its current form. EITI members should consider options to realize its
transformative potential in at least two ways.
6.3.3.1 Establish clear guidelines for reporting and sanctioning violations of EITI+ principles

EITI+ would further entail setting out clear guidelines for reporting and responding to violations. The Commission recommends more stringent reporting requirements accompanied by appropriate information confidentiality and security measures. These measures would address sensitive issues related to transfer pricing and IFFs, as well as the widely documented environmental and social dislocation costs associated with natural resource exploitation. Improved reporting mechanisms would have further positive effects. EITI faces the usual restrictions that governments often place on CSOs. It is also constrained by the limited technical and legal capacity of CSOs in resource-exporting states to interpret information about financial flows from extractive industries. Improved reporting mechanisms would therefore also contribute to more effective civil society engagement.

6.3.3.2 Make EITI+ complementary to the post-2015 SDGs

To more clearly link EITI’s transparency promotion to its goal of contributing to broader socioeconomic change, the Commission recommends introducing gradation, using stronger incentives to encourage partners to go beyond the minimum requirements. Including sustainability goals, and making the EITI+ complementary to the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals, is a first important step in this direction.

6.3.4 Secure the digital economy and promote Internet access in the Global South

To keep the expanding digital sphere of the hyperconnected global economy open, free, and safe, and with a view to promoting secure access to hundreds of millions of new users in the next few years, the Commission offers the following recommendations.

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Basic rules of the road accepted by the international community need to be elaborated and adopted authoritatively

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6.3.4.1 Expand norms and the rule of law in the digital marketplace

To expand the rule of law in the digital sphere of the global economy, basic rules of the road accepted by the international community need to be elaborated and adopted authoritatively. Hence, the Commission encourages the London Process to elaborate a nonbinding code of norms for cyberspace—building on the multi-stakeholder approach used for the NETmundial initiative, and on the new “social compact” idea of the Global Commission on Internet Governance— to which governments, companies, civil society organizations, and other stakeholder groups can sign up (see 8.3.1.1). Moreover, to clarify the application of existing, binding international law, the International Law Commission, in collaboration with the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE), should be tasked with drawing up a report on the application of secondary rules of international law, in particular on state responsibility and countermeasures, in cyberspace, taking due account of international human rights instruments and the views of the multi-stakeholder community. Last, given the unabated interest of countries around the world in joining the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the London Process should explore a sectoral approach to cyber-treaty making, to cover other aspects relevant to justice and security in the digital marketplace.
6.3.4.2 Combat cybercrime through international cybercrime centers and an international cybercrime experts roster

To combat cybercrime globally, new approaches need to be harnessed. The Commission therefore recommends, first, a global harmonization of cybersecurity frameworks and standards, under the aegis of the UN, as well as global regulatory compliance as an important step in improving the security, stability, and interoperability of networks.

Institutionally, the Commission recommends taking forward INTERPOL’s pioneering work in this area by strengthening its Cyber Fusion Centre (CFC) to properly equip it for building capacities in Member States in cybersecurity matters, including a new standby roster of cybercrime experts who assist countries in the Global South in developing critical cybersecurity capabilities. Moreover, in close cooperation with existing Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and expertise centers such as the new Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (see 6.3.4.4), we encourage the establishment of additional regional offices to bolster regional coordination in this area and to improve cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, establishing a global network of cybercrime centers (see box 6.4).

6.3.4.3 Promote fundamental good practice in cybersecurity globally

There is also a need for global education of Internet users, as operators in the digital economy, to protect themselves, their data, and their assets from falling victim to nefarious practices. The overall objective is cyber hygiene (see box 6.5). Only in this way can it be ensured that the hundreds of millions of people, especially from the emerging economies of the Global South, who are eager to gain access to the Internet, do not become potential victims. The Commission, therefore, recommends that cyber hygiene be treated as an essential part of digital literacy and the development cycle of cyber systems and products. It should be promoted globally through institutions such as the UN and INTERPOL’s Digital Crime Center (see box 6.4). Specifically, the Commission recommends that the 20 Critical Security Controls for effective cyber defense—the internationally recognized security methodologies and business disciplines for effective cybersecurity practices—be adopted at both international and national levels. These best practices, if adopted and implemented, will address many of the attack vectors known today and dramatically improve cyber hygiene.155

6.3.4.4 Promote universal access and the protection of rights and freedom in the digital marketplace

To help close the digital divide between and within countries and make the economic benefits of the digital marketplace more accessible to all, the Commission commends the call of the 2015 Global Conference on CyberSpace (GCCS) to integrate the promotion of Internet access in the Post-2015 Development Agenda. It urges the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise launched at the GCCS, which aims to foster international solidarity and provide political, technical, and financial support to strengthen international cooperation in cyberspace, to include Internet access as one of its focus areas. Moreover, the Commission recommends that multilateral efforts in this domain, such as the ITU’s Connect 2020 Agenda, should receive substantial support from all stakeholders with the appropriate capacity, including those at the regional level. When promoting Internet access worldwide, attention should be paid to respecting the fundamental human rights of the hundreds of millions of new users to emerge in the coming years.
As illustrated in box 6.1, the impact of cybercrime can be disastrous. The decentralized nature of the Internet, in general, and the technological and jurisdictional difficulties inherent in fighting cybercrime, in particular, necessitate a globally coordinated effort to combat and prevent this threat. Any new approach has to strengthen and complement efforts already underway. INTERPOL, for example, has recently established the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) as a cybercrime fighting entity in Singapore, with the Cyber Fusion Centre as its nerve center.

The Commission recommends further strengthening the CFC to build a substantially stronger global framework to combat cybercrime. The CFC should assist Member States in bolstering their cybersecurity and cybercrime fighting capabilities by pulling information and encouraging joint analysis and broader coordination. It should further promote best practices, coordinated policies, enhanced judicial and law enforcement cooperation, and common principles of state behavior. As an essential element of this approach, INTERPOL’s regional offices should establish regional cybercrime centers to ensure proper implementation of these activities, particularly through strengthened regional coordination. To improve cooperation with the UN and regional organizations, such as the EU, similar entities should be established at INTERPOL’s liaison offices in New York and Brussels, respectively. The CFC in Singapore can then act as the central hub for consolidating and analyzing global trends, as well as advancing global cooperation.

To further prevent cybercrime and strengthen cybersecurity efforts in the Global South, the Commission also recommends that INTERPOL establish a new standby roster of expert cybercrime fighters within the Cyber Fusion Centre, drawing on recommendations from INTERPOL member states. These experts would have the two-part mandate of (i) building up cybersecurity and cybercrime fighting capacities within countries in need, and (ii) expanding efforts by governments, in particular in emerging economies of the Global South, to promote good cyber hygiene (see 6.3.4.3), so that users can protect themselves and their data and assets from criminal activity. They can assist by providing direct policy advisory and technical support services to national governments, offering training and research (in connection with INTERPOL’s new Digital Crime Center), assisting efforts to harmonize and coordinate cybercrime fighting procedures with regional and global cybercrime centers, and by providing advice on new tools to combat cybercrime.
The problem sets addressed in the last three Sections are both threats to human security, human rights, and human development in their own right and deeply interconnected. Dealing with them effectively requires policies and perspectives that recognize those connections and the need for solutions that embody just security principles in each area. Lapses in security and justice will shape, direct, hinder, and conflate attempts to resolve issues seen in previous eras as largely independent of one another. Thus, in the Sahel over the next century, climate change is predicted to bring stronger floods even as it leads to longer droughts, and lack of governments’ capacity to meet essential resource needs such as water is motivation for social unrest and instability exploitable by extremist actors such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Ansar Dine. Lapse in security and justice will shape, direct, hinder, and conflate attempts to resolve issues seen in previous eras as largely independent of one another. Thus, in the Sahel over the next century, climate change is predicted to bring stronger floods even as it leads to longer droughts, and lack of governments’ capacity to meet essential resource needs such as water is motivation for social unrest and instability exploitable by extremist actors such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Ansar Dine.156 State fragility in turn undermines countries’ capacity to cope with climate change, as well as deal with the grievances it deepens that such groups can exploit.

The hyperconnected global economy, effectively and transparently governed, can reduce economic turmoil and benefit all countries and peoples by tapping and nurturing human ingenuity and productivity. The increasingly integrated global economy also provides empowerment tools that can strengthen international and local responses to the needs of fragile and conflict-affected environments, as described in Section 4. However, if managed poorly, the financial and natural wealth of a nation recovering from years of protracted violent conflict can be depleted without benefit to the majority of its citizens—as noted in the discussions of government corruption, IFFs, and the illicit exploitation of natural resources.

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**Box 6.5 Cyber Hygiene**

“In the wake of highly publicized breaches around the world, nearly everyone has at least heard about cyber security, even if many remain largely in the dark about just what that term means. What are the most important things to look at when evaluating the cyber security posture of any enterprise? What constitutes the minimum standard of due care when it comes to protecting information technology and data holdings?

Basic cyber hygiene—

- Hardware and software asset inventory;
- Limited administrative permissions;
- Real-time (automated) network and system monitoring and vulnerability patching.

These measures have been demonstrated to stop over 80 per cent of all known attacks. Cyber hygiene allows an enterprise to know what’s connected to and running on its networks, have the latest information on the state of repair that the networks are in, and control who has the ability to bypass, override, or change the networks’ security settings. When things go amiss, enterprises can, with these controls in place, find out quickly and move rapidly to respond. When facing an audit that includes cyber security, organizations should compare what the auditors are looking at to what technical experts actually know to be the most important things to do—and to do first—to achieve measurable cyber security.”

To remain sustainable, the hyperconnected global economy must also reinforce efforts to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change (the focus of Section 5). This includes promoting a New Climate Economy to reconcile the need to stem climate change’s effects while ensuring continued growth and job creation through technological innovation, better land use, and strategic investments in infrastructure. New governance innovations introduced in Section 6, including a G20+ and a UN System Sustainable Human Development Network, can generate sustainable, integrated approaches across economic, social, and environmental areas, in consultation with civil society organizations and private companies. So too can new communications technologies and the Big Data revolution help to unleash human creativity and collective action for resolving the climate crisis.

Through the framework of just security (introduced in Part I), all three of these fundamental global challenges—state fragility, climate governance, and the hyperconnected global economy—are brought together, heightening a sense of urgency and our understanding of how they interrelate. Just security also offers fresh perspectives, to which we now turn, on a related, yet broader global governance reform agenda and the coalitions of state and nonstate actors necessary to bring about systemic change.
III. More Effective Global Governance for the New Era
Since the end of the Cold War, some significant additions have been made to the machinery of global governance including the WTO, the ICC, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, UN Women, and the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). At the same time, attempts to modernize principal organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council, General Assembly, and ECOSOC have made little headway. Building further on the analysis of the three priority areas presented in Part II, and strengthening the linkages between them, here we present arguments for a coherent set of systemic global governance reforms. Adopting a network governance approach that harnesses the ideas, talents, resources, and political support of both state and nonstate actors to enhance global security and justice, we first address the reform of major global institutions and then ways in which nonstate, substate, and regional actors can enhance the effectiveness of global governance.
7. Reform of Major Global Institutions

The traditional pillars of global governance are the principal organs of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank Group and IMF). Other major global bodies (such as the WTO), UN agencies, programs, and funds, the regional development banks, and other functionally specialized institutions round out the mix, each designed to provide a specific range of global public goods. The crisis of global governance described in Part I arises not only from the scope and character of the challenges presently facing humanity, but also from the inability of current governance institutions to meet those challenges and the difficulty of getting agreement on reforms that might give them that ability. This section offers an array of important reforms to a range of institutions. It begins with an appreciation of the difficulties that any such reform agenda must face and overcome.

7.1 Obstacles to Reforming Global Governance Institutions

Whether advancing new norms and principles, creating new institutions, or attempting to reform the current system of global governance, chief obstacles to change have typically fallen within three categories: first, a lack of political will to change, particularly among powerful countries capable of obstruction; second, failure to effectively design and advocate a specific policy or institutional reform; and, third, limited skill and effort invested in sustaining a reform program through completion. Success in pursuing the reform agenda the Commission proposes requires dealing with each of these obstacles.

7.1.1 Political will matters

Achieving consensus among the 193 UN Member States, even on a relatively straightforward reform proposal and under favorable conditions, can be challenging. When national diplomats have few incentives to set their sights beyond their national interest and only the Secretary-General and a limited number of heads of international agencies speak out for the global interest, aligning national and global perspectives can prove difficult. Efforts to create a better climate for reform are further handicapped by the reluctance of many governments to create space for engagement by new global governance actors, from parliamentary bodies, business groups (including the media), and civil society to regional organizations and even municipal authorities.

Effective reform proposals must take into account what is politically feasible

Garnering and sustaining political support is central to advancing global policy and institutional reforms. Within the UN political context, reform proposals that threaten the interests of major powers, of standing coalitions of Member States, and the bureaucratic interests of major departments or agencies rarely prevail if change proponents fail to mobilize pressure against such powerful stakeholders’ resistance. Perennial efforts to reform the Security Council have faced such obstacles. Despite increased interest over the past two decades in UNSC reform by the broader UN membership, permanent members China, Russia, and the United States (all wielding veto
authority) appear skeptical of change. Recent Member State negotiations have lacked the robust commitment to reform normally signaled by active give-and-take diplomacy. Nevertheless, with a carefully calibrated reform package (as laid out in Section 7.3) tied to the historic occasion of the UN’s seventieth anniversary in 2015 and seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020, we believe political momentum can be renewed. At the same time, great power consent is not always a prerequisite for change, as the entry into force of the Land Mine Treaty in 1999, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2002, and the rise of the Responsibility to Protect as a global norm attest.

7.1.2 The art and science of designing and promoting reform

Our Global Neighborhood, the 410-page report of the 1995 Commission on Global Governance, was criticized for making complex and ambitious recommendations deemed too far ahead of its time. On the other hand, reforms introduced in official multilateral negotiations are too often rudimentary and limited in scope. For example, successive working groups on UN General Assembly (UNGA) reform have dedicated attention to improving the language of UNGA resolutions while avoiding a serious discussion on closing cluttered and long-standing debates or tracking the implementation of past resolutions. To get beyond such tinkering, effective reform proposals must take into account what is politically feasible and invest in a comprehensive communications strategy to make the case to policymakers and the broader public—through, for example, the media—for why a reform idea is needed, timely, and realistic. Key stakeholders, including powerful states and standing coalitions of Member States but also increasingly influential nonstate actors from civil society and the business community, are critical to driving (as well as holding back) reform. They must therefore be engaged skillfully to champion reform over an extended period.

Strong research and a shared analysis of the problem set underpin successful reform efforts. They lend greater urgency and new perspectives to understanding and responding to both new and old, but unmet, global challenges. Embracing the common insight that there can be no secure international order without justice and no global justice without the means to maintain our common security, the just security framework presented in Section 2.5 anchors the Commission’s analysis and informs decisions on which policy issues to prioritize from a complex and vast set of global problems. Designing and selling an effective reform program also means proposing new arrangements that align with the shifting power balances among major states, yet remaining flexible enough to respond efficiently to changes in technology and society. The balance between efficiency and representation (or participation) shapes effectiveness, a point that applies to the Security Council, as well as to the proposal for a new framework for global economic cooperation (see 7.3.3).

Success also depends on the skillful navigation of multilateral negotiations, sequencing of reforms, and mobilization of resources

7.1.3 The complexities of sustaining reform

The well-argued recommendations of previous international commissions and high-level panels have tended not to be accompanied by plans to sustain a reform agenda, even though, as one influential commentator notes, it is all about “follow-up, follow-up, and follow-up.” Neither the
1995 Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations nor the 1995 Commission on Global Governance, for example, followed up in any meaningful way on their significant proposed changes to the UN Economic and Social Council. Even when an idea is quickly accepted, as was the Peacebuilding Commission proposed by the 2004 High-Level Panel on Challenges, Threats and Change, poor implementation suggests the need for a major overhaul less than a decade later (see recommendation 7.3.5).

Mobilizing support for and sustaining a global governance reform program can benefit from smart coalitions of like-minded state and nonstate actors. Success also depends on the skillful navigation of multilateral negotiations, sequencing of reforms, and mobilization of resources. Finally, progress necessitates effective reform implementation, including monitoring and responding to setbacks. We detail each of these steps in Part IV in a near-term (three to five years) transitional strategy for reform designed to harness the ideas, networks, and resources of global and transnational actors and garner political support for a vision of just security for all.

7.2 Current Efforts to Reform Major Global Institutions

The Commission has focused attention on key challenges related to state fragility and violent conflict, climate and people, and the hyperconnected global economy. Global institutions have a major role to play in meeting the crisis in global governance head-on. Efforts to reform the architecture of global governance have come intermittently since the founding of the United Nations in 1945. With a few notable exceptions, such as the creation of the World Trade Organization and International Criminal Court, institutional reforms have been rather limited, for example merely increasing the membership of an international body. Sometimes, they have been counterproductive: for instance, the creation of several dozen UN programs, funds, and agencies with a high degree of operational autonomy from the UN Secretary-General and with weak and limited incentives to support coherent system-wide conduct and accountability. The difficulties of making the necessary changes to the multilateral infrastructure have caused many reform efforts to remain at the debating stage, mired in division.

7.2.1 UN General Assembly

The General Assembly, as a universal body of 193 countries (up from fifty-one in 1945), is the UN’s most inclusive principal organ. It is the central global manifestation of the public space referred to in Part I. Legitimacy in global governance, however, also stems from performance that benefits UN Member States and their citizens directly. Some progress has been achieved in building an institutional memory in the General Assembly President’s Office, but a lack of consensus among Member States stifles other reforms. For example, by politicizing appointment and staffing decisions for even relatively junior-level positions, the General Assembly (through its Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) exercises, at times, excessive budgetary (and hence staffing) authority over the UN Secretariat. Failure to dramatically improve the functioning of the UN’s main deliberative forum risks a further slide toward its irrelevance vis-à-vis other formal and informal intergovernmental bodies and powerful global nonstate actors and multi-stakeholder arrangements. The 2005 World Summit yielded consensus that the work of the General Assembly needed to be revitalized but reached little agreement on how to do it. To channel the discussions on reform, the UNGA established, in 2005, an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the General Assembly.
The Ad Hoc Working Group has since been the primary institutional focus of UNGA reform. Current proposals include reducing the large number of issues on the UNGA’s agenda, adopting fewer and briefer resolutions, enlarging the support staff of the President of the UNGA, diversifying the formats for debates, and helping smaller delegations deal with the work load of the many General Assembly meetings. Although these reforms are popular and may well improve the UNGA’s work, a lack of consensus on the best ways to implement them continues to impede progress.

7.2.2 UN Security Council

Whereas the UN General Assembly receives praise for its universality and justifiable criticism for its limited impact, the Security Council suffers from a widely perceived lack of representativeness but maintains considerable global political leverage. Indeed, it is the only principal UN organ empowered to authorize the use of force and to enact binding international law (see also 4.2.7). But as a distinct product of history now seven decades past, its five permanent members, or P5—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as chief victors from World War II (or successor states) continue to enjoy an unrivaled status and level of influence in the primary UN body for maintenance of international peace and security. Their veto power remains a source of concern among the broader UN membership and civil society, as well as a chief reason for the Security Council’s paralysis when its leadership has been most needed to prevent or halt the outbreak of violent conflict or mass atrocities (see 4.2).

Successful reform of the UNSC is not without precedent. In 1965, the Security Council expanded from eleven to fifteen members. Although the UN’s membership has grown by 65 percent since then, from 117 to 193 Member States, the size of the Council has not changed. It is time to enlarge the Council in line with present-day realities. This would create more opportunities for countries with significant peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding resources to contribute to the work of the Council and would counter the argument that the Security Council lacks representative legitimacy. Further, when an even larger number of Member States strongly endorse action to prevent or halt the outbreak of violent atrocities, it increases the pressure on a veto-wielding P5 member to not go against global public opinion.

Most recent Security Council reform efforts have been channeled through the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN). Although this forum has been instrumental in continuing vital discussions on reform, it has largely been paralyzed by discussions about procedural issues. The recent appointment of a new chair of the IGN, Ambassador Courtenay Rattray of Jamaica, possibly signals a renewed opportunity for reforming the Security Council.

Major issues under consideration within the IGN include expansion of Security Council membership, matters concerning its working methods, and how the veto power is exercised by the P5. These include a proposal that France brought forward and Mexico supported in 2013, calling on the P5 to define a code of conduct, including the collective renouncement of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. In September 2014, at the opening session of the UN General Assembly, the two countries convened a side-event at the ministerial level on the theme of regulating the veto in the event of mass atrocities. Many countries from around the world have come to support this idea in principle, though the exact contours of such veto restraint remain vague.
7.2.3 ECOSOC and global economic institutions

The UN Charter recognizes that socioeconomic stability and well-being “are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations” (Article 55 UN Charter). The Economic and Social Council, a principal UN organ, is an institutional expression of this insight. ECOSOC began with eighteen members and reached its present fifty-two in 1973. Despite (or possibly because of) these enlargements, ECOSOC is widely perceived as inadequate in fulfilling the coordination, oversight, and knowledge management functions assigned to it in Articles 62 through 66 of the Charter. The last major reform round, discussed during the 2005 World Summit, led to the creation of the Development Cooperation Forum, which meets every two years and includes active nonstate participation, and to voluntary presentations on the implementation of national development strategies to Annual Ministerial Reviews, which have not worked sufficiently well.

Despite being the UN’s primary organ in global economic governance, ECOSOC’s relative irrelevance—confirmed by the minor role it played during the recent global financial crisis—has given rise to a number of coordination mechanisms outside the UN, such as the G20 (see 6.2.1). In July 2013, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution, “The United Nations in global economic governance” (A/RES/67/289), in which it recognized the importance of enhanced interaction between UN organs and the G20, as well as the need for a strengthened ECOSOC. Specific, substantive measures to achieve this, however, were not included in the resolution.

7.2.4 International courts and human rights bodies

International justice institutions, such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, as well as international human rights bodies, such as the United Nations Human Rights Council, stand at the forefront of efforts to enhance security and justice worldwide through promoting the observance of international law, and through accountability for international crimes, including gross violations of human rights violations committed by state or nonstate actors. Their pursuit of international justice and human security has, however, been stymied by several factors, some of which are a function of the mandates and capabilities of these institutions, as well as limited links to other bodies such as the UN Security Council.

The ICJ only has mandatory jurisdiction over UN Member States that accept such jurisdiction, which inhibits its role in maintaining the rule of law internationally as a true “world court.”165 Seventy-one states have made a declaration recognizing the ICJ’s jurisdiction as compulsory, but this number is still far too low.

The ICC was established in 2002 to prosecute those most responsible for serious crimes of concern to the international community. The Court has since delivered its first judgments, but views of its overall performance have been mixed (see box 9.1). This track record points to wider problems with ensuring adequate support for transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict states. As conflicts around the world continue to flare up, and related transitional justice efforts—such as those in Libya and Egypt—struggle, more effective international responses to help fragile communities overcome past grievances need to be found (see also Section 4.2.6).
On strengthening the UN’s system to ensure compliance with various human rights treaties, much work remains too. According to former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay,

by resigning ourselves to the inevitability of noncompliance and inadequate resources, the system was left to suffer a long history of benign neglect to the point where, today, it stands on the verge of drowning in its growing workload, even when leaving aside the shocking fact that on average 23 percent of States parties to one treaty have never engaged in the review procedure of that treaty.166

In short, the UN human rights bodies lack resources, a commitment by Member States to the human rights treaties they have acceded to, and enhanced coordination among themselves and with relevant UN organs, including the Security Council.

7.2.5 Peacebuilding Commission

As detailed earlier, the UN Peacebuilding Commission fell, in its first decade, well short of international expectations in its core mandated areas of marshaling resources, supporting integrated strategies, and developing best practices to assist conflict-affected countries directly and proactively (see 4.2.7). The central question is whether to invest real authority in the Commission, including on matters of conflict prevention, and to establish an acceptable division of responsibility with the Security Council. Several of these issues are under consideration by the members of the Peacebuilding Commission as part of the body’s ten-year review to be concluded during the latter half of 2015. It is, however, uncertain whether the review will lead to consensus on the structural reform necessary to give the Peacebuilding Commission the authority and mandate it needs to fulfill its mission.

The central question is whether to invest real authority in the Peacebuilding Commission

7.2.6 UN Secretariat

Much more than the intergovernmental machinery of the larger UN system, the UN Secretariat has undergone continuous reform since it was created in 1945. The Secretary-General has considerable say in shaping the future direction of the Secretariat, and each new Secretary-General has arrived in the post with new reform ideas. UN administrative performance is also closely monitored by Member States, whose influence reaches down as far as job classifications and the number of temporary employees a unit may hire and for how long. Since the end of the Cold War, the Secretariat has undergone further reform, starting with the creation of new departments of political affairs and of peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s, taking over functions that previously resided in the Secretary-General’s office. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched a significant reform effort in the late 1990s, leading to the establishment of the Deputy Secretary-General post, as well as cabinet style management, embodied in the Senior Management Group and four executive committees (for peace and security; development; humanitarian affairs; and economic and social affairs, with human rights participating in all). The Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, established later, allows the heads of Secretariat departments and the UN funds, programs, and agencies to collectively agree on either country-specific or thematic policies. Finally,
the Chief Executives Board for Coordination, chaired by the Secretary-General, includes the heads of specialized agencies over which the Secretary-General has no direct administrative control, allowing for a degree of interagency coordination.

Early in his tenure as Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon split the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, creating a new Department of Field Support to service all field missions. He also created, alongside the Policy Committee, a Senior Advisers’ Meeting, and core groups of various configurations of senior officials from the Secretariat and from funds and programs. He also gave greater political responsibility to the Deputy Secretary-General, whose job description now encompasses peace and security as well as development issues. Despite these efforts, there remains room for improvement, beginning with steps to improve transparency in the selection procedure of the Secretary-General, enhance management of the Secretariat, and advance coherence across the entire UN system (see 7.3.6).

Notwithstanding various efforts in the past to reform key global governance institutions, they have not gone far enough to make them “fit for purpose” or to meet the most pressing of today’s challenges. The following sections point the way forward, outlining specific recommendations for each of these bodies, to turn them into effective providers of security and justice on a global scale.

7.3 Global Institutions for the Twenty-First Century

Against the historical backdrop and the broader analysis presented in Parts I and II of this Report, and seeking to join moral imperatives (what is right) with a politically attractive and realistic reform agenda (what is feasible)—the Commission recommends the following initiatives.

7.3.1 Revitalization of the UN General Assembly

The following UNGA reforms merit urgent attention.

7.3.1.1 Streamline the UNGA agenda and strengthen its president and committees

Calls for many years to streamline the UNGA’s agenda led, in 2005, to major thematic debates. To date, however, thematic debates remain the exception rather than the norm. Ten were organized in the sixty-third session (2008–2009), but only thirteen in the five years that followed. Meanwhile, the UNGA adopted 310 resolutions in its sixty-eighth session (2013–2014), 26 percent more than the fiftieth session (1995–1996) nearly two decades earlier. More thematic debates could help both reduce the number and improve the quality of UNGA resolutions, including those on fundamental global security and justice concerns. Furthermore, across the board, the UNGA—and the quality of the resolutions brought before the Assembly—would benefit from smaller committees with more tightly focused agendas, for example on closing long-standing debates and the implementation of past resolutions, which would increase performance and thus the body’s standing in the international community. Finally, the periodic repetition of resolutions should only be permitted if these are accompanied with a progress report as to their implementation.

7.3.1.2 Create a Shadow Council in the General Assembly for Security Council oversight

Offering underrepresented state and nonstate actors a voice on matters of international peace and security, the proposed Shadow Council would serve as the functional equivalent of a loyal opposition in parliamentary systems. It would seek input from states most directly affected...
by proposed Security Council action, and could receive written submissions from other states, representatives of regional organizations, civil society organizations, and business associations. It would then become the principal vehicle for consultation and oversight between the Security Council and the broader UN membership, a sort of UNSC-UNGA consultation committee established under Article 22 of the Charter.

7.3.1.3 Revisit the Uniting for Peace resolution
A revival of the Uniting for Peace resolution, which enables the UN General Assembly to act when the Security Council is paralyzed, merits reconsideration. By adopting A/RES/377 A (November 3, 1950), more than two-thirds of the UN Member States declared that the P5 cannot and should not prevent the UNGA from calling for actions necessary to restore international peace and security in cases where the UNSC has manifestly failed to exercise its primary responsibility for maintaining peace. Although the UNGA can only call for enforcement action, and any such call lacks the legal authority of a Chapter VII resolution, “Uniting for Peace” provides a mechanism for the UNGA to become active should two-thirds of the General Assembly agree that such action is necessary.

7.3.1.4 Lead the Post-2015 Development Agenda
As demonstrated with the Millennium Development Goals, the UN General Assembly has served, on an exceptional basis, as an effective mechanism for consensus-building, the generation of new international norms, and international development cooperation. Going forward, the UNGA should be charged with sustaining political support for the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, in particular, so as to make sure that both security and justice concerns are duly addressed, providing a forum for heads of state and government to highlight annually progress toward meeting them through 2030.

7.3.1.5 Establish a UN Parliamentary Network
Adopting a pragmatic approach toward strengthening UN-citizen relations and overcoming the world body’s democratic deficit, a United Nations Parliamentary Network established under UN Charter Article 22 could wield tremendous potential for expanding public knowledge of and participation in the work of the preeminent global institution (see box 7.1). Feeding fresh ideas into the UN General Assembly’s debates, the proposed UN Parliamentary Network would complement the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the longer-term efforts of civil society organizations to develop a transnational democratic culture.

7.3.2 Reform of the UN Security Council
Learning from failures to reform the Security Council over the past two decades, the Commission recommends three realistic proposals it believes meet the twin goals of enhanced effectiveness and acceptability to the widest possible range of Member States.

7.3.2.1 Expand the membership and allow immediate reelection of nonpermanent members
In 1965, the UN Charter was amended to expand the Security Council’s membership from eleven to fifteen, increasing the number of nonpermanent members by four. Given the great expansion in UN membership since then, it is again time to expand Council’s membership, in line with present-day realities. As a further step toward improving the Council’s representative legitimacy, nonpermanent members should be able to be reelected to consecutive terms, with the lengths of terms to be determined. These changes would require amendment to Article 23 of the Charter.
Commissioner Comment on Recommendation 7.3.2.1

Note: Different views were expressed by Commissioners on this recommendation.

Celso Amorim: “Expand the Security Council in the two categories of members, in line with present-day realities, including developing countries as permanent members.”

7.3.2.2 Improve the working methods

In September 2005, the world leaders at the UN Summit agreed, among other things, on two responsibilities:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity ...

To improve the Security Council’s working methods to advance this decade-old commitment and its wider mandate under the Charter, the Commission recommends an informal agreement among Security Council members on six points. First, to defend their No Votes publicly in the UNSC Chamber where there are reasonable grounds to believe situations pertaining to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 UN Summit Outcome Document pertain. Second, to allow permanent members of the Security Council the option of casting a dissenting vote that does not rise formally to the level of nonconcurrence (veto) and thus does not block passage of a resolution. Third, to ensure sufficient political support and resources for new and recurring peace operations where any of the listed crimes have been or are at risk of being perpetrated. Fourth, to establish a Group of Friends—with balanced membership from the Global North and South—to support each such Security Council-mandated peace operation politically and diplomatically, and invite interested nonmembers of the Council to participate. Fifth, to consult and address, on a semiannual basis or whenever a significant change in mandate is contemplated, the concerns of troop- and police-contributing countries who participate in peace operations with robust protection of civilians mandates. Last, to undertake a shared, rolling analysis of the terrorist, criminal, and other extremist elements located in a Security Council-mandated peace operation environment to identify and address key, premeditated sources of instability and violent conflict.

7.3.2.3 Hold regular, structured consultations with civil society and business

Civil society and the business community demonstrate a growing commitment to prevention, peacemaking, post-conflict peacebuilding, and peacekeeping (see box 4.3). It is therefore time to institute a formal consultative mechanism for periodic dialogues—building on the successful, albeit informal Arria-formula dialogues conducted since 1992 between the President of the UNSC...
Box 7.1 Overcoming the UN’s Democratic Deficit Through a UN Parliamentary Network

Public access to and participation in the workings of international organizations at the forefront of global problem-solving remain far too limited. Despite some progress in engaging civil society organizations, most intergovernmental bodies—beginning with the United Nations—have a democratic deficit. This harms the perceived credibility and legitimacy of the UN’s principal organs.

An important initial step toward more robust access and representation for “We the Peoples” of the United Nations would be developing a consultative UN Parliamentary Network (UNPN). It would bring together parliamentarians elected from their national legislatures, to discuss and advise on issues in UN governance that concern citizens worldwide. It would be similar in initial composition to the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and the Parliamentary Conference on the World Trade Organization, but would have a formal relationship with the UN and be focused on the world body’s efforts to promote global security and justice.

The UNPN would add an important democratic dimension to UN governance. It would offer national parliamentarians with a strong interest in UN governance the opportunity to provide their insights. It could help to address concerns at the grassroots level about the benefits of globalization by providing a continuous platform for input and accountability claims from domestic populations (such as public hearings with local constituents), and an important additional channel for global civil society groups, as well as the private sector. It could meet every September, at the start of a new UN General Assembly session, to feed ideas into the work of the UNGA—and convene periodically during the rest of the year when critical issues come to the fore.

The Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance supports development of such a UN Parliamentary Network. The Commission sees such support as complementary to longer-term civil society organization efforts to develop a transnational democratic culture, such as the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly, which seeks the creation of a standing, formally constituted UN second chamber. The campaign has won the support of a large number of national parliamentarians and civil society groups. A Parliamentary Network is a vital step that can be taken in the immediate term to expand public knowledge and participation in UN work as Member States weigh the merits of more robust and far-reaching democratic forums.

Finally, the UN Parliamentary Network could serve as a complement to the important work undertaken by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), which has promoted international cooperation and democracy for more than a hundred years. Where IPU member-state delegations tend to focus on national issues, UNPN members would focus on UN governance itself, and on facilitating more accountable and inclusive decision-making at the global level. The two bodies could work together in ways analogous to the European Parliament and the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union. Over time, the UN Parliamentary Network could be seen as part of a natural evolution toward a central and vital role for We the Peoples in the governance of the world body.

Source: Cabrera, “Strengthening Security, Justice, and Democracy Globally”.
and representatives of civil society, the business community, and municipalities. This is all the more important given the Security Council’s growing focus on nontraditional security issues (what essentially constitutes just security), including HIV-AIDS, Ebola and other diseases, protection of civilians, children in armed conflict, the role of women in peace and security, and climate change and natural disasters. Facilitation and oversight of the periodic dialogues could occur through the UN Global Partnership platform outlined below (see 8.3.2). Aside from creating a new channel for dialogue and exchange of ideas on the Security Council’s agenda with civil society, the business sector, and cities, this new consultative mechanism could lend much-needed support and political pressure to the above UNSC reform proposals on expanding membership and improving working methods.

Adopting a spirit of pragmatism, combined with other reform strategies outlined in Part IV, deals made on Security Council reform can reinforce rather than hinder a broader agenda for change.

7.3.3 G20+ and a new framework for global economic cooperation

In a globally integrated world economy, the need for global collective action and stability is almost universally recognized. The proposed new framework for global economic cooperation, with a competent and accountable coordination body (the G20+) and connected to a representative global system (the UN), aims to preserve global economic stability and to ensure that the global economy continues to grow inclusively to benefit all nations and peoples equitably (see 6.3.1). Unlike earlier attempts at reform (see 7.2.3), this concept is commensurate with changes in the world economy.

The core functions, structure, membership, and ties to the UN (including ECOSOC) of the G20+ within the wider new framework for global economic cooperation should also include the following aspects (see 6.3.1.1 through 6.3.1.5).

Three Core Functions

7.3.3.1 Facilitate multi-stakeholder, cross-disciplinary dialogue and policy solutions

The G20+ would adopt integrated approaches across economic, social, and environmental areas in the international system in consultation with a range of nonstate actors from civil society and the business community. This approach, which is integral to finalizing the ambitious Post-2015 Development Agenda, demonstrates the value of engaging state and nonstate actors simultaneously to share diverse voices and areas of expertise. It would also help identify and fill critical gaps in the current system, such as tax cooperation and the absence of a multilateral framework for restructuring sovereign debt (the latter highlighted in the 2009 UN Stiglitz Commission Report).

7.3.3.2 Promote inclusive economic reform

Additionally, the G20+ should encourage financial and economic regulatory reform by offering political support and other incentives for countries and regions that pursue difficult reforms to achieve growth and job creation—both of which are important to global security and justice—over an extended period and that avoid economic nationalism in the process.

7.3.3.3 Enable global economic crisis response

The G20+ would have more leverage to coordinate resources between UN Member States, the UN system, and other major economic bodies to avert and respond to transnational economic shocks. (The UN system is broadly understood to include the UN itself and its agencies, the World Bank Group, and the IMF. Other economic bodies would include a variety of entities—authoritative, such as the World Trade Organization; advisory and coordinative, such as the Financial Stability
Board; service oriented, such as the Bank for International Settlements; and newer lenders, such as the BRICS Development Bank.) In so doing, it would identify emerging threats and urgent crisis response needs, as well as promote global economic stability and growth through greater coherence within the system of global economic governance.

Structure, Membership, and Ties to the UN

7.3.3.4 Convene the G20+ every two years at the UN

In terms of the membership, to ensure greater institutionalized coordination between the G20+ countries, the 193 UN Member States, and representatives of major global and regional economic bodies, the G20+ should meet at the heads of state level every two years at UN Headquarters (as its normal twenty member grouping, which itself should remain flexible and open to change), timed in conjunction with the start of the new UN General Assembly annual session every third week of September in New York. In alternate years, the G20+ would continue to meet in the country of a particular year’s rotating president. Whereas the chief policy focus of the G20+ should remain priority setting on critical issues for the world economy, including in the area of crisis response, it should depend on formal international organizations and states for implementation and follow-through. Such a network governance approach (see 2.2.2) would also better allow coherent national policies to be urged and carried forward.

Prior to the G20+ heads of state meeting, the rotating president of the G20+ could engage in direct dialogue on policy priorities with regional and subregional organizations, especially from regions underrepresented in the G20 itself (Central America, Andean South America, Africa, Southwest and Central Asia, and much of Southeast Asia). Through the UN Global Partnership (proposal 8.3.2), steps should be undertaken also to engage business and civil society representatives in these dialogues. In addition, any governments that are critical to the economic issues on the table for discussion at a G20+ heads of state meeting could be invited to participate.

Commissioner Comment on Recommendation 7.3.3.4

Note: Different views were expressed by Commissioners on this recommendation.

José Antonio Ocampo: “Any enhanced role for the G20 should be based on strengthening its legitimacy by transforming it into a constituency-based organization (based on universal membership).”

7.3.3.5 Establish a global economic cooperation liaison mechanism

In addition to supporting the periodic meetings in New York as outlined in the previous recommendation and basic levels of coordination and information exchange among the secretariats of global economic bodies, a light global economic cooperation liaison mechanism should be created, involving senior staff from the G20+, the UN, and other major global and regional economic bodies. Its modest secretariat could be led by a second UN deputy secretary-general (see recommendation 7.3.6.3) focused on economic, social, and environmental matters. Consulting all relevant actors (including business and civil society groups via the UN Global Partnership), the liaison mechanism would be charged with facilitating regular communications and coordination between—as well as preparing technical documents on global economic governance matters concerning—the above bodies.
7.3.3.6 Create a (virtual) G20+ secretariat composed mainly of seconded personnel from major global and regional economic bodies

To both staff periodic G20+ meetings at the heads of state, foreign minister, finance minister, and senior officials levels, as well as review progress on commitments made at earlier meetings, induce greater compliance, and facilitate cooperation with the UN and other major global and regional economic bodies, a G20+ secretariat should be established. This can be either traditional (in a physical location) or virtual (operating online and dispersed throughout the world) as a form of network governance. Consisting of world class economists, social development specialists, environmental experts, political scientists, and international lawyers (that is, a technical body of experts) mainly seconded, for three- to four-year intervals, from the United Nations and other major global and regional economic bodies, the G20+ secretariat should be led by a respected international civil servant seasoned in facilitating complex multilateral negotiations on diverse economic and related matters involving both states and other economic actors in the Global North and South. An adaptable secretariat of staff specialists rather than political appointees could help keep the G20+ both flexible and results-oriented regarding the interactions of a growing range of global economic governance actors.

7.3.3.7 Focus ECOSOC on delivering the Post-2015 Development Agenda

With input from the liaison group mechanism, and under the direction of the General Assembly (see 7.3.1.4), ECOSOC—as a system of often well-functioning commissions and committees (for example, the UN Statistical Commission, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the Forum on Indigenous Issues)—could organize interim coordination and monitoring meetings on specific Sustainable Development Goals (including the tracking of progress indicators for each SDG and the adequacy of existing resources within the UN system to meet these goals) in the lead-up to annual heads of state and government progress reviews of the SDGs expected to be organized by the UNGA every September in New York. ECOSOC may need to develop new methodologies for tracking progress on, and perhaps further fleshing out key goals for, advancing just security, such as SDG no. 16 (see 4.2.8).

The ICJ, ICC, and UN Human Rights Council sit at the vanguard of global justice

7.3.3.8 Facilitate development cooperation and humanitarian action through ECOSOC

Moreover, the Economic and Social Council, as the Charter-mandated coordinator of UN agencies, a hub for lessons learned, and a main channel of communication between civil society organizations and the UN, is well placed to coordinate the system for development cooperation with developing countries. This includes through support for SHD-net (see 6.3.1.5), the international humanitarian system, and the follow-through to various UN summits and conferences. Learning from innovations introduced in the HRC over the past decade and building on its current annual ministerial reviews and regular sessions throughout the year on key issues, ECOSOC could also promote greater national accountability of its resolutions and decisions through a universal peer review mechanism.

7.3.4 International courts and human rights bodies: Reform and strengthening

The International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the UN Human Rights Council sit at the vanguard of global justice, but also have implications for security. In response to the main factors that stymie these actors in their pursuit of international justice and human security (see 7.2.4), the Commission recommends the following measures.
7.3.4.1 Strengthen and make full use of the ICJ
The International Court of Justice does not have mandatory jurisdiction over all UN Member States, which is necessary if the rule of law is to be maintained internationally. Expansion of its role, authority, and activity can be achieved through declarations made by states recognizing ICJ jurisdiction as compulsory. Seventy-one states have issued such declarations to date, including Italy, the United Kingdom, and Timor Leste in recent years—less than 37 percent of the UN’s membership. To expand this jurisdiction in contentious cases, the UN should first review the reasons states refrain from issuing such declarations and work toward expanding the number of declarations to cover more than half the UN membership over the next five years. In addition, the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction should expand equally to address today’s most pressing issues.

Although the ICJ’s advisory opinions would continue to be nonbinding, expanding access to such requests from the UN Secretary-General and other international courts and tribunals (including the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body) would increase their use, helping minimize conflicting interpretations of international law and foster its progressive development. Given that all other UN principal organs and various specialized agencies have already been authorized to this effect to date, the UNGA should consider granting the UN Secretary-General the right to request advisory opinions under Article 96(2) of the Charter. Other international courts and tribunals should be allowed to submit requests for advisory opinions through existing channels (such as the UNSC or UNGA) or be granted the right to request such opinions directly, which would require amendment of the UN Charter.

Another reform idea, to safeguard the independence and impartiality of the ICJ and allow other countries the opportunity to nominate potential justices, is the amendment of the ICJ’s statute (Article 13) so that justices serve only one nine-year term.

7.3.4.2 Enhance working relations between the UNSC and ICC
Improving the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council would strengthen the ICC’s ability to fulfill its mandate, further enhancing global security and justice (see 7.2.4). Specific recommendations include: (i) adopting a protocol or outlining factors that could guide the UNSC when it deliberates on the referral of a situation to the ICC; (ii) sustaining a dialogue between the ICC and the UNSC by allowing the ICC’s president and prosecutor to brief the UNSC periodically; (iii) securing agreement that the permanent members of the UNSC will not exercise vetoes in particular circumstances (such as genocide) or that vetoes of referrals to the ICC be justified publicly and in written form; (iv) using the UNSC’s Working Group on Tribunals as a forum to discuss pertinent issues; and (v) supporting ICC action against perpetrators, including enforcing ICC arrest warrants, through sanctions (such as freezing assets).

7.3.4.3 Streamline the global human rights architecture
With a view to strengthening key international justice institutions and human rights bodies, the Commission recommends: fully supporting the UN Secretary-General’s Human Rights Up Front Initiative, including by encouraging a human rights dialogue between the Security Council, Human Rights Council, and International Criminal Court; drawing on system-wide conflict analysis, early warning, and early actions in response to large-scale human rights abuses; and improving cooperation between New York and Geneva-based institutions. On the latter proposal, the focus should include reduced duplication of activities between the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly (a subsidiary body of the UNGA) and the HRC (also a subsidiary body of the UNGA), and clarifying the relationships between the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Human Rights Council.
The UN Commission on Human Rights was a key player in the promotion of human rights in the UN’s early years. Reporting to ECOSOC, it advanced important human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a number of (non-)treaty mechanisms, and “special procedures.” However, as the decades passed, it increasingly suffered from the politicization of its work, especially after the inclusion on the Commission of a number of notorious human rights abusers. By 2005, Kofi Annan stated that the Commission’s work had “cast a shadow on the reputation of the [entire] United Nations system.”

Reform of the Commission on Human Rights was a key recommendation of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and an important topic of discussion at the 2005 World Summit. In the Outcome Document, world leaders agreed to abolish the Commission on Human Rights and replace it with a new Human Rights Council, albeit with limited consensus as to the specifics of its form. The task of negotiating these details was left to the president of the General Assembly, Jan Eliasson. On March 15, 2006, the UNGA voted to establish the HRC.

Although some observers argued that the rushed decision-making did not address some of the structural issues that lay at the heart of the Commission’s problems, most considered the new HRC an improvement, pointing especially to its universal periodic review (UPR) process—through which the HRC periodically examines the human rights performance of all 193 Member States—and the revised election procedures, which stipulate that a candidate member must receive a simple majority of votes in the General Assembly after making human rights commitments and cannot stand for immediate re-election. In addition, the HRC, in contrast to the Commission on Human Rights, would be a standing body, facilitating quick responses to human rights crises and giving UN Member States more time to discuss salient issues. Furthermore, the HRC was established as a subsidiary body of the UNGA, thus potentially strengthening its accountability and effectiveness. Last, the mandated five-year review of its work offered opportunities to remedy any remaining shortcomings.

The HRC nonetheless faced enduring criticism for falling short in its normative commitments and providing insufficient attention to protecting the victims of human rights violations. The Human Rights Council’s five-year review, which started in 2009 and ended in February 2011 with Resolution 16/21 outlining new changes, was also a disappointment to some. A large group of delegates, for instance, refrained from considering proposals that would have enhanced the new Council’s ability to respond to violations.

The initial disappointment with the HRC’s inaction in its first years, however, later gave way to renewed optimism when many governments steered greater attention toward safeguarding international human rights, most significantly during the Arab Spring beginning in 2011. Examples are the rapid suspension of Libya from the HRC following human rights abuses in 2011, far-ranging debates about the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities leading to a 2014 HRC resolution, and special human rights fact-finding teams sent to Libya, Syria, and Côte d’Ivoire. The ongoing proliferation of special procedures, usually exercised by independent mandate-holders, is also widely seen as a positive catalyst for change. Despite ongoing criticism, the Human Rights Council has thus proved a substantial improvement over its predecessor body.


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**Box 7.2 From the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council**

The UN Commission on Human Rights was a key player in the promotion of human rights in the UN’s early years. Reporting to ECOSOC, it advanced important human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a number of (non-)treaty mechanisms, and “special procedures.” However, as the decades passed, it increasingly suffered from the politicization of its work, especially after the inclusion on the Commission of a number of notorious human rights abusers. By 2005, Kofi Annan stated that the Commission’s work had “cast a shadow on the reputation of the [entire] United Nations system.”

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7.3.5 From Peacebuilding Commission to Peacebuilding Council

As detailed earlier in this Report (see 4.2.7 and 7.2.5), the UN Peacebuilding Commission has, in its first decade, fallen well short of international expectations in its core mandated areas of marshaling resources, supporting integrated strategies, and developing best practices to assist conflict-affected countries directly and proactively. At the heart of the matter is whether to invest real authority in the Peacebuilding Commission, including on matters of prevention, and to establish an acceptable division of responsibility with the Security Council. Several of these issues are under consideration by the members of the Peacebuilding Commission as part of the body’s ten-year review. The Commission suggests the following as a contribution to that review.

7.3.5.1 Create a stronger Peacebuilding Council to replace the Peacebuilding Commission

A Peacebuilding Council empowered with new policy development, coordination, and resource mobilization authorities, in support of conflict prevention and recovering conflict-affected states not hosting a Security Council–mandated peace operation, would fill significant gaps in the Peacebuilding Commission’s performance following its first decade. This could be similar to the transformation of the Human Rights Commission into a new council in 2005–2006 (see box 7.2).

Alternatively, the Peacebuilding Council could serve as an appropriate contemporary replacement for the Trusteeship Council as a principal organ of the United Nations. The international trusteeship system, which the Trusteeship Council is entrusted to oversee, came to an end in 1994 when Palau became the 185th UN Member State. The first alternative would not require Charter amendment. To succeed, the new Peacebuilding Council would require new tools and approaches to address more countries and issues than the current Peacebuilding Commission (see, for example, 7.3.5.2 and 7.3.5.3).

A conflict-prevention mandate would encourage the development of new prevention tools, such as peacebuilding audits

7.3.5.2 Entrust the new Peacebuilding Council with a conflict-prevention mandate

A prevention ethos and innovative approaches must, as discussed in Section 4, run through the entire UN system and other global governance actors committed to transnational security and justice. Giving the Peacebuilding Council a conflict-prevention mandate would encourage the development of new prevention tools, such as peacebuilding audits—similar to the Human Rights Council’s country reporting mechanism—that could serve as an important early-warning function for the Peacebuilding Council and the Security Council. In consultation with (and beyond countries currently on the agenda of) the Security Council, both the Peacebuilding Council and the Secretary-General should determine a country’s suitability for a peacebuilding audit. The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), as a vehicle for prevention, also holds promise. In 2008, PBF resources were allocated to a clear-cut instance of prevention in Guinea (Conakry), thereby setting an important precedent in a country without a UN mission presence at the time.

7.3.5.3 Improve integrated peacebuilding strategies and monitoring

Although the Peacebuilding Commission’s integrated strategies have evolved in the right direction (in some cases merging with related tools that command respect in a host country), significant room remains for improvement: focusing on no more than four to five conflict drivers and adopting more concrete, time-bound, and measurable benchmarks of progress. This would also make the new
Peacebuilding Council far more attractive to conflict-affected countries beyond sub-Saharan Africa and enhance its accompaniment functions in direct support of a host country's peace process, as well as longer-term post-conflict peacebuilding.

7.3.6 Modernization of the UN Secretariat

Within the large agenda of ideas for strengthening UN Secretariat support to advance just security globally, three urgently needed reforms stand out.

7.3.6.1 Improve the selection procedure for the next Secretary-General

The selection of the Secretary-General has always been a secretive and jealously guarded prerogative of the Security Council, especially among the P-5. The 1 for 7 Billion Campaign rightly advocates for “a call for nominations by Member States, parliaments, and civil society organisations ... A formal list of selection criteria ... [and] a clear timetable for selection.” The Commission strongly supports these recommendations and further recommends consideration of a single, seven-year term for the Secretary-General. This would enable the Secretary-General to focus more on meeting performance, rather than political goals during the term.

7.3.6.2 Empower the Secretary-General with more discretion to manage the Secretariat

Though the Secretary-General has a degree of influence in the selection of heads of UN agencies, programs, and funds, they cannot be appointed (or be let go) by the Secretary-General. Moreover, the General Assembly can and does politicize Secretariat hiring at all levels by micromanagement of the budget. Although Member States should continue to approve the appointment of under-secretaries-general and assistant secretaries-general, the Secretary-General needs more discretion in choosing from among a slate of candidates. The Secretary-General also needs greater autonomy in how the Secretariat executes its responsibilities and work plans, in exchange for meeting those responsibilities on time and on budget, as Kofi Annan proposed when he first took office in 1997. If the United Nations is ever to be able to cope with the pace of contemporary world politics and crises, it is absolutely essential that the grip of micromanagement by Member States be substantially relaxed.

7.3.6.3 Further advance the Delivering as One UN Coherence Agenda through a second deputy secretary-general and additional incentives

Managing the G20+-UN-Global Economic Governance Liaison Group secretariat (7.3.3.5) and coordinating the UN System Sustainable Human Development Network (6.3.1.5), a new (second) UN Deputy Secretary-General for Economic, Social, and Environmental affairs would provide much-needed leadership. This deputy would seek, in particular, to maximize impact, leverage new technologies, improve communication of the UN’s many underappreciated achievements, and streamline reporting in support of the Post-2015 Development Agenda and broader UN socioeconomic and ecological goals. The current deputy secretary-general would provide a similar level of leadership on political and security matters. The Secretary-General should delegate substantial line management authority to the DSGs in their respective substantive areas, including authority to negotiate harmonization of personnel and financial rules necessary to facilitate a regular exchange of staff among UN Secretariat elements and other UN agencies, funds, and programs, at both headquarters and field levels.
Given the stark global realities and looming crises presented in this Report, a business-as-usual approach to address today’s global governance challenges will not work; global institutional responses cannot afford to adopt this approach either. Calls for systemic reform (along the lines found in figure 7.1) from traditional and new international quarters will continue to grow, particularly if global governance machinery tinkering remains the norm and the gap between performance, and what is actually needed, continues to grow. To focus the world on the central question of when, rather than if, substantial reforms will be undertaken, sustained political pressure and a movement for change will need to originate as much outside as within governments. Among the most critical nonstate actors in this regard are civil society, business (including the media), regional organizations, and local governing authorities.

Figure 7.1 An Updated UN Architecture for a New Era
8. Engaging Critical Regional, Local, Civil Society, and Business Actors in Global Governance

Global security and justice involve more diverse stakeholders than ever, as the rise of regional organizations, subnational and local governments, civil society organizations, and private-sector actors in global governance—both as contributors to and detractors from security and justice—continues unabated (see box 8.1). This shift in power is at the heart of recasting what was long known as international relations into what is now appropriately named global governance. It has also kindled the idea of “three United Nations”, beyond Member States and the Secretariat and comprising civil society and business groups. Despite a rapid diffusion of power in global affairs, states and existing structures of global governance are slow to adapt their ways of engaging with the emerging array of new governance actors. The category of actors beyond national governments comprises entities as diverse as Apple, Amnesty International, the African Union, global celebrities, and philanthropists.

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This shift in power is at the heart of what is now appropriately named global governance

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8.1 Beyond States and Global Intergovernmental Bodies

To the extent that power is dispersed outside the traditional Westphalian state-dominated governance model, provision of global public goods depends increasingly on regional bodies and nonstate and substate actors. In 2004, the High-level Panel on Challenges, Threats and Change highlighted the importance of using the full potential of regional organizations in maintaining international security and building peace.174 This capacity and relationship with the UN remains underdeveloped today, not only in the domain of security, but also for the promotion of justice globally. This is a concern that cuts across the three focus areas discussed in Sections 4 through 6. For instance, regional organizations such as the African Union play an increasingly important role in conflict prevention and crisis management. Civil society organizations are pivotal in the global discourse and on the best way forward to address climate change. Today’s critical ICT infrastructure, on which the hyperconnected global economy depends, more and more, is unthinkable without the support of system-relevant corporations. Moreover, at the substate level, regions and municipalities, particularly major cities, are increasingly active in global governance matters. In light of these transformative developments, the Commission offers recommendations aimed at improving both the integration and understanding of nonstate, regional, and local actors in global governance.
Whereas it is generally agreed that nonstate, regional, and local actors play or could play an important role in global governance, international institutions often face difficulties when engaging with them. Interaction does take place, but the role of CSOs, for example, is often limited to consultative status. At the UN level, CSO participation is most advanced in humanitarian emergencies, but it is also substantial in the development field, where participation is facilitated by the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service and by various CSO committees and advisory bodies established by UN departments. Also noteworthy are the efforts of the UN Development Group (UNDG), UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and ReliefWeb. The UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations makes recommendations as to which CSOs are granted consultative status to ECOSOC. Regional organizations may apply for observer status at the UNGA. Local communities, while viewed by the UN as one of the “Major Groups” for advancing sustainable development, tend to be excluded from giving their input to UN interlocutors in other areas of global policy decisions that affect them.

Over the past two decades, many international institutions have encouraged greater participation and accountability through civil society engagement in their work. The mechanisms established for this purpose, however, vary in terms of availability, use, and importance, which reveals the many persistent challenges in “democratizing global governance through expanded civil society involvement”[175. One concern pertains to when CSOs get to participate in global governance in a more substantive way. Civil society participation is today usually more extensive in the

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**Box 8.1 Nonstate Actors on the Rise in Global Governance**

The two thousand largest companies in 2014 accounted for US$38 trillion in revenues and profits of US$3 trillion. These firms employed 90 million people worldwide. In 2011, Walmart’s revenue of US$422 billion exceeded Norway’s GDP (US$414 billion), which would rank it alongside the twenty-fifth largest economy.

A similar trend can be observed for illicit nonstate actors or terrorist groups, increasing in both numbers and wealth. A report by RAND indicates that the number of Salafi-jihadist groups (which includes al-Qaeda and affiliates) increased by 58 percent since 2010, from thirty-one to forty-nine groups. In 2014, the Islamic State took in US$3 million per day through oil smuggling, extortion, theft, and human trafficking, making it the wealthiest terrorist organization in the world.

On a more positive note, through their increasing wealth, nonstate actors also increased their delivery of development aid. In 2013, the top ten charities together donated more than US$5 billion, amounting to roughly the same amount of development assistance from such countries as the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, and Canada, who are among the top ten state contributors of ODA.


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8.2 Current Efforts to Integrate Critical Nonstate, Regional, and Local Actors in Global Governance

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implementation of policy than it is in decision-making, the politically most consequential stage of international cooperation. At the decision-making stage, civil society actors participation is rare. Civil society groups may follow negotiations, circulate papers, and sometimes address the parties, but they are rarely welcomed as experts within a government delegation (where they could have a more direct impact on decision-making). Civil society engagement then resurges at the stage of policy implementation.

The Commission views the enhanced participation of nonstate, regional, and local governmental actors in UN and other global institutional matters—beyond their general consultative role—as a critical component for the effective delivery of global public goods. Both policymakers and scholars should look critically at ways to include them in advising policy and decision-making processes, in recognition of their emerging role, in many ways, as a kind of third United Nations.176 Thinking further, one may even contemplate a “fourth” United Nations, encompassing intergovernmental actors such as the G20, WTO, and regional organizations that, though not formally part of the UN system, help further the purposes and principles of the UN and advance its agenda for better global governance (figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1 The Emergence of the Third and Fourth United Nations

In terms of innovative ways to enhance the participation of new actors, the Council of Europe is a source of inspiration. It has participatory bodies for regional, local, and nonstate actors: the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities and the INGO Conference. Both participate in the Council of Europe’s quadrilogue with its Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. The INGO Conference introduced participatory status for international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in 2003, going beyond mere consultative status and giving them a role in developing policy lines and adopting action programs. The institutional role of the INGO Conference is a unique feature rarely seen in international organizations. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities is a political assembly with representatives of local and regional authorities of the Member States. It interacts with both national, local, and regional governments, as well as other regional bodies such as the EU’s Committee of the Regions. Concrete action, however, requires concrete reform ideas that could be implemented.
The UN Global Compact is a trailblazer in bringing the business community into global governance. Launched in 2000, the Global Compact has more than twelve thousand corporate participants and other stakeholders from more than 145 countries that commit to its ten principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anticorruption (see also box 8.2). It is a prime example of network governance (see 2.2.2). The Global Compact Secretariat does not monitor progress with regard to the participating companies or impose sanctions for noncompliance. Instead, it relies on different levels of reporting ranging from advanced to self-sustaining to learner.

Building on these innovative techniques, it is time to fully harness the growing clout of nonstate actors as a force for good in global governance, starting with the measures outlined in the following sections. Situated at the intersection of security and justice, both states and nonstate actors form an essential element of any campaign to make global governance “fit for purpose” in the twenty-first century.

**Box 8.2 Nonstate Actors at the Intersection of Global Security and Justice**

Through their commercial activities, transnational corporations (TNCs) can directly or indirectly take part in conflict or human rights abuses, especially if state institutions fail to provide security and justice. This can occur through financing conflict parties, trading conflict-related goods, hiring certain ethnic groups, or exploiting the regulatory gaps left by state authorities. An example of the latter is the issue of Western retailers who indirectly maintained poor labor conditions in Bangladesh by working with factories employing workers under harsh conditions in unsafe environments. After the collapse of a factory complex killing 1,100 workers and a deadly fire in 2013—the latest in a series of catastrophes—they were urged by human rights organizations and activists to take all necessary steps to ensure safe work places and end safety violations in their supply chain. Both companies and the government of Bangladesh acted and adopted measures, another example of nonstate actor involvement in security and justice, as civil society pressure contributed to the adoption of measures to improve human security.

At the same time, companies can also make positive contributions through a variety of initiatives. Business partners of the United Nations Global Compact, for instance, have committed to aligning their operations and strategies to ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anticorruption. An example of their promotion of security and justice can be found in Colombia, where Global Compact network members have helped reintegrate former FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) combatants. By hiring former combatants, these companies contribute to conflict resolution and the prevention of a relapse into violence.

*Sources:* Deitelhoff and Wolf, *Corporate Security Responsibility*; Human Rights Watch, “Bangladesh: Factory Deaths could have been prevented”; North, “Dhaka Rana Plaza collapse.”
8.3 New Approaches to Engaging Civil Society, Business, Regional Organizations, and Local Authorities in Promoting Justice and Security Worldwide

With a view to turning nonstate actors into proactive stakeholders for global justice and security, as well as pillars in the global governance architecture, the Commission recommends the following key measures.

8.3.1 Introducing new social compacts

8.3.1.1 Develop new social compacts to support multi-stakeholder solutions to critical governance problems

Building on the experience of the UN Global Compact and advances in multi-stakeholder governance elsewhere (such as NETmundial), new social compacts could represent non-legally binding, multi-stakeholder arrangements tying together governmental authorities and relevant nonstate actors in relationships to shape expectations and build confidence. They can be used at the global, regional, or national level, such as to further climate or cyber governance (see 5.3.1.2 and 6.3.4.1), or applied in a particular geographical theater, such as in a post-conflict environment or disaster response situation (see 4.3.3.1). That is, in addition to their fundamental norm and trust-building roles, new social compacts could further help to garner political support and reinforce capacities to respond more quickly and effectively to crises, such as the recent Nepal earthquake, the Ebola pandemic, and the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Informed by earlier discussions on improving relations between individuals and the state, new social compacts could also be innovative and flexible instruments for advancing global security and justice by increasing trust and opportunities for sustained collective action.

8.3.1.2 Establish a repository for new social compacts

The UN Global Partnership (see 8.3.2) could function as a repository for new social compacts. In doing so, the Global Partnership would become a hub for this new form of global, multi-stakeholder soft law. It could furthermore draw on the experience of the UN Global Compact in keeping track of commitments and progress reports from businesses around the world, building on the UN Secretariat’s traditional function as a global treaty repository under Article 102 of the UN Charter. The Global Partnership, while it would not wield any sanctioning or monitoring power itself, could also be tasked to use different levels of reporting, akin to the Global Compact model for businesses, including advanced (measuring progress toward meeting the criteria of the new social compact through third-party assessment/audit) and self-sustaining (active reporting by the different new social compact stakeholders) reporting levels.

8.3.2 Inaugurate a UN Global Partnership

Despite forging decades-long relationships, civil society, the business community, regional intergovernmental organizations, and local governmental bodies participation in the work of the United Nations remains piecemeal and ad hoc. It lacks a level of prominent institutional representation and a hub through which these new actors can more effectively shape decisions at the global level, and through which various UN bodies can tap into the expertise and networks of these resourceful organizations. The Commission, therefore, proposes creating a UN Global Partnership.
8.3.2.1 Establish a UN Global Partnership
With representation from civil society, the business community, and the senior echelons of the United Nations and World Bank, the new UN Global Partnership, as an innovative, hybrid entity in global governance, would forge an even closer relationship between the United Nations and nonstate actors to increase capacity for addressing global challenges and leveraging new opportunities for the promotion of just security.

The new UN Global Partnership would forge an even closer relationship between the United Nations and nonstate actors

Meetings of an apex body of the UN Global Partnership, the UN Global Partnership Steering Committee, could take place at least three times per year between the UN Secretary-General, the World Bank President, the head of a new civil society-led Committee on Civil Society-UN Relations, and the vice chair of the UN Global Compact Board of Directors. An annual meeting of the UN Global Partnership, timed to coincide with the opening of the UN General Assembly in September, as well as an interactive and multilingual web portal, would aim to further the engagement of CSOs and business groups in the UN agenda, including by giving voice to often underrepresented or neglected international policy issues.

8.3.2.2 Strengthen civil society and business engagement
The primary objective of the Global Partnership should be to strengthen civil society and business engagement (as well as safeguarding their past gains) in all UN bodies and agencies through the identification and encouragement of new channels of participation for civil society and business groups in the UN’s agenda. Digital consultations (and the associated promotion of digital access), building on the Internet-based discussions for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, will serve as one key platform for engaging these nonstate actors. Broader international educational activities that actively engage universities are another key means to enhance support for a broader consensus on global governance reform.

8.3.2.3 Encourage greater UN policy and programmatic attention to major civil society and private sector priorities
Another core function of the Global Partnership should be to encourage greater policy and programmatic attention within UN intergovernmental bodies, departments, and agencies on major civil society and private-sector priorities (for example, on promoting the status of women, irregular migration, and investing in technical skills for a modern workforce).

8.3.2.4 Further codify principles for UN, civil society, and business interactions and corporate social responsibility in global governance
The Global Partnership should also be tasked to help codify further the principles for interactions between the UN, civil society, and businesses and for corporate social responsibility in global governance, building on the UN Global Compact, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the findings of the Cardoso Commission on UN-Civil Society Relations. These principles could include minimum conditions for all nonstate actors such as their commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the SDGs, and the UN Charter.
8.3.3 Bolster regional organizations as promoters of global security and justice

Regional organizations increasingly acknowledge their responsibility in global governance beyond their respective region. One of the stated purposes of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for instance, is to “ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment” (Article 1(4) ASEAN Charter). Meanwhile, the African Union seeks to “encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Article 3(4) Constitutive Act of the AU) and the European Union pledges to contribute to, inter alia, “peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights” (Article 3(5) Treaty on European Union). Created in 2008, the UNASUR South American Defense Council has been mandated to “consolidate South America as a zone of peace, a base for democratic stability and the integral development of our peoples and a contribution to world peace”; its critical efforts in diffusing crises and building confidence have improved conditions for global security and justice. With a view to taking up these and other organizations’ pledges to be forces for good in global governance, the Commission recommends strengthening the role of regional organizations as partners in the work of the UN system in the following ways.

8.3.3.1 Promote regional courts to protect international human rights and to address particular issues
First, regional organizations should further bolster international human rights protection through regional measures. The UN should encourage the establishment of regional charter and adjudication mechanisms in every part of the world, covering at least the core of universally recognized human rights. Moreover, the possibilities for establishing regional tribunals should be explored with a view to addressing particular issues, such as transnational or environmental crimes.

8.3.3.2 Explore ways to grant regional courts the right to request ICJ advisory opinions
To make fuller use of the ICJ as the World Court (see 7.3.4.1), the UN and regional organizations should establish arrangements for granting regional courts the right to request advisory opinions from the ICJ, either via existing channels such as the UNGA (not requiring Charter amendment) or directly (requiring Charter amendment).

8.3.3.3 Update the Cold War–based UN regional groups and strengthen the role of regional organizations
As part of the wider efforts to improve the functioning of the UN General Assembly (see 7.3.1), the UN’s regional groups, still allocated along Cold War lines, should be updated according to present-day realities and in a way that better enables them to represent common regional positions and interests in UN bodies and agencies as a common conduit, but not as a replacement, of UN Member States.

8.3.4 Bring global cities and local communities into global governance
Given that half the world’s population now lives in urban areas, cities are becoming the main hubs of political, economic, and social interaction. They are instrumental in defining and implementing the global agenda. Close to where citizens reside, municipal governments are well placed to understand their needs, detect tensions, and promote civic participation. Increasingly, municipalities are called to play a pivotal role in bridging local and international responses to major global challenges, such as migration and climate change. Integrating cities into global governance
and fostering coordination at different institutional levels is, therefore, a necessary step to maximizing the effectiveness of global policies and their social relevance.

8.3.4.1 Create an official dialogue and institutional links between international, national, and local institutions
A first key step to strengthen global-municipal governance cooperation is to create an official dialogue and institutional links between international, national, and local institutions and to foster cooperation between leading international bodies and associations, including the United Nations, the Global Parliament of Mayors, the World Mayors Council on Climate Change, the Forum for Cities in Transition, and similar initiatives.

8.3.4.2 Bolster local capabilities to fulfill their expanded governance role
Although devolution of authorities is essential to empowering local governments, both national governments and multilateral bodies should simultaneously bolster their capabilities to fulfill their expanded governance role. UN Habitat’s Safer Cities Program, for example, could serve as a model: it provides expertise and tools in fighting urban crime and violence, employing a holistic, integrated, and multisectoral planning and management approach to enhancing the quality of life for residents. Its methodologies could be applied in other areas, such as rule of law promotion, climate resilience, and the creation of what are called smart cities by leveraging digital technologies for enhanced municipal government performance and citizen well-being.

Working alongside states and intergovernmental organizations toward a common vision of just security for all, civil society, business, regional organizations, and local authorities are poised to work together on the most pressing global challenges. Their effectiveness will largely depend on putting in place, ideally within the next five years, innovative arrangements—at all levels of governance—to tap hidden resources and unleash unforeseen partnership opportunities. Beyond the design phase and garnering initial political momentum, progress toward achieving such systemic reforms in global governance depends on a sustained strategy for reform that respects and engages all key stakeholders, the subject of the concluding part of this Report.
IV. A Transitional Strategy for Reform: “Getting from Here to There”
Achieving bold yet practical reforms to overcome the present crisis of global governance requires at least two key ingredients. First, it needs an attractive ethical vision that accounts for the power and interests of states and increasingly influential nonstate actors and ensures basic human rights for people everywhere. Anchored around the concept of just security, the Commission’s proposals in this Report offer such a positive, alternative vision for a more just and peaceful world order. Second, reforms require a realistic strategy for Advocating Justice and Security Together (AdJuST), rooted in a rigorous, ideally shared analysis and harnessing the ideas, networks, resources, and most of all, leadership of multiple actors to move toward this new vision—in other words, concrete steps on how to get from here to there.

Designing an effective transitional strategy for reform of the global system and sustained partnerships to drive change involves different dimensions, including building coalitions to initiate and nurture reforms, skillful multilateral negotiations, resource mobilization, and tools to measure progress and respond to setbacks. Taking in the lessons from successful coalitions of like-minded states and nonstate actors while encouraging new approaches, we are committed to helping marshal, monitor, and sustain support for the reform agenda introduced in this Report (see Parts II and III). Each policy and institutional reform pursued will employ realistic timelines, achievable within a three- to five-year time frame.
9. Build Smart Coalitions to Mobilize Support and Sustain Reforms

If smart power reflects the combination of traditional and nontraditional means for projecting influence beyond a state’s borders toward progressive goals, then the examples that follow, alongside earlier examples introduced in this Report, illustrate the creative collaboration of traditional (state) and nontraditional (nongovernmental) actors—or smart coalitions—to engender progressive global systemic change. Representing a new form of diplomacy for a new era of international relations, successful smart coalitions have the following key characteristics:

- **State and nonstate actors** are engaged constructively in policy dialogue—and treated with mutual respect—at the early stage of a new reform initiative.

- The ideas, networks, resources, and leadership skills of all actors with something to offer are carefully cultivated, harnessed, and assessed (the ideas of network governance and Four UNs introduced in 2.2.2 and figure 8.1). International civil society organizations have specific kinds of expertise, can infuse multilateral negotiations with a sense of democratic legitimacy, and can shame governments into action. But governments maintain chief responsibility for the provision and enforcement of justice and security, and the business community (including the global media) can offer considerable financial and human capital for global problem-solving and effective communications. Regional organizations are further poised to harness state and nonstate resources toward common ends in a specific geographic space, and many local authorities have fast become engines of public innovation and dynamism (see 8.3.4). Governments should recognize the force multiplier value of nonstate actors, regional organizations, and local authorities.

- **Changing narratives and reframing issues**, including through new concepts and analytical frameworks, can help to avoid bottlenecks and circumvent protracted differences due in part to perceived threats to the power and interests of influential state and nonstate stakeholders.

- Broad, interrelated, and complex reforms are often organized into more manageable, issue-specific areas, enabling the formation of more diverse coalitions led by actors with particular interests and areas of expertise.

- Political support is articulated and mobilized for clear, near-term interim milestones, which often generate a positive and irreversible snowball effect toward realizing broader and more ambitious reform objectives.

- Specific interim and longer-term reform objectives are carefully measured through a combination of qualitative and quantitative monitoring tools and multiple independent sources of data and analysis.

- **Frequent communication**—through an advanced multidimensional platform that engages the global media—identifies clear reform objectives and progress in achieving interim milestones.

- Inevitable setbacks in both building international political traction for a particular reform and facilitating implementation are prepared for through a dynamic and flexible multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism.
Since the end of the Cold War, smart coalitions of like-minded states and nonstate actors have proven critical to achieving global governance reform whether through norm diffusion, policy innovation, or creation of a new global institution. For instance, the norms of human security and the Responsibility to Protect have each benefited, over the past two decades, from strong proponents within governments, civil society, and the business community. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, successfully teaming up with Canada and other governments to secure widespread support for the Mine Ban Treaty. And within less than a decade of its formation, a diverse coalition of CSOs and countries from the Global South and North brought about the previously unimaginable entry into force of the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court (see box 9.1).

Box 9.1 Coalition for the International Criminal Court: Impact Through a Broad-Based Alliance

Smart coalitions—of state and nonstate actors cooperating toward easily identifiable, widely shared norms and goals—can make lasting improvements for global security, justice, and governance. A key example from the turn of the millennium is the successful Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). The idea for an international criminal court had existed for decades, but, similar to many other global governance reform ideas, was undercut by Cold War Realpolitik. In light of the horrors of the Bosnian civil war and the Rwandan genocide, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda—in the early days of a new post-Cold War era—created momentum for a permanent court. The UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee soon focused more intensively on the proposal for the International Criminal Court. A group of like-minded states, willing to push the idea, took shape.

The CICC was established in February 1995. It consisted of a core group of twenty-five CSOs striving toward a straightforward goal: a powerful and independent ICC. The Coalition maintained a loose organizational structure and broad membership criteria to grow the Coalition membership in both size and scope. The criteria were to (i) make an active commitment to promoting worldwide ratification and implementation of the ICC’s Rome Statute, (ii) maintain the integrity of the Rome Statute, and (iii) ensure that the ICC will be as fair, effective, and independent as possible. These characteristics, combined with the strong normative power of the message, ensured considerable attention and support, both from supporting governments and numerous CSOs. The CICC membership soon grew to a diverse group of more than two thousand CSOs from the Global North and South. The CICC recognized the importance of cooperation with like-minded governments. Coalition members made it a priority to develop relations with state representatives, combining their information and awareness campaigns with advocacy efforts. They consequently had a significant impact on the Court’s formation.

In June 1998, the Sixth Committee organized a conference in Rome to negotiate the text for the International Criminal Court’s founding statute. The ICC’s supporters maintained an important competitive edge because of their strong level of organization and coordination. Their 236 representatives outnumbered all other groups, giving them an advantage in framing and steering the debate. Many governments depended on dissemination outlets published by the CICC to stay updated, one being the International Criminal Court Monitor.
Box 9.1 continued

Some CSOs even took part in the negotiations as invited members of state delegations. Further, the CICC played three vital roles: it facilitated the accreditation to the Rome conference of hundreds of CSOs; it served as a resource center for CSOs and delegations alike (especially small delegations); and last, it served as a neutral, nonpolitical platform for discussions around contentious issues. The technical, rather than political, approach to these issues contributed to ultimately successful negotiations.

After weeks of negotiation, the CICC and the like-minded group of states convinced the conference president to abandon the search for consensus and to seek a majority vote instead. The text voted on included essential elements for which the CICC had argued, especially an independent prosecutor and jurisdiction that would not depend on the consent of the state party concerned in each and every case. The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court was adopted with 120 votes in favor, 7 against, and 21 abstentions. Giving up consensus greatly facilitated the speedy adoption of the statute, but the lack of major power support—including China, Russia, and the United States—also weakened the ICC, reducing its legitimacy, resources, and jurisdictional reach and complicating future cooperation with these nonsupportive states.

After the Rome Statute was signed, the CICC and like-minded states continued their work together, this time on a global ratification campaign. At Rome, the negotiators had decided that the statute would go into effect with sixty ratifications. Within three and a half years, on July 1, 2002—much more quickly than anyone had expected—the Rome Statute came into effect.

This success is easily explained. First, NGOs and governments made use of each other’s relative advantages. NGOs applied their expertise, their ability to inform and frame the discourse, and their ability to affect dissenting governments through naming-and-shaming campaigns. Governments used their resources and decision-making power to implement rules and enforce them. Second, ICC supporters conducted a campaign based on a strong and simple normative message. Justice for victims and an end to impunity had broad-based appeal. Third, the willingness to pursue institutional innovation without major power support facilitated the relatively quick establishment of an independent institution. Despite the lack of major power buy-in, the Rome Statute represents a breakthrough in advancing individual accountability under international law. Even if it engendered only second-best responses, it managed to improve norm awareness and, directly and indirectly, norm compliance.

The ICC, which has now operated for thirteen years, is a testament to the potential of smart coalitions between CSOs and like-minded states combining to mobilize support for a significant global governance reform. The Court, although still facing many obstacles (see 7.2.4), has made marked progress in delivering justice for victims and ending impunity for the perpetrators of heinous crimes.

At this juncture, when the Court and the Rome Statute need continued support, the CICC remains a leader in promoting the Statute system, strengthening the ICC, and increasing access to information on matters of international criminal justice.

The best lessons from the CICC, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, and other successful global reform efforts can be drawn upon to encourage the formation of new smart coalitions to study, innovate, and mobilize political support for the ideas presented in this Report. These coalitions should promote international public dialogues and other means to forge consensus for its analysis and reform program by rallying diverse, like-minded governments, civil society groups, businesses, the media, regional organizations, and local authorities around the joint promotion of urgent security and justice objectives in global governance—specifically, just security.

Such an approach to diffusing norms, reframing issues, and building transnational coalitions will allow for international actors with specific interests and expertise to identify linkages and undertake specific campaigns within the overall, broad reform effort. This strategy will further expedite setting realistic, near-term interim milestones, which when met can be widely communicated and help galvanize and grow the transnational coalitions necessary to achieve wider institutional reform goals through more complex, official multilateral negotiations.
10. Multilateral Negotiations, Sequencing of Reforms, and Resource Mobilization

Beyond mobilizing support and sustaining momentum for global governance reforms (including facilitating their implementation once enacted), smart coalitions are needed to help navigate multilateral negotiations skillfully, promote the sequencing of reforms at an accelerated yet politically feasible pace, and mobilize adequate financial resources for the agreed systemic changes. Multiple avenues can be envisioned for pursuing the broad, yet integrated reform agenda presented in this Report. The Commission recommends two in particular that merit special attention.

10.1 Reform Through Parallel Tracks (RPT)

Building on various approaches pursued since the early 1990s, Reform Through Parallel Tracks encourages raising awareness—including through international public dialogues—in the near term for each of the global policy and institutional changes recommended in this Report. At the same time, it acknowledges that different kinds of multilateral reform negotiations will require different negotiating forums and will proceed at different speeds. For example, specific UN task forces in New York (composed of a select group of permanent representatives from all major regions and co-chaired by two permanent representatives from the Global North and South) could deliberate on reforming principal UN organs, such as a UN Parliamentary Network to advise the UNGA and the creation of a new UN Peacebuilding Council, prior to final negotiation in the UN General Assembly or Security Council; the new framework for global economic cooperation idea could be negotiated through an ad hoc forum established by the G20 and heads of the UN, IMF, World Bank, ILO, and WTO; and other policy reform innovations introduced in Part II of this Report could be negotiated separately in the most appropriate global forum.

Advantages of the RPT approach include (i) facilitating a careful sequencing of reforms based on criteria such as urgency, political feasibility, and cost, enabling certain reforms to be enacted by the UN’s seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020; (ii) precluding a logjam in negotiating one reform (for example, requiring UN Charter reform through Article 108) from affecting progress in other areas; and (iii) better ensuring that relevant experts can directly influence negotiation outcomes.

Disadvantages include (i) limiting opportunities for defining linkages between global governance issue areas; (ii) enabling specific reforms to be more easily subverted by one or two powerful opponents; and (iii) reducing chances for deal-making to facilitate stronger negotiation outcomes (for example, as occurred with the Responsibility to Protect paragraphs in the 2005 UN Summit Outcome Document, as part of a package of interrelated reform proposals).

10.2 Convene a World Conference on Global Institutions (WCGI)

Marking the United Nations’ seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020 with the culmination of a three-year multilateral negotiation process on global institutional reforms, a World Conference on Global Institutions could help advance many of this Report’s recommendations. Initiated at a meeting
of foreign ministers in early 2018 in New York, four subsequent separate Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings could be held every six months each in a different region, the fourth and final concluded by foreign ministers. World leaders could then convene the WCGI in September 2020 at the time of their annual gathering in New York. Although consideration could be given to UN Charter Articles 108 or 109 for pursuing specific amendments to the Charter, most global policy and institutional changes deliberated on at the World Conference on Global Institutions could be undertaken without Charter reform. Every effort should be made to engage the voices and ideas of civil society at the most local level, as well as under-represented groups, in the lead-up to the World Conference.

Most global policy and institutional changes could be undertaken without Charter reform

Advantages of the WCGI approach include: (i) serving as a defined rallying point for smart coalitions and offering the potential to generate political momentum for multiple urgent global reform initiatives; (ii) promoting systemic change by identifying tensions and encouraging mutually reinforcing linkages between several major issue areas; (iii) attracting considerable and sustained international media attention for stronger institutions of global governance; and (iv) facilitating strong negotiation outcomes (a reform package approach) through deal-making across a broad reform agenda that speaks to diverse national interests and values.

Disadvantages include: (i) allowing the potential for a highly contentious reform issue to hijack the broader reform process; (ii) making it more difficult to space out consideration of reforms that are less urgent or less politically feasible; and (iii) making it, unless carefully structured, cumbersome to engage experts effectively in negotiations.

Fortunately, having to choose between these two approaches is neither inevitable nor necessary. The Commission recommends tapping the strengths of both and keeping options open through a hybrid approach. This practical way forward in facilitating multilateral negotiations and sequencing reforms—within a broader transitional strategy for reform—offers the higher potential for success in advancing a complex set of systemic global governance reforms.

10.3 Financial Resources for Reform

Many reforms proposed in this Report will require little or no new financing. Some innovations, however, such as a Green Technology Licensing Facility or new tools and training to better operationalize the Responsibility to Protect norm, will require predictable revenue streams to function and provide new kinds of global public goods. Just as global governance in a growing number of sectors—from cyberspace and the environment to trade, energy, and even peacebuilding—engages a combination of public and private sector actors, so should these efforts. At the same time, as the main actors within most global institutions today, governments will need to continue to combine resources to support mutually beneficial global governance reform innovations. The overall subject of financing is one that the project will take up in Phase II of its work, focused in particular on those recommendations that have uniquely high potential to generate essential global public goods and that appear to have the greatest appeal to implementing coalition partners and the best chance of going forward. High priority, urgency, and popularity may combine to open funding paths for global governance initiatives that historically have been closed.
11. Progress Measurement and Setback Responses

In garnering and sustaining international political momentum for a particular global policy or institutional reform, large and small setbacks are inevitable. Sometimes, as indicated earlier (see Section 7.1), it is far easier to build initial consensus around a specific reform than to implement it. For both, setting up a dynamic and flexible multi-stakeholder mechanism for monitoring and coordination is crucial to success.

11.1 Establish a Mechanism for Monitoring and Coordinating Reform

To inform public debate and engage diverse actors in a coherent global governance reform effort, between the UN’s seventieth anniversary in 2015 and its seventy-fifth anniversary in 2020, the Commission recommends creating a light and manageable monitoring and coordination mechanism that involves representatives from governments, civil society, businesses, regional organizations, local authorities, and the United Nations. It should employ concrete, time-bound, and measurable indicators of progress to inform public debate and draw on multiple, independent sources of data and analysis. Toward promoting progress for interim milestones and broader reform objectives (see figure 11.1), the monitoring and coordination mechanism could feed a robust communications and global media outreach strategy for either or both the Reform Through Parallel Tracks or World Conference on Global Institutions approaches. It could also be the nucleus of an ever broader and organizationally diverse network—a Platform for Global Security, Justice & Governance—aimed at both supporting current and catalyzing new reform coalitions and campaigns to garner and propel support for the Commission’s reform agenda.

Setbacks of various kinds—political, financial, and operational—are inevitable when mobilizing and implementing global governance reform. Frequent monitoring of progress, or especially lack of it, can trigger early corrective action. This in turn must carefully account for the power and interests of state and nonstate actors and respond to the three major sets of reform obstacles outlined in Section 7.1: a lack of political will or outright political resistance, reform design and advocacy shortcomings, and the inability to sustain a reform program. Various approaches, such as a rapid analysis of alternative reform options and consulting major stakeholders on new ways to overcome particular reform challenges, should be pursued skillfully through the proposed monitoring and coordination mechanism.

11.2 Getting from Here to There

A powerful, ethical vision for a more just and peaceful world order can only be as successful as the transitional strategy with which it is paired. Besides harnessing the ideas, networks, and resources of myriad transnational and increasingly global actors, garnering political support and seeing through to fulfillment a robust vision of just security—translating it into practical global governance applications that resonate in meaningful ways for ordinary people—requires a new kind of diplomacy—and indeed, a new kind of leadership—at the United Nations and other global institutions. It depends on leaders who are ready and willing to adopt a far-sighted strategy that gives equal weight to and pursues both global security and justice goals simultaneously, when
working to overcome obstacles and seize new opportunities for the benefit of all people.

Multilateral diplomacy must also begin to move from a competitive zero-sum or lowest common denominator framework to more collaborative negotiations, where a better balance is struck between local, national, regional, and global interests. Many of the arguments laid out in this Report and elsewhere can be employed (for example, through skillful engagement of the global media and a network governance approach) and used effectively to persuade powerful stakeholders to get on board, even when they do not perceive a particular reform as being in their immediate interest—or when political inertia prevents them from stepping up. Other concrete ideas, such as a UN Global Partnership (see recommendation 8.3.2) and Parliamentary Network (see box 7.1), can also contribute to this cultural shift in how diplomacy is conducted in the still early years of a new century. “Getting from Here to There,” then, depends on not only an attractive ethical vision and set of clear guideposts along the way, but also on who participates, the level of enlightened global leadership exerted, and how the journey unfolds.

Figure 11.1 Implementing a Hybrid Approach to Global Governance Reform

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<th>Reform Through Parallel Tracks</th>
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<td>Advocacy and Key Milestones</td>
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<th>Support for Current and New Smart Coalitions</th>
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A Call to Action

In seeking to forge a mutually supportive system of good democratic governance and sustainable peace globally through the intersection of security and justice, just security offers a unique prism for understanding and responding to some of the most pressing global concerns of our time. From recurring violence and terrorism in multiple flashpoints to the threat of rising sea levels, devastating storms and heat waves, cyber attacks, and cross-border economic shocks in our increasingly crowded and fragile planet, the need to jointly pursue security and justice—the keys to overcoming the present global governance crisis—is both acute and urgent. From new opportunities for sustainable human development, inclusive and accountable governance, and building peace within and between fragile states and societies, the rewards from effective collective action are equally pronounced. Rooted in the present global political context, nothing short of a forward-leaning reform program—inspired by several of the ideas and practical innovations put forward in this Report—can ensure that our global institutions and relationships, rooted in the twentieth century, are up to the twenty-first century tasks ahead.

We, the members of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, call upon all peoples and nations to rise to this challenge. Our structures of global governance are merely a reflection of how we choose to govern ourselves across borders and entire regions. Powerful states and other increasingly influential global actors have a special responsibility to work toward a shared analysis of global problems and to seize opportunities to remedy them. Further still, we must all refuse to accept mediocre solutions that rely on institutions and mindsets from another era. Only when men and women from diverse places and backgrounds rally around a shared, inherent need for security and justice—always felt locally but created at many levels—can these powerful actors be nudged toward what is needed, as well as what is right.
Summary of Recommendations

Coping with State Fragility and Violent Conflict

4.3.1 Strengthen the role of women in peace and security
   4.3.1.1 Strengthen the role of women in peace processes
   4.3.1.2 Learn and share lessons from implementing National Action Plans under SCR 1325

4.3.2 Prevent armed conflict
   4.3.2.1 Improve conflict analysis and crisis warning
   4.3.2.2 Focus on the Responsibility to Prevent

4.3.3 Develop greater consensus on R2P operations
   4.3.3.1 Specify the responsibilities and objectives of R2P mission participants
   4.3.3.2 Emphasize the principle of “no net harm” in R2P planning and deployments
   4.3.3.3 Embed standards-monitoring and human rights teams in R2P-associated events

4.3.4 Strengthen UN military, police, and civilian response capacity for peace operations
   4.3.4.1 Make designated Member State military units available for UN or regional peace operations on short notice
   4.3.4.2 Enhance UN ability to rapidly deploy military planning and support teams to new and existing UN missions
   4.3.4.3 Make designated Member State formed police units available for UN deployment on short notice
   4.3.4.4 Establish a sizable standing and reserve capacity to support rapid and sustainable deployment of police to UN peace operations
   4.3.4.5 Establish standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployment needs for civilian specialist skills

4.3.5 Improve capacity for restoring rule of law, transitional justice, and host state resilience
   4.3.5.1 Focus G20 support on the New Deal for engagement in fragile states
   4.3.5.2 Combat corruption to support effective rule of law
   4.3.5.3 Augment current disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programming with greater emphasis on countering (preventing the rise of) violent extremism
   4.3.5.4 Consider hybrid models of justice when transitioning to a modern state court system
   4.3.5.5 Consider transformational justice as a postwar alternative that addresses not just the results but also the roots of violence

Climate and People: Global Systems, Local Livelihoods

5.3.1 Global innovations in climate governance
   5.3.1.1 Facilitate and strengthen linkages between the UNFCCC and other international regimes and organizations dealing with climate change
   5.3.1.2 Give subnational and nonstate actors the opportunity to endorse climate rules more stringent than the UNFCCC process creates
   5.3.1.3 Establish an International Carbon Monitoring entity
5.3.1.4 Establish a Global Climate Research Registry and Climate Action Clearinghouse
5.3.1.5 Establish a Climate Engineering Advisory Board and Experiments Registry
5.3.1.6 Engage the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and UNEP Environment Assembly on climate issues

5.3.2 Build climate consciousness into the work of other key global entities
5.3.2.1 Make global and regional trade more climate-sensitive
5.3.2.2 Seek advisory opinions from the ICJ in climate change disputes
5.3.2.3 “Green” the G20

5.3.3 Climate adaptation needs better defined objectives and more financial support
5.3.3.1 Define one or more global climate adaptation goals and gauge their achievement in terms of measurable improvements in local human security
5.3.3.2 Structure climate finance to increase net support to climate adaptation

5.3.4 Engage private enterprise on market-based incentives to reduce carbon emissions
5.3.4.1 Negotiate carbon subsidy reduction targets
5.3.4.2 Reduce emissions of short-lived climate pollutants
5.3.4.3 Institutionalize financial climate risk reporting
5.3.4.4 Establish a Green Technology Licensing Facility

Governing the Hyperconnected Global Economy

6.3.1 A new framework for global economic cooperation and crisis response
6.3.1.1 Create a G20+ to enhance coordination with the UN, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies
6.3.1.2 Strengthen the IMF
6.3.1.3 Bolster the FSB
6.3.1.4 Ensure labor rights and global economic governance for inclusive growth
6.3.1.5 Establish a system-wide UN Sustainable Human Development Network

6.3.2 New tools to combat illicit financial flows and extremist financing
6.3.2.1 Promote the AEOI standard and transparency of corporate registries
6.3.2.2 Assess the effects of anti-money laundering policies on crime and terrorist groups
6.3.2.3 Use human rights norms and policy tools to curb illicit financial flows
6.3.2.4 Address IFFs in the Post-2015 Development Agenda

6.3.3 Transform the EITI into EITI+ for effective governance of natural resources
6.3.3.1 Establish clear guidelines for reporting and sanctioning violations of EITI+ principles
6.3.3.2 Make EITI+ complementary to the post-2015 SDGs

6.3.4 Secure the digital economy and promote Internet access in the Global South
6.3.4.1 Expand norms and the rule of law in the digital marketplace
6.3.4.2 Combat cybercrime through international cybercrime centers and an international cybercrime experts roster
6.3.4.3 Promote fundamental good practice in cybersecurity globally
6.3.4.4 Promote universal access and the protection of rights and freedom in the digital marketplace
Reform of Major Global Institutions

7.3.1 Revitalization of the UN General Assembly
   7.3.1.1 Streamline the UNGA agenda and strengthen its president and committees
   7.3.1.2 Create a Shadow Council in the General Assembly for Security Council oversight
   7.3.1.3 Revisit the Uniting for Peace resolution
   7.3.1.4 Lead the Post-2015 Development Agenda
   7.3.1.5 Establish a UN Parliamentary Network

7.3.2 Reform of the UN Security Council
   7.3.2.1 Expand the membership and allow immediate reelection of nonpermanent members
   7.3.2.2 Improve the working methods
   7.3.2.3 Hold regular, structured consultations with civil society and business

7.3.3 G20+ and a new framework for global economic cooperation
   7.3.3.1 Facilitate multi-stakeholder, cross-disciplinary dialogue and policy solutions
   7.3.3.2 Promote inclusive economic reform
   7.3.3.3 Enable global economic crisis response
   7.3.3.4 Convene the G20+ every two years at the UN
   7.3.3.5 Establish a global economic cooperation liaison mechanism
   7.3.3.6 Create a (virtual) G20+ secretariat composed mainly of seconded personnel from major
global and regional economic bodies
   7.3.3.7 Focus ECOSOC on delivering the Post-2015 Development Agenda
   7.3.3.8 Facilitate development cooperation and humanitarian action through ECOSOC

7.3.4 International courts and human rights bodies: Reform and strengthening
   7.3.4.1 Strengthen and make full use of the ICJ
   7.3.4.2 Enhance working relations between the UNSC and ICC
   7.3.4.3 Streamline the global human rights architecture

7.3.5 From Peacebuilding Commission to Peacebuilding Council
   7.3.5.1 Create a stronger Peacebuilding Council to replace the Peacebuilding Commission
   7.3.5.2 Entrust the new Peacebuilding Council with a conflict-prevention mandate
   7.3.5.3 Improve integrated peacebuilding strategies and monitoring

7.3.6 Modernization of the UN Secretariat
   7.3.6.1 Improve the selection procedure for the next Secretary-General
   7.3.6.2 Empower the Secretary-General with more discretion to manage the Secretariat
   7.3.6.3 Further advance the Delivering as One UN Coherence Agenda through a second deputy
   secretary-general and additional incentives
Engaging Critical Regional, Local, Civil Society, and Business Actors in Global Governance

8.3.1 Introduce new social compacts
   8.3.1.1 Develop new social compacts to support multi-stakeholder solutions to critical governance problems
   8.3.1.2 Establish a repository for new social compacts

8.3.2 Inaugurate a UN Global Partnership
   8.3.2.1 Establish a UN Global Partnership
   8.3.2.2 Strengthen civil society and business engagement
   8.3.2.3 Encourage greater UN policy and programmatic attention to major civil society and private sector priorities
   8.3.2.4 Further codify principles for UN, civil society, and business interactions and corporate social responsibility in global governance

8.3.3 Bolster regional organizations as promoters of global security and justice
   8.3.3.1 Promote regional courts to protect international human rights and to address particular issues
   8.3.3.2 Explore ways to grant regional courts the right to request ICJ advisory opinions
   8.3.3.3 Update the Cold War–based UN regional groups and strengthen the role of regional organizations

8.3.4 Bring global cities and local communities into global governance
   8.3.4.1 Create an official dialogue and institutional links between international, national, and local institutions
   8.3.4.2 Bolster local capabilities to fulfill their expanded governance role

A Transitional Strategy for Reform: “Getting from Here to There”

9 Build Smart Coalitions to Mobilize Support and Sustain Reforms
10.1 Reform Through Parallel Tracks (RPT)
10.2 Convene a World Conference on Global Institutions (WCGI)
11.1 Establish a Mechanism for Monitoring and Coordinating Reform
Endnotes

1 Hudson et al., “Heart of the Matter,” 30; and Bosha, “Gender and Women’s Inclusion,” 3–5.
2 IPCC, Climate Change 2014; and NRC, Can Earth’s and Society’s Systems, 30–32.
3 NRC, Can Earth’s and Society’s Systems, 33, 61.
4 World Bank, World Development Indicators.
5 UN Economic and Social Affairs, “World Population Prospects,” 2; UN Conference, “Map of the LDCs”; Population Reference Bureau, “2014 World Population Data sheet.” Contraceptive prevalence among married women in sub-Saharan Africa is 24 percent, less than half that in other low- and middle-income regions, and unmet demand for contraception is a further 24 percent of married women. Next-lowest prevalence and unmet demand is in South Asia, at 53 percent and 20 percent, respectively.
6 World Bank, World Development Indicators.
7 Glazer and Yadron, “J. P. Morgan.”
9 Ibid., 2.
10 Mu, “Global economy hyperconnected.”
11 CGG, Our Global Neighborhood, 2.
13 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, 20–22.
16 Barrett, Why Cooperate?, 64.
18 Piedmont, “The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.”
19 The 2004 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change refers 651 times to security and five times to justice (UN, ‘A more secure world”). The 2014 Human Development Report refers two hundred times to security and nineteen times to justice. The UN Charter is similarly weighed, 164 references to security and twenty-two to justice.
20 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 16. Rawls argued that principles underpinning a “fair” distribution would emerge from deliberations among rational individuals if a “veil of ignorance” could be supposed to prevent them knowing their current position in society.
21 Ibid., 302.
22 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 149–50.
23 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 247. For an elaboration of the last argument, see Pogge, World Poverty.
25 An initiative of the Peruvian Presidency of COP20/CMP10, the incoming French Presidency of COP21/CMP11 and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
26 Curtis, “Global cities”; and Van der Pluijm, City Diplomacy.
27 Ruggie, “Guiding Principles”; UN, “An Agenda for Peace”; and Annan, We the Peoples.
29 These choices also track with results of recent elite and public opinion surveys. In a recent World Economic Forum survey of 1,500 global experts across business, government, academia, and civil society, the top five trends projected for 2014 were rising societal tensions in the Middle East and North Africa; widening income disparities in both rich and poor nations; persistent structural unemployment; intensifying cyber threats; and inaction on climate change (World Economic Forum, Outlook on the Global Agenda 2014). Similarly, in a spring 2013 Pew Research survey of more than thirty-seven thousand respondents in thirty-nine countries (including all major regions), the most prevalent perceptions of threat related to global climate change (54 percent); international financial instability (52 percent); Islamic extremist groups (49 percent); Iran’s nuclear program (44 percent); and North Korea’s nuclear program (42 percent). See Wike, “Many around the world.”
31 Violence containment spending is defined as economic activity that is related to the consequences or prevention of violence where the violence is directed against people or property. See Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2014, 17.
32 World Bank, “Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries.”
33 Geneva Declaration, “More Violence, Less Development.”
34 Briscoe, “Conflict, security and emerging threats,” 2, 4.
35 High-level Panel, A New Global Partnership.
36 Bell, “Women address the problem,” 96–126.
38 Fleshman, “African women struggle.”
40 UN, “Secretary-General on Women’s Participation.”
41 UN, “Financing of Peacekeeping Operations,” para. 27.
42 Barnes Robinson et al., “State of Affairs.”
43 Aloyo, Connolly, and Newman, “Preventing the Kinds of Conflicts.”
44 Ibid., 10.
46 UNHCHR, Mid-Year Trends 2014; CIA, “World Factbook.”

International Coalition, “Statements of the Permanent Members.”


On collaboration, see Sebastian, “Intervention in Internal and Transnational Conflicts,” 7–8; on fatalities, UN, “Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” 2014; 5; see also UN Peacekeeping, “Fatalities by Mission,” 2015.

UN, “Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,” paras. 24–27.

UN, “Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

The most thorough review of civilian personnel needs in field missions was done by the Senior Advisory Group led by the former head of UN peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno. Its report, published in early 2011, resulted in the launch of a Civilian Capacity (CIVCAP) project in autumn 2011 that lasted little more than two years before being dismantled. It is not therefore unlikely that Secretariat ability to rapidly recruit, train, and deploy civilian personnel for missions is appreciably better now than when the Guéhenno panel released its report. See UN, “Civilian capacity.”


MIhr and Sriram, “Rule of law.”

UN, “Human Rights.”

MIhr and Sriram, “Rule of law.”

González, “Set to Fail?” 4. 10.

MIhr and Sriram, “Rule of law.”


Turquet, *Progress of the World’s Women,* 82.

Paton, “HeForShe Campaign,” cited in Bosha, “Gender and Women’s Inclusion.”

Barnes Robinson et al., “State of Affairs.”

For example, see the hybrid model of justice proposed in CPHD and UNDP, *Bridging Modernity and Tradition.*


The IPCC’s latest reports were released in 2013 and 2014. IPCC, *Climate Change 2014.*


IMF, “Energy Subsidy Reform.”


These include carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and methane.

UN Environment Programme, “Near-term Climate Protection.”


Nicholls et al., “Ranking Port Cities.”

Ibid., 41.


See, for example, Article 4, para. 1(c) UNFCCC; EU, “2030 EU Framework”; IPCC, *Climate Change 2014;* White House, “U.S.-China Joint Announcement.”

These market restraints include relatively high custom tariffs, inadequate local intellectual property rights protection, low demand, national tax restrictions, and others.

IPCC, *Methodological and Technological Issues,* 432.

Within the UNFCCC, the Technology Mechanism and the Green Climate Fund have been established to deal with climate innovation development and financing among others.

The six gases are carbon dioxide (CO2); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); perfluorocarbons (PFCs); and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).

“Addressing the Challenge,” 34.

UN, “The Future We Want,” para. 85.

“The 18 founding Member countries of GGGI include: Australia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Kiribati, Mexico, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and Vietnam. Since inauguration, Fiji, Jordan, Mongolia, Rwanda, Senegal and Vanuatu have also become Member countries of GGGI.” See GGGI, “Programs & History.”


European Commission, “The EU and China join forces.”

AP, “EU reaches deal.”

Al Jazeera, “US and China reach agreement.”

CCFLA, *Action Statement.*

For more information, see C40 Cities, “About the Compact of Mayors.” The ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability was
originally the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI). The organization rebranded in 2003 “to reflect a broader focus on sustainability, not just environmental initiatives.” (“Frequently Asked Questions”)

The UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) “is an effort to create a financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. REDD+ goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.” (“About REDD+.”)

WMB’s corporate advisory board includes representatives from Kingfisher, Nike, Ikea, Merill Lynch, Unilever, Starbucks, HP, Tata, and Neuw Ventures SA. We Mean Business, “About.”

Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.

The Carbon Disclosure Project operates this system on behalf of institutional investors representing over a third of the world’s invested capital. “Strategic Plan 2014-2016.”

RE100, “About.”

See Weidman, “Communication, technology,” 1-6, and the research presented in the special issue. See also Day, Pinkney, and Chenoweth, “Collecting Data.”


Dattels and Kodres, “Further Action Needed.”


For an authoritative account, see Tuori and Tuori, Eurozone Crisis.


Abruzzese, “Parting of the ways,” 22.


Kar and Spanjers, “Global Illicit Financial Flows.” Note: This figure only includes funds lost through crime, corruption, and trade-based money laundering between unrelated companies.

Ibid., 11. According to the African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity, over the past three decades a staggering US$1.4 trillion has left Africa in the form of illicit financial flows. See Oman Observer, “The money drain.”


Rustad and Le Billion, “Building or Spoiling Peace?”

Sedghi, “Facebook.”

A quick look at the Internet suggests the level of commercial interest. See, for example, IBM, “What Is Big Data?”; Wegener and Sinha, “The Value of Big Data”; or Hammond, “The Value of Big Data Isn’t the Data.”

CSIS and McAfee, Net Losses, 3.


FSB, “First Annual Report.”

Lowy Institute, “G20 2014.”

IMF, “Acceptances of the Proposed Amendment.”

Van der Heijden and Zandvliet, “Enforcement of Fundamental Labor Rights.”

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution 54/109 on December 9, 1999. Ratified currently by 186 states, it is one of the most successful antiterrorism treaties in history.


For example, after Nigeria’s EITI identified missing payments from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the publication of associated audits, the Nigerian government recovered US$2 billion. EITI, Progress Report 2013, 7.

Scanteam, “Achievements and Strategic Options,” 3.

Global Conference, “Chair’s Statement,” 9.
The new framework for global economic cooperation should adopt the post-2015 SDGs framework, meaning that civil society engagement would occur via the major groups. In other words, not only large international CSOs and business, but youth, women, trade unions, local authorities, farmers, and the scientific community are all treated as separate major groups. According to Gareth Evans, “the [Commission on Global Governance] generated a mass of recommendations that were both adventurous and specific, but so many of them were beyond what the market was capable of bearing for the foreseeable future that its report became almost a byword for wishful thinking.” See Evans, “Commission Diplomacy,” 295. For an elaboration and empirical basis of each characteristic, see Ponzio and Buitelaar, “Mobilizing Support and Negotiating Global Governance Reform.” See also Krause, “Transnational Civil Society Activism.”
Bibliography

The URLs for all online documents are embedded as hyperlinks in the title of the documents included in this bibliography.


- Elborgh-Woytek, Katrin et al. Women, Work and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity. IMF Staff Discussion Note.


- Evans, Gareth. “Commission Diplomacy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and
Annexes
Annex 1. Acknowledgments and Project Team

The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center are pleased to acknowledge the contributions made by the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation at the Peace Palace, the Embassy of the Netherlands to the United States, the International Peace Institute, the Municipality of The Hague, the Observer Research Foundation (India), the Permanent Missions of Brazil, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, and the Netherlands to the United Nations, and the President Woodrow Wilson House. We wish to thank the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) for thematic support—in particular from Michèle Augua, Sara Burke, and Volker Lehman from FES New York—as well as for in-kind assistance at various stages of the Commission’s work.

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All background papers will be accessible via:

http://www.globalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/publications-resources/publications/

Several of the background papers will be published, in 2016, in a companion edited volume to the Commission Report.
Annex 2. Commission Meetings, Consultations, and Public Events

The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, together with partner institutions across the world, conducted public lectures, presentations and expert consultations to solicit feedback on the research and policy agenda of the Commission. Public lectures and presentations sought to inform policymakers, scholars, practitioners, and students about the Commission’s work. High-level expert consultations invited senior scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to provide input on the Commission’s specific focus areas: coping with state fragility and violent conflict, climate and people, and the hyperconnected global economy.

Commission Meetings

Second Meeting of the Commission, April 1–2, 2015, New York, New York, USA
Commission E-Discussion, January 19 – March 8, 2015
First Meeting of the Commission: November 21, 2014, Washington, DC, USA
Meeting with the Co-Chair (Secretary Madeline Albright): June 25, 2015, New York USA

Consultations (Summaries of all consultations are accessible at:
http://www.globalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/consultations-public-events/)

Second United Nations Member States Consultation
Date: April 2, 2015, New York, USA

Experts Consultation
Date: February 25, 2015, New York, USA

First United Nations Member States Consultation
Date: February 24, 2015, New York, USA

Discussion with Scholars at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association
Date: February 20, 2015, New Orleans, USA

Expert Consultation, “Fragile States and the Fault Lines of Global Security and Justice”
Date: February 6–8, 2015, Munich, Germany

Expert Consultation, “Global Climate Governance, Human Security, and Justice”
Date: December 9, 2014, Lima, Peru

Date: November 21, 2014, Washington, DC, USA
Discussion with the Council of the World Federalist Movement
Date: November 10, 2014, The Hague, The Netherlands

Expert Consultation, “The Road to Lima: Climate Governance, Adaptation, and Technological Responses”
Date: November 6, 2014, The Hague, The Netherlands

Expert Consultation, “Cyber Security, Justice, and Governance”
Date: October 18, 2014, New Delhi, India

Business Community Consultation during The Hague Conference on Business and Human Security
Date: September 2, 2014, The Hague, The Netherlands

Date: July 18, 2014, The Hague, The Netherlands

E-consults

Youth E-Consult: Engaging the Minds of Tomorrow with the Global Governance Challenges of Today
Date: March 23 – April 20, 2015

Global Economic Governance and Averting Financial Crises
Date: March 24 – May 5, 2015

Justice and Security in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Environments
Date: February 2 – March 20, 2015

Global Climate Governance: The Intersection of Human Security and Justice
Date: January 12 – February 13, 2015

Expert E-Consultation on Cyber Security, Justice, and Governance
Date: November 3 – December 3, 2014

Public Events

Keynote Address at the Annual Congress of SIB-Amsterdam (student association for international relations)
Date: May 8, 2015, Amsterdam

Presentation to graduate students of the Institute for Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Date: December 12, 2014, The Hague, the Netherlands

Public Lecture at Leiden University
Date: October 30, 2014, Leiden, the Netherlands

Presentation and Discussion at the European University Institute
Date: November 21, 2014, Florence, Italy
Global Economic Governance and its Importance for Security and Justice with Commissioner Professor José Antonio Ocampo
Date: November 20, 2014, Washington, DC, USA

Public Lecture at the Inaugural Annual Meeting of the United Nations Business for Peace (B4P) Platform
Date: September 29–30, 2014, Istanbul, Turkey

Presentation and discussion with members of the Dutch United Nations Students Association
Date: September 16, 2014, The Hague, the Netherlands

Date: August 26–27, 2014, Washington, DC, USA

Public Lecture at the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University
Date: July 8, 2014, Beppu, Japan
Co-Chairs: Madeleine Albright (former United States Secretary of State) and Ibrahim Gambari (former Nigerian Foreign Minister and UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs)

Commissioners: Haifa Fahoum Al Kaylani (Founding Chair, The Arab International Women’s Forum); Celso Amorim (former Brazilian Minister of Defense and Foreign Relations); Lloyd Axworthy (former Canadian Foreign Minister); Yoriko Kawaguchi (former Japanese Foreign and Environment Minister); Jane Holl Lute (former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and UN Assistant-Secretary-General for the Department of Field Support and Peacebuilding Support Office); Asha-Rose Migiro (Tanzanian Minister of Justice and Constitution Affairs and former UN Deputy Secretary-General); José Antonio Ocampo (former Colombian Finance Minister and UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs); Shyam Saran (former Indian Foreign Secretary and Chief Climate Change Negotiator); Michael Schaef er (BMW Foundation Chairman and former German Ambassador to China); Jozias van Aartsen (Mayor of The Hague and former Dutch Foreign Minister); Erna Witoelar (founder of the Indonesian Environmental Forum); and Wu Jianmin (former Chinese Ambassador to the UN and France).

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In the face of growing mass violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber attacks, the world needs a new kind of leadership combined with new tools, networks, and institutions. In this pathbreaking Report, the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance offers a vision for just security, to ensure that neither justice nor security imperatives are neglected by critical international policy debates in 2015 and beyond. It further presents a bold, yet practical action plan for innovating global governance, and ways to mobilize diverse actors to advance reform to better respond to 21st century threats, challenges, and opportunities.